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SUMMARY. 
On August 1, 1961, the Prime Minister, Dr HF Verwoerd, 
announced that a general election would be held on October 18, 1961, 
eighteen months prematurely. The announcement of the early election 
did not come as a great surprise to most of the opposition parties. 
Although the National Party did not greatly increase its 
representation in parliament, it did win nearly all its seats with 
increased majorities. The Progressive Party suffered a very 
severe reverse with the loss 0£ all but one 0£ its seats in 
parliament. The newly-formed National Union Party also acquitted 
itself very poorly in the election, winning only one parliamentary 
seat. The results 0£ the election helped to strengthen Verwoerd's 
position as leader 0£ the National Party and appeared to vindicate 
his decision to lead South Africa out 0£ the British Commonwealth. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
The 1961 general election has not received much 
publicity over the years possibly because it was overshadowed 
by the referendum of the previous year. It was regarded at the 
time as being a comparatively unexciting election with a 
predictable result and it did not produce any really great change 
in the number of seats held by the National Party (NP) Most 
of what excitement was engendered by the election lay in the 
conflict between the United Party (OP) and the Progressive 
Party (PP). There has also been comparatively little written 
about this election. Stultz and Butler wrote one short article on 
the 1961 election and Kenneth Heard also wrote a chapter about it 
in his study of South African general elections between 1943 
and 1970. In his memoirs entitled My Lewe in die Politiek, 
Ben Schoeman devoted very little space to the 1961 general 
election, and much of what appeared on pages 281 and 282 dealt 
with Japie Basson and the performance of the National Union 
Party (NOP) as well as the way that English-speaking whites 
seemed to have accepted the idea of the republic. In his memoirs, 
Sir de Villiers Graaff devoted only two short paragraphs on 
page 185 to this election in which he mentioned the difficulties 
attached to fighting an election on two fronts against both the 
NP and the PP while simultaneously facing the reality of having 
lost much of the support of the English press. Sir de Villiers 
also discussed the way that the UP regained all but one of their 
seats lost to the Progressives in 1959. 
Memoirs and biographies of PP politicians give a much 
more comprehensive account of the 1961 general election, possibly 
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because it was the first general election ever fought by that 
party as a separate political entity and also because it 
represented such a major political reversal. Ray Swart's 
Progressive Odyssey, Jeremy Lawrence's Harry Lawrence, and 
Helen Suzman's autobiography, In no uncertain terms, all provide 
interesting accounts of the 1961 general election although the 
account in Suzman's autobiography does not pay much attention to 
the Progressive campaign outside her own constituency of Houghton. 
Joanna Strangwayes-Booth's biography of Helen Suzman also provides 
very useful information on the formation and the early years of 
the PP. Dr FA Mouton's thesis on Margaret Ballinger is also very 
interesting and useful, and gives a lucid description of the 
dissension within the ranks of the Liberal Party. Terry Wilks's 
comparatively short biography of Douglas Mitchell describes 
Mitchell's frequent clashes with members of his own party. Some 
readers may, however, regard this biography as being rather skimpy 
on details and too flattering towards Mitchell at times. Catherine 
Taylor's autobiography, If courage goes, gives little detail on 
the 1961 general election. 
Unfortunately Nationalist politicians do not seem to 
be as prolific in writing their autobiographies as do opposition 
politicians. 
particularly 
Ben Schoeman's memoirs are interesting reading, 
as they describe the antipathy felt towards 
Dr Verwoerd by many Nationalist politicians in the early years 
of his premiership. DS Prinsloo's biography of PW Botha naturally 
focuses more on the years of his premiership and does not provide 
much new information on the NP during the period 1958 to 1961. 
Dirk and Johanna de Villiers' biography of Paul Sauer gives a very 
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interesting account of the strained relationship between Sauer 
and Verwoerd. 
There are several useful publications on the history of the 
various parties, including Brian Hackland's thesis on the earlier 
years of the PP, and an Afrikaans study Die Verenigde Party 
Die Groot Eksperiment, edited by Barnard and Marais. This 
latter work is very informative on the dissension that was endemic 
within the UP for much of its existence. Also very useful were Dan 
O'Meara's Forty Lost Years and the book edited by R Schrire, 
Leadership in the Apartheid State. 
This dissertation has a threefold purpose. Its primary 
objective is to determine and describe the course, background and 
significance of the 1961 general election. Its second purpose is 
to analyse the relative position of the political parties in the 
years leading up to the 1961 general election. Thirdly it 
quantifies statistically some of the assumptions made about 
South African politics over the years e.g. the effect of 
delimitation on the successes or defeats of the National and the 
United Parties, the effect of the distribution of the support 
enjoyed by the UP on the fortunes of that party, the strength of 
the NP during various critical elections and the relationship 
between percentage turn-out of voters and support received by 
the UP and the PP. 
In many respects the 1961 general election was not as 
important for the NP as was the 1958 general election. The 
reason for this assertion is firstly that the gains made by 
the NP in 1961 were not nearly as significant or extensive as 
those made in 1958. Furthermore the 1958 general election was 
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most probably one of the most decisive general elections contested 
by the NP as it was in this election that its position became 
virtually impregnable. The UP's hopes of ever being returned to 
office suffered a blow that can be seen as final and irreversible. 
However, the 1961 general election was important in that it was 
probably the first general election in which the NP could 
realistically be described as enjoying the support of more than 
half the white electorate. Despite the optimistic claims made by 
some sections of the Nationalist press after the results of the 
1958 general election had been announced, the NP probably did not 
command the support of half the white electorate in 1958 although 
it came rather close to doing so. In addition the themes of the 
two elections do differ slightly in that in 1961 the Nationalists 
made a much more concerted effort to capture the votes of as many 
English-speaking whites as possible. 
Certain themes are prominent in any study of South 
African politics of this period. One of them is how the UP's 
numerical strength in parliament failed to reflect the full extent 
of its support among the electorate. This was to be a perennial 
source of discontent among UP supporters. In this dissertation 
certain statistical comparisons have been drawn with other general 
elections such as the influence of delimitation on the performance 
of certain parties and the percentage swings required to unseat 
the NP in some general elections. These comparisons provide a very 
interesting perspective on the growth and decline of various 
parties over nearly two decades. Another theme is how certain 
marginal seats made the position of the NP a trifle insecure in 
the early years of its rule and how this situation was remedied by 
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the general election of 1958. Also interesting is the dilermna in 
which the UP found itself for much of its post-1948 history 
whether to adopt a more liberal approach or to attempt instead 
to fight the Nationalists on behalf of its traditionally 
conservative supporters who 
party loyalties. What was 
might have been 
also of great 
wavering 
interest 
in their 
was the 
relationship between the English-language press and the leadership 
of the UP. It was particularly striking how many editors appeared 
to dislike Douglas Mitchell intensely and how even in 1961 some 
editors already seemed disenchanted with the leadership of 
Sir de Villiers Graaff. 
It should be remembered that the voters in South West 
Africa were represented by six members of parliament. Their 
constituencies were, however, determined by a separate 
delimitation cormnission. This dissertation naturally pays much 
more attention to the 150 seats in which white voters in the 
Republic of South Africa cast their votes. The coloureds in the 
Cape Province were represented by three members of parliament, 
who were not elected on the same day as their 156 fellow 
parliamentarians representing white voters in South Africa and 
South West Africa. 
In researching this dissertation I have found the 
newspapers of the period to be invaluable as well as certain 
periodical publications such as Round Table, African Digest, 
and Forum. Much useful material has also been found in the 
archival collections of Harry Lawrence, Oscar Wollheirn, Sydney 
Waterson, and Colin Eglin in the University of Cape Town Library 
as well as the collection of Dr Eben Donges in the provincial 
archives in Cape Town. Useful and interesting information was 
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also gleaned from the various United Party collections in the 
UNISA library. The Progressive Party collections and the Liberal 
Party papers in the William Cullen library at the University of 
the Witwatersrand were also well worth consulting, as was the 
Liberal Party Collection in the Alan Paton Centre at the 
University of Natal. Most archival information concerning the 
National Party during this period came from the various 
collections at the Institute for Contemporary History at the 
University of the Orange Free State. My thanks are due to the 
staff of all these archival repositories for their assistance 
and to my two supervisors, Professor JCH Grabler and 
Mrs BM Theron, for their guidance. 
Some readers might regard general elections as being 
a trivial or inconsequential topic of study, particularly as some 
people might regard white politics or parliamentary politics as 
being somewhat irrelevant in the light of contemporary historical 
events. Nevertheless general elections are a very interesting and 
fruitful field of research as they provide fascinating revelations 
on the attitudes held at various times by certain political 
parties as well as the white population of the time. Thus, even 
though while not nearly as momentous as, for example, the 1948 
general election, the 1961 general election was an interesting 
contest. In the late 1950s, Professor GHL le May of the University 
of the Witwatersrand regarded the state of election analysis in 
South Africa as "abysmal", but hopefully this situation is in the 
process of being remedied. 1 
1 B Murray, WITS the open years ( Witwatersrand University 
Johannesburg, 1997 ), p 258. 
Press, 
CHAPTER ONE. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE 1958 GENERAL ELECTION. 
The deteriorating position of the United Party after 1948. 
It would not be an exaggeration to state that the results 
of the 1948 general election came as a great if not overwhelming 
surprise to the majority of South Africans. Although the National 
Party (NP) had scored significant successes in several by-elections 
leading up to the general election in May 1948, most observers and 
participants in both political camps did not expect the NP and its 
ally, the Afrikaner Party (AP), to come to power. The historian, 
Newell Stultz, states that "neither Malan nor Smuts appears to 
have anticipated that the HNP would increase its parliamentary 
representation by more than, at the outside, twenty seats at the 
general election of 1948." 1 
Ben Schoeman, in his memoirs, also recounts that about 
a week before polling day in May 1948, he, JG Strijdom, 
HF Verwoerd, and Jan de Klerk held discussions concerning the 
results that they expected. They were all convinced that the 
Nationalists would do far better than they had fared in the 
previous general election but none of them thought that the 
NP would possibly win the election. 2 
The reason for this emphasis on the shock and 
unexpectedness of the NP's victory is that it shows on the one 
hand how uninformed the NP leaders were concerning the strength 
of their party and on the other hand a certain inability on the 
1 
2 
NM Stultz, The Nationalists in Opposition 1934 1948 
( Pretoria & Cape Town, 1974 ) , p 131. 
BJ Schoeman, My lewe in die politiek (Johannesburg, 1978 ), 
p 144. OF Malan's expectations that the UP would remain in 
power are discussed in PW Coetzer ( ed ), Die Nasionale Party, 
deel 5, ( Bloemfontein, 1994 ) , pp 639 - 640. 
part of many 
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senior members in the United Party (UP) 
hierarchy to realise the strength of the NP. There was also a 
disinclination to identify and address many of the UP's own 
weaknesses and problems. There was thus a tendency in certain 
quarters in the UP to think that the NP's victory was only a very 
temporary aberration and that the UP might soon be returned to 
office. Harry Lawrence, for example, when asked by a journalist 
from the Rand Daily Mail how long he thought it would be 
before the Nationalists would be forced out of office, replied, 
"It may take as long as two years." 3 
Even a cursory inspection of the statistics relating to the 
general election of 1948 will show how narrow the Nationalist 
victory was and how tenuous its position was to be in its first 
few years in office. In the 1948 general election the NP and its 
electoral partner, the Afrikaner Party, together polled 442 038 
votes in the contested seats, while the UP polled 515 273 votes. 
In addition the UP won 11 uncontested seats while the NP won only 
one uncontested seat. 4 
The NP-Afrikaner Party alliance won a total of 79 seats 
whereas the UP together with the Labour Party won 71 seats. The 
UP could normally also rely on the support of the three Natives' 
Representatives who were elected to parliament to represent the 
interests of the black people in the Cape Province. Thus, the 
NP-Afrikaner Party alliance had an effective majority of only 
five seats in parliament. 
The weakness of the NP's parliamentary position after the 
1948 general election is further shown by the fact that the NP 
3 J Lawrence, Harry Lawrence, ( Cape Town & London, 1978 ) , p 221. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika 1910 - 1976 
( Pretoria, 1977 ), p 301. 
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and the Afrikaner Party had captured 23 of their 79 seats with 
less than 55 % of the total number of votes cast. 5 This is 
striking evidence of the precarious position of the NP-AP 
alliance in parliament. It also accounts for the NP's necessity 
to allocate six new seats to South West Africa in 1950. 
With the 1953 general election approaching, the UP could 
possibly be excused for thinking that it had a reasonably good 
chance of regaining the position it had lost in 1948. We can gauge 
the level of optimism in some sections of the UP at this time by 
the fact that the leader of the UP, JG Strauss, in discussing the 
cabinet that he would be forming after the expected UP victory 
in 1953, actually asked Sir de Villiers Graaff which portfolio he 
would like to hold. 6 
In the general election of 1953 the NP won a further 
nine seats in the Union as well as the six seats that had been 
allocated to South West Africa in 1950. While this was a 
considerable setback for the hopes of the UP, the position of 
the NP was still not particularly secure. The NP now had 94 seats 
in the House of Assembly and faced a parliamentary opposition that 
consisted of 57 UP seats, five seats held by the Labour Party and 
three seats held by the Natives' Representatives. 7 
The insecurity of the NP's parliamentary position after the 
1953 general election can be shown by the fact that it had won 
nineteen seats with less than 55% of the total votes cast and a 
swing of slightly less than ten percent from the NP would have 
5 
6 
7 
BM Schoeman, 
pp 282 - 300. 
Parlementere verkiesings 
De Villiers Graaff, Div looks back 
Johannesburg, 1993 ), p 141. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in 
in Suid-Afrika, 
Cape Town & 
Suid-Afrika, p 333. 
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been required to oust the Nationalists from off ice - a significant 
improvement from its position after the 1948 general election but 
still one that would have troubled the Nationalist hierarchy. 8 
In the 1958 general election the NP won 97 seats in the 
Union itself and a further six seats in South West Africa. The 
Labour Party did not manage to win any seats and the UP won 53 
seats. Thus the NP's parliamentary strength increased by nine 
members while the UP's had decreased by four. The three seats held 
by the Natives' Representatives had not yet been abolished and 
there were four seats that were allocated to the representatives 
for the coloureds. The Nationalists thus now had a majority of 43 
seats in parliament. 9 
The Nationalists found much cause for jubilation in their 
increased representation in parliament and they could also 
congratulate themselves on becoming much more firmly entrenched 
in the constituencies which they had won. There were now only 
seven constituencies in which the Nationalists had won less 
than 55% of the total votes cast. They were Boksburg, Fort 
Beaufort, Hottentots-Holland, Kimberley South, North West Rand, 
False Bay, and Vereeniging. 10 
As can be readily seen, the significance of the 1958 general 
election lies partly in the fact that it strengthened the position 
of the NP to the extent that it would be virtually unassailable 
for many years. It indicated incontrovertibly to the UP that its 
electoral fortunes would henceforth be almost permanently on the 
wane. This general election was therefore a watershed for the NP 
8 
9 
10 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 316 
333. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 346 
365. 
Figures calculated from BM Schoeman, 
verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 346 - 365. 
Parlementere 
-
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And a mortal blow to any hopes that the UP may have entertained 
for an electoral revival in its favour. 
An assessment of the support given to the National Party by the 
electorate in the 1958 general election. 
zThe fact that the UP won 24 uncontested seats in the 1958 
general election while the NP won no such seats, makes it 
difficult to determine precisely the extent of the NP's popular 
support throughout the Union. Nevertheless it is a valuable and 
interesting exercise to calculate whether the UP's claim that it 
represented more voters than the NP, was still valid after the 
NP's enhanced electoral successes. 
After the 1958 general election The Cape Times claimed 
that the NP still had less support than the UP. It declared that 
even if the "most conservative possible allowance" were to be 
made for the unopposed seats, the NP had obtained at least 15 500 
fewer votes than those polled by the UP and a minimum of 25 800 
less than those polled by the opposition parties. This figure 
would increase to 36 800 if the votes in the coloured elections 
were to be included. 11 The NP polled 625 629 votes in the Union 
and 16 390 votes in South West Africa. The UP obtained a total of 
492 071 votes in the Union and 11 568 votes in South West 
Africa. 12 
The political reporter for the Eastern Province Herald, 
Donald Prosser, calculated that had all the seats been contested, 
the UP would have polled 709 746 votes and the NP 682 668. The UP 
11 
12 
Cape Times, 19 April 1958. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, p 365. 
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would thus have had a majority of 27 078 excluding the majorities 
it would have obtained in the coloured seats. These figures were 
reached by assuming that the 5 639 votes obtained by the Liberal, 
Labour and Christian Democratic Parties would probably have gone 
to the UP while the 4 723 votes won by the South African Bond, 
Independent Conservatives, Republicans and Independents would 
have been expected to go to the NP. In addition it was assumed 
that the nationwide percentage poll of 89,61 % would also have 
applied to the uncontested seats and that the Nationalists would 
have obtained fifteen percent of the votes cast in the uncontested 
constituencies won by the UP. The reporter stated that this 
assumption would give the Nationalists an average of slightly 
more than 1 400 votes in the uncontested seats which was 
"more than generous". In support of this, Prosser cited the case of 
the contest in Kensington where the Nationalist candidate had 
polled only 1 166 votes to the UP candidate's 8 234. Prosser argued 
that one of the reasons for the UP's lack of success was the new 
delimitation "which favoured the Government in most seats", and 
he mentioned the example of the constituency of Hottentots-Holland 
which had seen the removal of the safe UP area of Somerset West, 
which had then been added to the safe NP constituency of 
Stellenbosch. 13 
In the contested constituencies in the Union, the NP 
received 133 558 more votes than the UP and similarly in South 
West Africa it obtained 4 822 votes more than the UP. Thus the 
Nationalists polled 138 380 votes more than the UP. 14 
In assessing the overall strength of the NP at this time, 
13 
14 
Eastern Province Herald, 19 April 1958. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, p 365. 
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the situation is complicated by the fact that there were seven 
constituencies that the UP won against parties other than the NP. 
It is thus difficult to determine exactly how many votes the NP 
would have been able to muster in these constituencies. These seats 
were Hospital, Cape Town Gardens, Natal South Coast, Orange Grove, 
Pietermaritzburg District, Sea Point, and Von Brandis. From the 
fact that in these seven constituencies there were only 13 712 
votes in favour of a republic in the 1960 referendum, it is a 
reasonable assumption that the NP would most probably have had 
fewer than 13 712 supporters in these constituencies in the 1958 
general election. This assumption is naturally somewhat generous 
towards the Nationalists. 15 
For the UP to support its claim that it represented more 
voters than did the NP, it would have to be sure that in a contest 
with the Nationalists in the 24 uncontested seats that it won, it 
would obtain enough of a majority to counter-balance the 
Nationalists' majority of 138 380 plus the 13 712 votes 
represented by the previously mentioned seven constituencies 
i.e. 152 092. According to the official results of the 1960 
referendum, there were 46 376 votes in favour of a republic and 
233 176 votes against a republic in these 24 uncontested seats 
i.e. a majority of 186 800 votes against the proposal. 16 
This argument naturally rests on the assumption 
that votes in favour of a republic in 1960 would most likely be 
cast by supporters of the NP while votes cast against the republic 
in 1960 probably represented those who supported the UP in 1958. 
15 
16 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 376 - 386. 
Ibid. 
Page 8 
In comparing these two figures i.e. the majority of 186 800 votes 
cast in 1960 in the uncontested seats against a republic and the 
152 092 votes that would have represented the Nationalist majority 
in 1958, we should remember two important facts. The first is that 
the number of eligible voters increased considerably between the 
1958 general election and the 1960 referendum. Secondly, the 
percentage turn-out of the electorate in the referendum in 1960 
was appreciably higher than that of eligible voters in the 1958 
general election. Such a comparison is understandably rather 
inconclusive and it is thus very difficult to determine which of 
the two parties had the greater popular appeal. However, it would 
appear that the UP still enjoyed a slight majority in 1958. 
Some may argue that such calculations or hypotheses 
are too speculative or vague to have any historical value but 
they do help us to understand why the UP would have felt extremely 
despondent and frustrated at such a disparity between the total 
number of votes that they had won and their position in parliament. 
A very interesting view of the 1958 election was 
given by Professor JL Sadie of the University of Stellenbosch. 
In an article in Die Burger, he claimed that the NP had lost a 
certain amount of support among Afrikaans-speaking voters and 
that the Nationalist election victory was due to demographic 
factors rather than to conversion. He also believed that the 
effect of the NP's propaganda had been limited to preventing a 
change in the political affiliations of those who had supported 
the party in the previous general election and that the decisive 
factor in the election was the difference in the rate of increase 
of the two main white language groups. He devoted some attention 
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to the effect of the proposed enfranchisement of the white 
eighteen-year-olds and believed that by the time of the 1963 
general election, the number of Afrikaans-speaking voters 
over the age of 21 
English-speaking voters 
would exceed 
by 223 900. 
the comparable number 
Should the franchise 
of 
be 
granted to the eighteen-year-olds, then the difference would be 
270 400 i.e. an increase of 46 500 more votes. Sadie was, however, 
of the opinion that such a lowering in the age requirement for 
the franchise would lead to the Nationalists winning only one new 
seat, namely Queenstown. 17 
The National Party's reaction to the general election results. 
At a victory celebration in Pretoria on 22 April 1958, 
t~ Prime Minister, JG Strijdom, delivered a fiery and 
uncompromising speech in which he described the NP's reaction 
to the election results and its view of South Africa's political 
future. Strijdom stated that the result of the election was "a 
very decisive reply to the outside world and to those people, who 
without any real knowledge of the circumstances, are continually 
poking their noses into our affairs.'' He condemned the UP, its 
colour policy and its Senate Plan, stating that the electorate had 
shown that it would not tolerate a party that preached ''a policy 
of integration of Black with White". In giving his opinion of the 
UP's Senate Plan, Strijdom stated that, "Never in the history of 
our country has anything more nefarious and traitorous been 
hatched against the White man than this abominable U.P. Senate 
17 Die Burger, 29 August 1958. 
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Plan." He also attacked the opposition press and said that 
although some of its newspapers pretended that they supported 
cooperation between the two white language groups, they were in 
reality busy sowing the seeds of opposition among English-speaking 
people to such a policy. What was perhaps the most significant 
part of Strijdom's speech was his statement that the cooperation 
between English and Afrikaans speaking whites, which was an 
absolute necessity for South Africa, would not be fully achieved 
until South Africa became a republic, and as he expressed it, 
"Daarom voorwaarts ... Burgers van Suid-Afrika na ons einddoel en 
bestemming sander vrees en sander aarseling 1 " 18 
The UP'S Senate Plan will be discussed more 
comprehensively elsewhere but it should be mentioned that it 
intended to reduce the enlarged Senate from 89 to 50 members, 
twelve of whom would be elected by voters other than whites, and 
in which both the representatives of the whites and the blacks 
would be able to veto any important measures that were detrimental 
to their interests. 19 Barnard and Marais describe the Senate Plan as 
being so complicated that the average voter could comprehend it 
only with difficulty. 20 
The results of the 1958 general election made the 
NP feel much more secure in office. They were able to disregard 
the parliamentary opposition more than before. The results 
reinforced the NP in its conviction that the electorate was highly 
susceptible to a strongly right-wing and aggressive style of 
18 
19 
20 
Central Archives, Pretoria (hereafter CA), A2, JG Strijdom 
Collection, vol 132, pp 203 - 218. 
KA Heard, General elections in South Africa 1943 - 1970 
(London, 1974 ), p 76. 
SL Barnard & AH Marais, Die Verenigde Party - Die Groot 
Eksperiment (Durban & Pretoria, 1982 ), p 102. 
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government and electioneering. The fact that it had at the very 
least polled only slightly fewer votes than the UP, was a powerful 
encouragement for it to take concrete steps to establish a 
republic. The Nationalists also knew that the proposed 
enfranchisement of eighteen-year-olds would work very appreciably 
in its favour. Those Nationalists who still feared a possible 
resurgence or revival of the UP's influence were reassured by that 
party's much poorer performance at the polls and its inability to 
decide where it stood on various important issues - an inability 
which was to be seen repeatedly in the way that the UP spoke with 
one voice to its supporters in the rural areas and with another 
voice to those in the urban areas. 
The United Party's reaction to the 1958 general election results. 
The results of the 1958 general election exacerbated the 
already hostile relationship between the liberal and conservative 
wings of the UP - a situation that had been apparent for several 
years. The conservatives within the UP felt that the liberal wing 
of the party had cost them a great deal of their traditional 
support and that their only chance of regaining that support lay 
in adopting a policy that would appeal to the electorate's sense 
of "swart gevaar" i.e. the idea that the blacks posed a 
considerable threat to the whites ) and desire for segregation 
and white domination. This was not a new feeling. In 1955 for 
example, Senator Jack Connan, later to become the leader of the UP 
in the Cape Province, had warned the Cape Head Committee that the 
UP would lose all its support in the rural areas of the Cape 
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should they support the re-enfranchisement of the coloureds. 21 
Similarly, Sir de Villiers Graaff said that he 
would not allow the liberals in South African politics to 
influence him detrimentally again. This, he told Colin Eglin, 
then MP for Pinelands, in an interview in which they discussed the 
election results and what they portended for the UP and South 
African politics. 22 
Ray Swart also describes quite strikingly how the results 
of the 1958 general election propelled Sir de Villiers Graaff in a 
much more conservative direction. After the election Swart had a 
discussion with Graaff in which he told him how disappointed he 
was that the UP was becoming more conservative and drifting 
towards the Nationalists. Graaff pointed to a drawer in his desk 
and told Swart that in it were scores of letters from supporters 
in the rural areas who had expressed their concern at what they 
perceived to be 'liberal' trends in the UP, ideas they were not 
prepared to support. Graaff told him that he would not risk 
large-scale defections from the UP and the possible disintegration 
of the party by allowing it to become more liberal. As far as he 
was 
of 
on 
and 
21 
22 
23 
concerned the UP had gone as far to the left on the question 
racial policy as its supporters would tolerate. 23 
Thus the most important effect of the 1958 general election 
the UP was probably to hasten the clash between the liberal 
conservative wings of the party. This was to culminate in 
J Strangwayes-Booth, A cricket in the thorn tree (London, 1976 ), 
p 99. The coloureds were removed from the common voters roll in 
1956 after a very long and acrimonious parliamentary struggle. 
SL Barnard & AH Marais, Die Verenigde Party, p 105. 
R Swart, Progressive Odyssey (Cape Town & Johannesburg, 1991 ), 
p 45. 
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the dramatic break-away of the liberal wing from the UP in 
Bloemfontein in 1959, propelling the party in an even more 
conservative direction. 
The reaction of the press to the results of the 1958 general 
election. 
Because the press played a very important role in South 
African politics, the reactions of the various newspapers to 
the results of the 1958 general election are worth recording 
briefly. Some of the Afrikaans newspapers saw the election 
results as a partial vindication of the idea that Afrikaans and 
English-speaking whites should draw and were drawing closer 
together. Die Burger maintained that Afrikaner Nationalists 
saw their English-speaking fellow citizens as potential colleagues 
in the building and preservation of a white nation. According to 
the newspaper the great majority of Afrikaans and English-speaking 
whites had a similar outlook on South Africa's racial question. 24 
Die Transvaler was of the opinion that the election 
results confirmed the NP's policy of cooperation between the two 
white language groups on the basis of equal rights and "South 
Africa First". According to this newspaper, the Nationalist 
government had shown that the language, culture, rights and 
assets of all the "volksdele" were safe under its rule. Those 
English-speakers who opposed the Nationalists should not feel 
downhearted at their defeat because, as the newspaper expressed 
it, "As Suid-Afrika wen, kan hulle nie verloor nie." 25 
24 
25 
Die Burger, 18 April 1958. 
Die Transvaler, 18 April 1958. 
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In an article entitled, "Graaff se bydrae tot die ramp", the 
political correspondent for Die Burger accorded Graaff partial 
blame for the UP's poor performance. It blamed him for the 
unpopular Senate Plan and the UP's promise to restore the 
coloureds to the common voters' roll with unspecified higher 
requirements for new voters. The reporter saw Graaff as being a 
"reklarnebeampte" advertising agent ) rather than a leader and 
described him as damaging his image by allowing himself to be 
portrayed in advertisements that did not show him to advantage, 
were "cheap" or gave the impression that he lacked political 
weight. 26 
Die Volksblad came to the conclusion that the NP had won 
the general election because it had fought the election on the 
basis of clearly defined principles without resorting to political 
opportunism or the making of unrealistic promises. The newspaper 
seemed to echo the sentiments of Dr DF Malan when it stated that 
the NP had to bring together all those who as a result of their 
own convictions, belonged together. In discussing the role and 
performance of the UP, the newspaper claimed that the process of 
disintegration could not be reversed and that the influence of the 
conservatives had waned while that of the liberals had increased. 
It prophesied that thousands of conservative UP supporters would 
reject the UP as a result of the growing liberal influence and 
that these voters would then find a home within the NP. 27 
The opposition newspapers generally took a gloomier view of 
the election results. The Cape Times wrote that the NP had won a 
26 
27 
Die Burger, 22 April 1958. 
Die Volksblad, 18 April 1958. 
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"sectional victory, both in seats and votes", and that no future 
delimitation or "appeal to sectionalism" could make the NP more 
fully represent the Afrikaans-speaking whites or the areas outside 
the cities. 28 
The Eastern Province Herald likewise took a pessimistic 
view of the Nationalist victory, stating that the "Europeans of 
this country" continued to be swayed by their emotions and had 
voted largely from the heart instead of the head. As they were 
protected against "the worst economic shocks", they had not 
discovered the real issues on which elections should be fought. 29 
The Rand Daily Mail took a similar view. The editorial 
was of the opinion that the Nationalists had drawn much of their 
support from ''the twin calls of the blood - to White blood in 
general and Afrikaner blood in particular". 30 
After the results of the general election had been announced, 
the Natal Mercury commented that South Africa had chosen "the 
hard way", and that its decision had been motivated by fear. As 
the Prime Minister had stated, the colour policy of the NP had 
been the "dominant factor" in the election and had undoubtedly 
swayed the floating vote. The fear that had been responsible for 
engendering such support for the Nationalists, would, however, 
breed nothing but despair. 31 
It is worthwhile quoting the opinions of the opposition 
newspapers as they give a very strong indication of how they 
detested the NP and its policies. As the UP was becoming 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Cape Times, 18 April 1958. 
Eastern Province Herald, 18 April 1958. 
Rand Daily Mail, 18 April 1958. 
The Natal Mercury, 18 April 1958. 
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progressively weaker, the role of the opposition newspapers in 
criticising the Nationalists was becoming increasingly important. 
The influence of delimitation on the general election of 1958. 
The 1958 general election was fought on the 1957 
delimitation that was perceived by many opposition supporters as 
manifestly favouring the Nationalists. The British journal, 
The Economist, commented sarcastically on the influence of 
delimitation when it wrote : 
After the South African election, the prime minister, 
Mr Strydom, gave thanks to the Creator for willing the 
government's victory. He failed, however, to express any 
public gratitude to three gentlemen whose contribution to 
the triumph was far less disputable : the members of the 
Delimitation Commission. Had the election been fought on 
the 1953 boundaries, his 70 000 extra votes would have 
brought him only three more seats : on the new 
delimitation, he gained a resounding nine." 32 
After the election there was some dissatisfaction in 
opposition circles about the system of delimitation which in some 
people's eyes unduly favoured the rural areas and the NP. 
Die Burger entered the dispute with an editorial which made 
an issue of the discrepancies in the size of some of the 
constituencies in Canada and the United Kingdom, claiming that 
these were far greater than those found in South Africa. It cited 
several constituencies in Canada such as York-Scarborough, 
York-Centre and Mercier with populations of 167 310, 127 591 and 
124 913 respectively, which were far greater than other 
constituencies such as Isles-de-la-Madeleine and Kings with their 
populations of 11 566 and 17 853 respectively. 33 
32 
33 
The Economist, 10 May 1958. 
Die Burger, 22 April 1958. 
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This apparently biased electoral system was discussed 
in a column "An Afrikaner's Diary", in The Star. The columnist 
mentioned that the Conservative Party in Canada had recently 
managed to win 208 of the 265 seats in Parliament by polling 
only 53 % of the votes cast. 34 
The South African columnist for The Round Table also 
expressed himself very sarcastically on the discrepancies of the 
South African electoral system. 35 He wrote : 
Whatever the distribution of votes, there is no questioning 
one fact - that South Africa must have achieved some sort of 
world record for electoral anomalies. With the same number 
of votes, one party gets 103 members, the other 53. In this 
election, it required 13 053 United Party votes to elect one 
United Party member and 6 566 Nationalist votes to elect one 
Nationalist member." 
The British psephologist, RR Farquharson, quotes the situation in 
the new Kimberley North seat 
Though even an impartial delimination would thus preserve 
some disparity, the Commission has not gone out of its 
way to remove anomalies, and has indeed introduced some 
new ones. The salamander-shaped constituency which 
immortalised Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts could not 
be more bizarre than the new seat of Kimberley North. 
The old seat was compact, urban and United Party the 
new is 97 miles long, and achieves a Nationalist Party 
majority by the inclusion of a thin, wriggly swathe of 
countryside. On the map it looks like something between a 
triffid and a Scotsman with a tam o' shanter. 
The Eastern Province Herald also had some harsh words 
on the delimitation. It cited Fort Beaufort in which strongly 
UP areas such as Cathcart and Stutterheim had been removed and 
added to the safe UP seat of King William's Town. The strongly 
Nationalist areas of Cookhouse, Alicedale and Alexandria had 
then been added to it, resulting in a NP victory. 37 
34 
35 
36 
37 
The Star, 23 April 1958. 
The Round Table, June 1958. 
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It is therefore quite clear that delimitation 
will always be a very important factor and in a closely fought 
election, even a decisive one. It is also easy to note why it 
has always been such a contentious topic in South African 
politics. 
Reasons for the success of the NP in the general election. 
Besides the delimitation of constituencies during the 
1950s another demographic factor that favoured the NP was the 
preponderance of Afrikaans-speaking whites in the younger age 
groups of the population. This was clearly shown by the census 
of 1951. For every 1 000 English-speaking whites in the age-groups 
40 44, 45 - 49, 50 - 54, and 55 - 59, there were 1 107, 1 050, 
1 027, and 1 175 Afrikaans-speaking whites respectively. In the 
age-groups 10 - 14, 15 - 19, 21 - 24, and 25 - 29, for every 1 000 
English-speaking whites there were 1 900, 1 941, 1 730, and 1 450 
Afrikaans-speaking whites. 38 
As the NP drew the great mass of its support from the 
ranks of the Afrikaans-speaking whites, it can be readily 
understood from these statistics why the NP's electoral fortunes 
continued to improve after it came to power. This was undoubtedly 
a crucial factor in the 1958 general election, when most of the 
whites in the age group 15 - 19 would have been eligible to vote 
for the first time. 
The NP was also assisted in the 1958 general election 
by the fact that it was a very cohesive and unified party under a 
38 Department of the Interior, Census Report for 1951, vol 6, 
pp 50 - 64. 
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leader who was seen as dynamic and uncompromising. There were 
undoubtedly some minor tensions within the NP at this time. 39 
Nevertheless, any attempts by the English-language press to 
create the impression of disunity in Nationalist ranks were 
largely unsuccessful. 
To boost its own popularity the Nationalists had adopted 
election tactics that were intended to convince the electorate 
that the UP was ineffectual, irresolute and incapable of 
protecting the interests of the whites. It was alleged that 
policies such as the Senate Plan would lead to chaos, black 
domination and disaster. This strategy was to prove particularly 
effective. Prime Minister JG Strijdom, for example, at a meeting 
in Pretoria on 10 April 1958, attacked the UP's policy of 
integration that had been set out at its Union Congress in 
November 1954. He alleged that demands to extend political rights 
to other race groups were an inevitable and historical consequence 
of the increase in the economic power of such groups and that the 
UP would therefore have to adopt certain measures to acknowledge 
this. In his view this could have only one outcome full and 
equal rights with the white man. 40 
The NP also circulated a pamphlet during the campaign, 
portraying the UP's Senate Plan as virtually an act of treason 
towards the white man. Headed "The U.P.'s Senate Plan", it was 
rather dramatically sub-titled : "A dagger into the heart of white 
South Africa". It stated that this plan would give the twelve 
representatives of the "non-whites" the ability to control the 
39 
40 
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balance of power " that is why we accuse the U.P. of giving 
with their diabolical plan the non-whites a complete stranglehold 
on the whites". Those who voted for the UP were voting in favour 
of placing the coloureds in the Cape Province back on the same 
voters' roll as the whites. 41 
In interviews with the Cape Times, several successful 
Nationalist candidates explained the reasons for the NP's success. 
Otto du Plessis, the successful candidate for Stellenbosch, 
commented that greater numbers of English-speaking whites had 
voted for the NP than had been the case in 1948 or 1953 and this 
was due to a greater acceptance of the party's policies on colour 
and republicanism. Voters no longer saw republicanism as a "bogy" 
and accepted that a republican form of government would 
undoubtedly bring "greater national unity, and that it need not 
affect good relations with our friends overseas." In his view the 
success of the NP had brought a republic much closer. Jan Haak, 
who won the Bellville seat for the NP, expressed his belief that 
the Senate Plan had cost the UP much support as the voters thought 
that it posed a danger to the whites in South Africa. 42 
Harry Oppenheimer identified the chief factors for 
the success of the Nationalists as their ability to identify their 
party with "the special cultural aspirations and pride of the 
Afrikaans-speaking majority of the population", and also the 
widespread belief that the UP did not have the ability or will to 
"maintain European supremacy in South Africa". He thought that the 
election showed a "determination not to accept or compromise with 
41 
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the forces of Black nationalism". This outlook was also shared by 
many South Africans who had not voted for the Nationalists. 43 
Bernard Friedman, former MP for Hillbrow, wrote a 
very discerning article for the Rand Daily Mail in which he 
ascribed the Nationalists' victory to their appeals to "colour 
prejudice", and its main election theme that "the Nationalist 
Party is not only the true home of the Afrikaner but it is the 
only party that can safeguard his status as a member of the White 
ruling caste. 11 44 
In October 1958 the UP published a booklet for the 
information of speakers from its platforms. Entitled, Information 
Guide and Speakers' Notes, it discussed the 1958 general election 
comprehensively. It stated that NP policy on its own would not 
have been responsible for the increased support it received and 
ascribed the NP success to "careful planning, the indoctrination 
of our children and young people over the years, the exploitation 
of race prejudice and sentiment, both as regards the European and 
non-European races and a favourable distribution of votes". In the 
writer's opinion, the examples of careful planning included the 
two previous delimitations in 1952 and 1957 ; the way that the 
government had raised the requirements for naturalisation, thus 
making it more difficult for Commonwealth citizens to become South 
African citizens the tendency of the government to discourage 
the immigration of Commonwealth citizens, and the fact that in 
1952 an amendment was passed to the Electoral act that had the 
43 
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effect of making it no longer compulsory for voters to register 
a change of address, thus enabling them to vote "selectively". 45 
The NP's ability to appeal to the racial feelings of much of 
the South African electorate undoubtedly paid dividends during the 
1958 general election, and that is why examples of such appeals 
and sentiments have been described in some length in this section. 
The NP also stressed the need to preserve Afrikaner unity and its 
perception that every true Afrikaner belonged in the NP. This was 
a prominent theme in the 1958 general election but one which was 
less heavily stressed in the subsequent election in 1961. So 
strong was this theme that KA Heard entitled his chapter on the 
1958 election "The Tribal Drum", - a reference to an excerpt from 
the Transvaler which stated, "The tribal drum beats for every 
'rasegte' person when the National Party beats the tribal 
drum, it causes a voice to be heard which its people trust". 46 
Writing on the 1958 general election, Edwin Munger paid 
some attention to the way in which the Nationalists appeared to 
be exploiting the language divisions among the whites as well as 
the theme of Afrikaner nationalism. According to him, the NP made 
much use of its theme : "There is no place for the Afrikaner in 
the United Party". Although the UP had tried to counter this 
criticism, claiming that two-thirds of its candidates were 
Afrikaners, the Nationalist press had demonstrated that half the 
"renegade" Afrikaners spoke English at home and that most of them 
sent their children to English schools. He also described how the 
46 
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Nationalists had ridiculed "the somewhat stilted Afrikaans accent" 
of Sir de Villiers Graaff. 47 
Reasons for the United Party's lack of success in the 1958 general 
election. 
As discussed earlier, the UP was affected very detrimentally 
by the delimitation of certain constituencies before the 1958 
general election as well as the increasing percentage of 
Afrikaans-speakers in the white population. What also worked 
against the UP was its long-established tendency to win many 
urban constituencies with large numbers of wasted votes while 
the NP won many of its seats with significantly fewer such 
wasted votes. This tendency is discussed at greater length in the 
section dealing with the statistical comparison of the 1958 and 
1961 general elections. There were several other factors, however, 
that militated against the success of the UP in the 1958 general 
election. 
In the immediate aftermath of the general election 
several UP candidates tried to explain the reasons for their 
party's electoral reverses. One of them, D Gray, the unsuccessful 
candidate for Parow, ascribed the failure of the UP in part to 
the effects of indoctrination in the schools and partly the fact 
that the NP was able to exercise "tight control" in many 
constituencies, which enabled it to exert pressure on its 
supporters and even "indulge in various forms of victimisation". 
Pieter de Kock, who had contested the Bellville constituency for 
the 
47 
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instead that the increase in the NP's majorities was because of a 
"substantial number of new Afrikaans-speaking voters as a result 
of its blatant appeal to Afrikaner sentiment." 48 
The UP was plagued by disunity after the 1953 
general election and this was perhaps the most important reason 
for its lack of success in 1958. In his memoirs, Ray Swart gives 
a very interesting description of how he and many of his future 
fellow Progressives, newly elected to parliament in the 1953 
general election, attended their first caucus meeting in Pretoria 
before the commencement of the parliamentary session and 
encountered the views of the Bailey Bekker group of conservatives. 
These conservatives argued that the party had lost the 1953 
general election partly because of its position concerning the 
coloureds and the common voters' roll. It came as a "shattering 
revelation" to Swart that there were several members of the UP 
caucus who supported the idea that the party should abandon its 
belief that the coloureds should be kept on the common voters' 
roll and that it should try "to do a deal with the Nats". Swart 
identified the five most prominent of these conservatives as 
Bailey Bekker, Blaar Coetzee, Abraham Jonker, Arthur Barlow and 
Frank Waring. Significantly he writes : " But there were 
others, perhaps a little more cautious ( or less courageous ? 
who remained silent, but whose silence was not a silence of 
disapproval." 49 
It is not really relevant to describe in detail the long and 
often tortuous process whereby these conservatives either resigned 
or were expelled from the UP. It will suffice to say that Dr 
48 
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Abraham Jonker, the MP for Gardens, was expelled from the UP in 
the Cape in October 1953 with 96 members of the Cape Provincial 
Head Committee voting in favour of his expulsion and only four 
voting against it. 50 Soon afterwards Bailey Bekker, Frank Waring and 
Blaar Coetzee were expelled from the UP in the Transvaal as "they 
had failed to give the undertakings required by the Head Committee 
of the United Party." 51 
Later, when Arthur Barlow, the MP for Hospital Hill, 
had also been expelled from the UP, a new party came into 
existence the Independent United Party - later to become the 
National Conservative Party, supported by these five former 
members of the UP. In 1954 they were joined by the MP for 
Durban Point, Vernon Shearer, who was expelled from the UP in 
September 1954. 52 
It is worthwhile to examine the motives of the members of 
the Bailey Bekker group as they tend to illustrate the mentality 
and calibre of some of the UP's parliamentarians at the time. 
Undoubtedly they were strongly influenced by the idea that the 
UP was moving in a too-liberal direction and that the great mass 
of the electorate would not accept this. The party's defeat in 
the 1953 general election was seen as a confirmation of this 
belief. Shearer, for example, stressed this when he was presenting 
his case to the Head Committee of the UP, which was considering 
his possible expulsion. He attacked the liberals in the party for 
causing a decrease in popular UP support and he predicted that 
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they would precipitate "the destruction of the Party as an 
effective political force in this country". 53 
Arthur Barlow expressed the opinion that the right wing of 
the UP would save the party and would "leave the Straussites 
barking behind." 54 Abraham Jonker claimed that the UP had become a 
"purely English speaking jingoistic party and had pushed away all 
Afrikaans-speaking people". 55 
The desire for personal political advancement was 
probably a factor which contributed to the disunity and weak 
performance of the UP in 1958. The idea that political advancement 
in the South African context could be achieved only by moving in 
the direction of the Nationalists was expressed succinctly in a 
letter written by Arthur Barlow to his daughter, Joyce Waring, 
in June 1953 : 56 
In this country if you change GO RIGHT. With your 
background the Nats would worship your shrine, before 
long you would have every Nat Minister's wife ( for a 
year or so) backing you .... There is nothing to 
stop you going into a Nat cabinet. You will NEVER 
be able to go into a U.P. cabinet because there 
will never be a U.P. cabinet. 
At this time Barlow was already elderly and clearly nearing the 
end of his political career but he undoubtedly had ambitions for 
the careers of his daughter and son-in-law, Frank Waring. The 
fact that Frank Waring was later to be elevated to the cabinet 
endorses Barlow's view that the Warings would be rewarded for 
changing their allegiances. 
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disunity in the UP. In his memoirs, Graaff recounts how Bailey 
Bekker at one time "was lobbying quite openly" to supplant 
Strauss. According to Graaff, " [ Bekker ] could not stand Strauss 
and I think Strauss felt the same about him, but not so intensely". 57 
In his reminiscences, Miles Warren, MP for King William's 
Town, describes how he clashed with Strauss over certain important 
agricultural issues even before the latter was chosen as leader of 
the UP. Warren blames Strauss for much of the UP's defeat in the 
1953 general election and for its subsequent problems because he 
replaced many of the UP "stalwarts" with "liberals". 58 
Ray Swart considers that the breakaway of the Bailey 
Bekker group "went much further than personal dislike of Mr 
Strauss", as they were "arch-conservatives who were mesmerised 
by the success of the National Party on its ultra-conservative 
ticket". They thought that if they could "do a deal" with the 
Nationalists over the constitutional deadlock, "there might be 
some personal rewards". 59 Zach de Beer was also of the opinion that 
"personal ambition played an important part" in the breakaway 
of the Bailey Bekker group. 60 
The removal of the coloureds from the common voters' 
roll also reinforced the divisions in the UP and there was a great 
deal of equivocation on the precise policy that it should adopt. 
This led to the departure of Bernard Friedman, and at one time 
it appeared that he would be followed by other liberal members 
of the parliamentary caucus. In his memoirs, Graaff blames the 
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left wing of the UP for provoking the issue that led to Friedman's 
expulsion from the UP in 1955. He described how the "left-wingers" 
in the UP asked Strauss to issue a statement that would commit him 
to restoring the coloureds to the common roll if the UP should win 
a general election. Strauss refused, preferring to state that 
while he supported and believed in the common roll, he would do 
what was best for the coloureds at the appropriate time. Graaff 
thought Strauss's position to be a ''sensible one", but after 
Friedman dissented publicly from this position, he was expelled 
from the UP. He did the "honourable thing" by resigning his 
Hillbrow seat, and subsequently he lost the by-election. 61 
Ray Swart, however, thinks that the question of the UP's 
intentions was really one set by the NP together with the five 
"rebels". He describes how the Nationalists devised a simple 
question to be asked repeatedly in parliament in order to 
embarrass the UP : "If, after we have taken the coloured voters 
off the common roll, you are returned to power, will you put them 
back on the common roll ?" The inability of the UP to devise a 
satisfactory answer to this question caused the party considerable 
embarrassment and internal dissent. 62 
After some of the more liberal members of the UP had 
issued a statement in 1955 seemingly contradicting their leader, 
it appeared that another split was imminent. According to Ray 
Swart, the dissenters were himself, Jan Steytler, IS ( "Sakkies" I 
Fourie, Owen Townley Williams, Ronald Butcher, John Cope, Helen 
Suzman, and later, Bernard Friedman. After many conciliatory 
attempts by Harry Oppenheimer and other influential members of 
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the party to find a bridge between the new rebels and the party 
leadership, a compromise statement was agreed upon and issued by 
Strauss. This was acceptable to all the rebels except Friedman, 
whose departure from the party was soon to begin. 63 
In her autobiography, Helen Suzman writes that it 
was the "intervention of the two Harry's Oppenheimer and 
Lawrence"- that averted the split and that persuaded them that 
they should remain in the UP as "a pressure group ... to advance 
liberal values." 64 
Although Friedman was the only member of the liberal group 
to resign from parliament, there was one member of the Provincial 
Council, A Every, the MPC for Port Elizabeth South, who resigned 
from the UP in support of him. 65 
This dispute was in many ways the precursor of the much 
greater breakaway from the UP four years later in 1959. 
There were three significant breakaways from the UP in the 
1950s, the first being the departure of the Bailey Bekker group, 
the second being the resignation of Friedman and Every, while the 
most important one was the schism involving the progressives at 
Bloemfontein in 1959. ) As we have seen, it was only a matter of 
tact and compromise that stopped the departure of one member from 
the UP caucus from becoming a much greater exodus. It also 
heightened tensions between the right and left wings of the 
already highly divided party. Furthermore it showed how confused 
and on the defensive the UP leadership and policy planners had 
become. 
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The extent of the disunity within the UP can be gauged 
by a significant passage in Ray Swart's memoirs. He describes how 
on "a number of occasions" the members of the caucus were still 
engaged in "acrimonious debate" when the Assembly bells had rung 
to begin the day's proceedings. On these occasions Strauss and 
most of the senior members of the caucus would remain to try to 
solve the deadlock while Harry Lawrence would be given the 
responsibility of leading the remaining members of the UP caucus 
in the debate in the assembly. 66 
The removal of the coloureds from the common voters' 
roll in 1956 did not portend a major loss of seats by the UP. 
If a comparison is made of the number of coloured voters on the 
voters' rolls of the various constituencies on 15 April 1953 
with the size of the UP majorities and defeats in the 1953 general 
election, we can observe that only the seat of Cape Flats, held by 
the UP, could possibly have become a marginal seat. In that seat 
the size of the UP majority was 5 853 while the total number of 
coloured voters in the constituency was 5 888. This seat was to be 
abolished in the subsequent delimitation of constituencies. 
However, Port Elizabeth North, Caledon-Bredasdorp, Paarl, and 
Prieska, which were won by the NP with the comparatively small 
majorities of 521 votes, 240 votes, 358 votes, and 779 votes 
respectively, would with the removal of the coloureds no longer be 
marginal seats for the Nationalists. In these constituencies, the 
numbers of coloured voters were 484, 1 083, 2 506 and 448 
respectively. 67 Thus, in numerical terms the removal of the 
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coloureds from the common voters' roll did not have a particularly 
serious impact on the fortunes of the UP in the 1958 general 
election. 
After the defeat of the UP in 1958, doubts were also 
raised as to the quality of Sir de Villiers Graaff's leadership. 
Whereas the NP possessed in Strijdom an astute and forceful 
leader who knew exactly what he wanted, the UP was perhaps less 
fortunate in this regard. Sir de Villiers Graaff's character and 
leadership had an important effect on the UP prior to the 1958 
general election and thereafter. The events and circumstances 
often painful and acrimonious - that led to his replacement 
of JG Strauss as leader of the UP in November 1956, have been 
well described not only by himself, but also by Joanna 
Strangwayes-Booth, and Jeremy Lawrence. 68 
The acrimony caused by the replacement of Strauss undoubtedly 
damaged the UP. His successor, Sir de Villiers Graaff, inherited a 
party that was fraught by dissension and had become even more 
dispirited during his predecessor's period of leadership. The 
election of Graaff was greeted with widespread jubilation among UP 
supporters including the liberals, even though in time he was to 
disappoint that particular group considerably. A personality cult 
began to develop around Graaff soon after his election. The Times 
of London described his election as "marking a significant change 
in the opposition to the present government." It claimed that 
"Fresh vigour was needed and this Sir de Villiers Graaff is well 
qualified to supply". 69 
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Although in later years, the English press began to 
criticise Graaff with increasing severity, his first few years 
as leader marked a period in which he was usually treated very 
kindly by them. It was obvious that the English press expected a 
great deal of Graaff. For example, a review of his leadership 
style at the 1957 Bloemfontein conference was published in a 
regular column in the Cape Argus, entitled "Tavern of the 
Seas" : 70 
The week-end found Cape Town talking about what 
one might refer to as the resuscitated United Party 
[ Div ] can smile at those who attack hi~. 
He has never yet fallen back on the heated personal 
retort which is the badge of the man who lacks 
confidence in policy and in his own leadership. 
The liberal wing of the UP was to be sorely disappointed 
in Graaff. Helen Suzman describes how he had a "devoted following" 
among many ex-servicemen and that everybody assumed that he would 
be an "outstanding leader" but "in no time at all he had thrown in 
his lot with the conservative majority in caucus". She alleges 
that Graaff was "weak and ambivalent" concerning the laws that 
discriminated against blacks, and was critical of his favourite 
advice to the caucus on contentious issues : "when in doubt, 
leave out". 71 
Ray Swart, in his recollections of his political career, 
describes Graaff as being a "middle-of-the-road" man, who fitted 
"neatly, if undramatically, into the leadership role of the UP of 
the late fifties". Swart was rather sarcastic about aspects of 
Graaff's leadership : "His political convictions were difficult 
to assess : he was a white South African patriot, and he disliked 
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the extremism of the Nat racial policies, but if he had deep 
convictions they were often more noticeable in respect of his 
farming operations than his politics." 72 
Zach de Beer was harsher in his judgement of Graaff's 
qualities of leadership. He described him as a man who "worked 
extremely hard, and had immense personal charm", but who 
nonetheless was "without convictions and without vision" on 
racial issues. 73 
SL Barnard is also critical of Graaff's leadership 
abilities. He ascribes Graaff's lack of success in part to his 
"clinically-correct scientifically-based" approach to political 
affairs. This, according to Barnard, did not go down well with 
the Afrikaans voters, whom Barnard described as being extremely 
emotional in political matters. Barnard also cites Vorster's 
description of Graaff as having the problem of talking with the 
same emotional intensity about Newcastle-sickness in chickens as 
about republicanism. 74 
In his article in the Rand Daily Mail, discussing 
the UP's performance in the 1958 general election, Friedman also 
criticised Graaff's leadership style at some length, accusing him 
of adopting the policy of "me-taoism" which had supposedly 
characterised Strauss's tactics in the 1953 general election. 75 
The final reason for the UP's lack of success in the 1958 
general election lay in its vague and contradictory racial policy. 
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The NP often tried to make political capital out of labelling the 
UP as a party of "kaffirboeties" ( negrophiles ) and in the 1958 
general election, some members of the UP tried to turn the tables 
on the Nationalists by trying to label the Nationalists as 
favouring the blacks above the whites in some respects. This drew 
comment from both RR Farquharson and Edwin Munger. 
Farquharson was critical of the UP which he saw as 
trying to increase its "slender Afrikaans support" by "outbidding 
the Nationalist Party" in utterances of a supremacist nature 
while simultaneously supporting racial integration as an economic 
policy. He alleges that the UP, while campaigning among the 
English-speaking electorate, tended to denounce the supposed 
inhumanity of the government's colour policy, but at the same time 
in the rural areas it took a completely different stance and 
accused the government of such actions as favouring blacks over 
whites in the provision of housing, trying to organise the blacks 
to support Nationalist policies, and also permitting the products 
of black industries in the reserves to compete with articles 
produced by whites. 76 
Edwin Munger in his article in Foreign Affairs on the 
1958 general election commented similarly on the UP's attempts 
to satisfy these two widely divergent groups. 77 
The Nationalists naturally exploited this situation. 
Strijdom, for example, at a meeting in the Johannesburg City Hall, 
said that "To the platteland they send men like Marais Steyn, 
Louis Steenkamp and Wolfie Swart of the Free State and others to 
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make speeches that are as Nationalist in substance as any 
Nationalist can make. They sometimes advocate apartheid yes, 
even a republic - and they do so with no other reason than to 
mislead." 78 
Eric Louw, the Minister of External Affairs, dwelt on this 
same theme at a subsequent meeting in Pretoria when he told his 
audience that some liberals in the UP would criticise the 
government for not spending enough on housing for blacks in 
urban slums while other members of the UP would tell their 
meetings in the platteland or in parts of the Witwatersrand 
that the government was spending too much on housing for the 
blacks. 79 
An example of the conservative campaigning of some UP 
members of parliament was provided by Douglas Mitchell, the 
leader of the UP in Natal, who at a meeting at Kimberley alleged 
that the NP government preached apartheid but still followed "the 
lines of economic and Civil Service integration". He mentioned 
that 10 400 vacancies in the civil service had been filled by 
those he described as "non-Europeans" during the previous two 
80 years. 
Certain sectors of the UP appear to have genuinely 
believed that the strategy of trying to be more extreme on the 
racial issue than the Nationalists would bring them a rich harvest 
of votes in the rural areas. As can readily be seen from the 
election results, this strategy proved a dismal failure, and 
increased the polarisation within the UP. It also caused many of 
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its supporters and opponents to view the party with a certain 
amount of scorn and derision . 
The significance of the 1958 general election. 
The 1958 general election was a watershed for both the 
NP and the UP. It reinforced the view held by many Nationalists 
that the way to success at the polls lay in the regular and 
thorough exploitation of the idea of "swart gevaar", and it proved 
to the Nationalist leadership that its racial policies were 
becoming acceptable to a significantly larger portion of the 
electorate. The election results were thus regarded by the 
Nationalist hierarchy as a vindication of its policies which 
encouraged it to pursue its racial policies with unremitting 
vigour. Furthermore the results of the election gave the 
Nationalists a far greater sense of security. They made the NP 
much less susceptible to any adverse swing of support. In addition 
they encouraged the Nationalists to take positive steps to attain 
their long-cherished republican ideal. The fact that nearly half 
of the electorate had supported the NP in the 1958 general 
election, together with the great numerical preponderance of 
Afrikaans-speaking youths in the soon-to-be-enfranchised age group 
of eighteen to twenty-one years, meant that the Nationalists could 
view the future with confidence. 81 
For the UP on the other hand, the results of the 1958 
general election were a shattering blow that was to contribute 
significantly to its gradually waning fortunes in the future. It 
81 GM Carter, The Politics of Inequality, South Africa since 1948 
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was a harsh demonstration of the unpalatable reality that it had 
very little prospect of ever being returned to office. The 
election showed conclusively that the demographics of the white 
South African population and the growing conservatism of the 
South African electorate were to be insuperable barriers to its 
chances of an electoral resurgence. In the short term the 1958 
general election aggravated the already extremely bitter 
within the UP and ended the likelihood that it would ever 
a slightly more liberal position. It is thus not surprising 
feuds 
adopt 
that 
the split which occurred at the 1959 UP congress in Bloemfontein 
came so soon after the 1958 general election. 
CHAPTER TWO. 
PRELUDE TO THE 1961 GENERAL ELECTION 
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1958. 
The three years and six months that followed the general 
election of April 1958 were undoubtedly full of incidents, 
traumatic and otherwise, that also had a profound effect on 
the 1961 general election. They included the death of Advocate 
JG Strijdom, and the election of his successor, Dr HF Verwoerd, 
who wasted no time in putting his unique stamp on the NP. There 
was also a closely-run decision by the white electorate that 
South Africa should become a republic. This was followed by South 
Africa's exit from the Commonwealth under considerable pressure 
from the Afro-Asian bloc. These years saw the realisation by 
many South Africans, after Harold Macmillan's "Winds of Change" 
speech, that South Africa's position in world politics as well as 
its racial policy would be coming under increasingly critical 
scrutiny. South Africa's status in international circles 
deteriorated and severe domestic unrest including much bloodshed 
in various African townships such as Sharpeville and Cato Manor, 
led to the proclamation of several states of emergency and the 
adoption of increasingly firm measures to restore domestic 
tranquillity. 
readjustment 
South Africa also experienced a considerable 
of its relationship with Great Britain, severe 
clashes with various clerical figures and last but not least, 
the attempted assassination of Verwoerd at the Rand Show in 
April 1960. During these years South Africa, the South African 
government and its domestic policies came increasingly under 
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siege. This had a notable and extensive influence on the outcome 
of the 1961 general election. 
The death of Advocate JG Strijdom. 
Soon after the 1958 general election, Strijdom died after 
a lingering illness. Although many newspapers in Great Britain 
expressed a strong dislike of his policies, some admiration was 
expressed for his strong sense of conviction, his perseverance 
and his dogged adherence to what he thought was best for South 
Africa. The influential journal, The Economist, stated that 
"into many a liberal obituary notice in Britain ... there crept 
an uneasy note of respect", and that "There was in the man a 
humanity, however overlaid, and in the politician a realism, 
however belated, which the outside world never really grasped." 1 
The election of Dr HF Verwoerd to the premiership. 
Most probably the most important political event of 1958 
was the succession to the premiership of Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd. 
Verwoerd enunciated his principles and goals unambiguously in a 
broadcast speech soon after his election. He declared that he 
would devote all his energies to establishing a republic in South 
Africa which in his opinion was the only way of unifying the two 
white races in South Africa. The government would afford full 
opportunities to all racial groups "to the extent to which the 
people or groups in various stages were capable". He defended the 
policy of apartheid by saying that "The uninitiated, particularly, 
The Economist, 30 September 1958. 
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do not understand that separation or separate development is based 
on the principle that only in this way can the weak be protected 
from the strong, and the minority be made to feel safe." The 
government, however, should not lose sight of the rights of the 
whites to "everything that they have built up over generations." 2 
The election of Verwoerd was met with gloom and pessimism 
in many quarters overseas. The British Daily Telegraph expressed 
its opinion of the new prime minister in an editorial 
Many have thought that the death of Mr Strijdom would 
reveal from the ranks behind him a less rigid successor as 
Prime Minister of South Africa. The Nationalist Party's 
choice, however, has fallen on the most extreme and 
intransigent candidate, Dr Verwoerd. 3 
The opinion of The Times on Verwoerd's succession to the 
premiership is also relevant because it reflected the views of a 
very significant section of the Conservative "establishment" in 
Great Britain. In describing the early career of the man whom it 
described as "a fanatic of apartheid", it stated that during his 
career as an academic he had acquired "some notoriety" in 1936 
when he protested against the entry into South Africa of Jewish 
refugees from Nazi Germany. According to The Times of London, 
in its review of his editorship of Die Transvaler, he had 
"showed that disregard for the opinion and sentiments of 
opponents which has distinguished his later political career." It 
described his attitude towards the parliamentary opposition as 
2 
3 
Cape Times, 4 September 1958 ; Institute of Contemporary 
History, University of the Orange Free State, ( hereafter 
INCH), PV 93, DR HF Verwoerd Collection, file 1 / 11 / 2, 
Dr Verwoerd se radio toespraak, 3 September 1958. 
Daily Telegraph, 2 September 1958. 
Page 41 
being typified by some recent incidents in which he had refused to 
answer questions about "Africans" on the grounds that no South 
African legislation referred to "Africans'' and that there was 
therefore nothing for him to reply to. The newspaper described 
Verwoerd as being "contemptuous of opposition from outside his 
party and intolerant of opposition from within it". The only 
complimentary remark passed by the newspaper was that he was 
sincere in his idea that apartheid was in the best interests of 
all races. 4 
Time magazine commented that in Verwoerd's eight years 
as Minister of Native Affairs, he had proved himself to be 
"pre-eminent among all the racists crowding the South African 
stage", even though he was "no simple Kaffir-bashing White 
supremacist". The periodical also alluded to Verwoerd's editorship 
of Die Transvaler, and his attacks on "British Jewish 
liberalism". 5 
Helen Suzman said that personally, she would rather have 
had Verwoerd than Donges as Prime Minister. Verwoerd, "admittedly 
is mad, but at least genuinely believes in his mad schemes." 
Furthermore, she thought that it was already difficult to keep 
English-speaking people "politically conscious", and had 
Dr Donges been chosen as prime minister, "they would have lulled 
themselves into a complete coma." 6 
The Sunday Times had some harsh words to say about 
the new Prime Minister. In an editorial in which it described 
him as a "ruthless egotist" with "none of the traditional 
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characteristics of the Afrikaner" and one whom "few Nationalists 
like and all fear", it expressed the opinion that Verwoerd was 
a man to whom compromise was cowardice. He was "a dictator by 
nature with entire faith in his own infallibility." 7 This, then, 
was the man who would lead the NP into the 1961 general election 
and whose character would be made a theme in that election 
campaign. 
The attitude of Great Britain towards South Africa. 
The attitude of the British government towards South 
Africa during this period was somewhat ambivalent. It showed a 
distinct desire to avoid embarrassing incidents while it also 
displayed a certain reluctance to become too closely associated 
with some aspects of the South African government's policies. 
The British Foreign Office naturally did not desire to alienate 
a dominion where Britain had manifold and extensive interests and 
connections, both economic, cultural and historical. The Foreign 
Off ice also realised that the Afro-Asian bloc of nations was 
growing larger and more influential every year, and that this 
bloc, would in conjunction with popular opinion in Britain and 
elsewhere, expect the British government to adopt a much stronger 
attitude to what was seen as gross racial discrimination practised 
openly and unashamedly in South Africa. 
The British government's unwillingness to become embroiled 
in any South African controversy was exemplified by an incident 
involving the Royal Navy in February 1961. The British Admiralty 
issued instructions that three coloured ratings from the aircraft 
7 Sunday Times. 7 September 1958. 
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carrier "HMS Victorious" be landed at Plymouth and another six at 
Gibraltar, so that they would not be on board the ship when it 
docked in Cape Town and Durban on its way to the Far East. The 
Admiralty stated that it had been its practice for some years "to 
try to avoid involving Coloured personnel in visits to South 
Africa", and that the men had been landed to save them from 
possible embarrassment or discriminatory treatment in South 
Africa. The opposition Labour Party in Britain was highly critical 
of this decision, but the Cape Argus in an editorial was of the 
opinion that the Admiralty "may have forestalled the manufacture 
of an incident damaging to South Africa", and that it "may well 
have acted sagaciously and with a keener appreciation of the 
outside world's detestation of racial discrimination of any sort 
than most South Africans possess". 8 
The visit to South Africa by the British Prime Minister, 
Harold Macmillan, and his "Winds of Change" speech in the South 
African parliament in February 1960 brought it home very 
forcefully to many white South Africans that their country was in 
danger of becoming even more isolated than before and that its 
relationship with the United Kingdom was becoming less than 
entirely cordial. Macmillan put his government's position very 
concisely. He told the South African parliament that there were 
some aspects of South Africa's policies which made it impossible 
for Britain to support South Africa without being false to her 
own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men. 
In emphasizing the strong links between South Africa and Great 
Britain, Macmillan pointed out that at the end of 1956 Britain 
8 Cape Argus, 30 January 1961. 
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accounted for nearly two-thirds of overseas investments in South 
Africa. Britain also took a third of South Africa's exports and 
produced a third of South Africa's imports. Macmillan expressed 
the opinion that the great issue in the second half of the 
twentieth century was whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and 
Africa would swing to the East or to the West. However, he 
deplored the boycott that was being planned against South Africa 
and said that it could have only "serious effects on Commonwealth 
relations and trade and be to the ultimate detriment of others 
than those against whom it is aimed." This part of the speech was 
applauded by many of his listeners. 9 
It should also be added that what also annoyed many of the 
Nationalists at this time was the fact that Macmillan's staff 
neglected to give Verwoerd an advance copy of the speech, as was 
customary according to diplomatic protocol. This made it necessary 
for Verwoerd to reply in an impromptu speech. 10 
Verwoerd thanked Macmillan for his frankness and said 
that Britain and South Africa did not often see "eye to eye" on 
the question of how Africa could "be won for the West". He saw 
many inherent dangers in British policies and feared that "they 
might defeat the very objects aimed at." In what was possibly 
the most significant sentence in his speech, he pointed out that 
"Justice to all in Africa did not only mean justice to the black 
man. " 11 
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In his front-page article the reporter for the 
Eastern Province Herald commented on the way various opposition 
members of parliament had described Macmillan's speech as 
"magnificent ... brilliant in its construction ... utterance of a 
statesman". According to the reporter, however, various 
Nationalist members claimed that Macmillan had failed "to 
appreciate the role that the White man was playing in Africa", 
and were delighted that Verwoerd had made it clear that his 
government "would not deviate from its policies no matter what 
the British Government or the rest of the world might have to 
say about them." 12 
An interesting assessment of the South African situation 
in the light of Macmillan's speech was given by a Conservative 
member of parliament, Christopher Chataway. According to him the 
only way to avert disaster in South Africa was "to make the 
Afrikaner see reason". He was of the opinion that the policy of 
apartheid was not simply "a question of naked oppression", but 
that it stemmed from "the unity of a fiercely patriotic people 
and from deeply-held religious beliefs". According to Chataway, 
the only hope of averting disaster lay in the possibility of 
"a crack in the racial solidarity of the Afrikaner people". 13 
Douglas Mitchell, the leader of the UP in Natal, in 
commenting on Macmillan's speech, gave what would have been the 
opinion of many of the conservatives in the UP caucus, when he 
stated that Britain's actions and its "getting out of Africa" 
would not make the white people of South Africa change their 
opinions. They were there to stay. 14 
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The government's views and sense of indignation at the 
speech were typified by a statement issued by Eric Louw. He gave 
the impression that he considered the speech to be motivated 
partly by Britain's concern about the position of the Western 
powers relative to Soviet Russia and her allies in Africa and 
motivated also by criticism of his government both in the British 
press and in parliament. Louw also questioned whether Macmillan 
had the right to criticise the domestic policies of a member of 
the Commonweal th. 15 All in all, Macmillan's speech seems to have 
strengthened the resolve of the Nationalists to stand united 
against the outside world. 
During the early years of Verwoerd's premiership the 
attitudes of many overseas opponents of apartheid tended to 
intensify. This strengthened the "siege mentality" among many 
South African whites and caused some of the English-speaking 
electorate to re-assess their traditional loyalties at the time 
of the 1961 general election. In April 1960 the British House 
of Commons approved a motion by a Labour member of parliament, 
John Stonehouse, that condemned the South African government's 
racial policies as this "was threatening the security and welfare 
of all races in the Union and good relations between members 
of the Commonwealth." Sir Godfrey Nicholson of the Conservative 
Party stated that there was no difference of opinion between the 
Conservatives and Labourites on the aims of the motion but that 
Stonehouse was using "a bludgeon when the finest of precision 
tools was needed." 16 
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During this period there were intermittent calls in 
Britain for a boycott of South African goods but these had very 
little effect on the South African government. For example, in 
December 1959 several anti-South Africa organisations called 
for a month long boycott of South African consumer goods. 17 
The boycott was inaugurated in February 1960 by a mass 
rally in Trafalgar Square and a speech made by Hugh Gaitskell, 
the leader of the British Labour Party. Various Labour-controlled 
local councils affirmed their support of the boycott. 
The Economist claimed that trade boycotts were almost always 
ineffective and usually increased support for the government 
concerned. 18 Approximately a year later, The Economist reported 
that the boycott had failed dismally. 19 
The fulfilment of the Nationalists' republican dream. 
In 1960 the cherished ambition of many Nationalists 
became reality when South Africa was able to declare itself a 
republic. In his broadcast message to the people on 3 September 
1958, soon after becoming Prime Minister, Verwoerd claimed 
that relations between English and Afrikaans-speaking South 
Africans were continuing to improve. He affirmed his belief that 
the "unification of a people could only come about with the 
establishment of a republic in South Africa. He looked forward to 
the "happy day" when they would all be joined together "by a 
17 
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common patriotism into one people with two languages", and when 
political differences would no longer be based on "sentiment" but 
purely on differences of opinion on social and economic 
problems. 20 
On 20 January 1960 Verwoerd announced that a 
referendum would be held in October to decide whether South Africa 
should become a republic. He added that the decision to proclaim a 
republic would rest on a "bare majority" of the votes cast by 
white voters, even if that majority was only "one vote". Later, 
while speaking in parliament on 21 March, Verwoerd said that if 
the government did not manage to receive a bare majority of votes 
in the referendum its next attempt would be to allow the decision 
on South Africa's becoming a republic to be taken by a majority of 
the members of a parliament that was "elected for that 
purpose". 21 
With the benefit of hindsight, Verwoerd's decision to 
hold a referendum on this issue was not surprising. The results 
of the general election in 1958 showed that the number of NP 
voters was now very close to the number of opposition voters. In 
addition the recent enfranchisement of the eighteen-year-olds 
would probably benefit the NP as there was a very high proportion 
of Afrikaans voters in this particular age group. 
The decision to hold a referendum elicited a very 
angry response from the anti-Republicans. The most extreme were 
most probably those gathered around Douglas Mitchell, the 
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leader of the UP in Natal. In a fiery speech in parliament 
on 25 April 1960, Mitchell stated : 
If the Government are going on with their republican 
scheme at the present time and in the present 
circumstances, with the country like this, then 
let them not believe that they are going to bring peace. 
They are going to bring a sword .... And I therefore 
say that if this goes against us, we say in advance to 
the Government and to the Nationalist Party - and we 
say this as South Africans - 'You go and be damned, 
because we will not accept that decision'. 22 
After a rather bitter referendum campaign, the result 
was that 850 458 voters in both South Africa and South West 
Africa had voted in favour of a republic while 775 878 had 
voted against it. This represented a majority of 74 580 votes 
for a republic. The results in certain regions were particularly 
interesting. In the Cape the contest had been very evenly 
balanced with 271 418 votes for and 269 784 votes against a 
republic i.e. a majority of 1 634 votes ) . In the Transvaal 
the pro-republicans won by the comfortable margin of 81 591 
votes with the pro-republican votes numbering 406 632 and the 
anti-republicans numbering 325 041. The contests in Natal and 
the Orange Free State, however, illustrated the extreme regional 
political differences existing in South Africa at the time. In 
Natal there were 135 598 votes against and 42 299 for a republic 
a majority of 93 299 ) . In the Orange Free State there were, 
however, 110 171 votes cast for the republic while only 33 438 
votes against ( a majority of 76 733 ) . 23 
The results of the referendum were manifold. One was 
the considerable increase in the stature of Verwoerd. The outcome 
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of the voting represented the fulfilment of an ideal long held by 
generations of Afrikaners. It would also, in the minds of some 
Nationalists, have removed the resentment that they felt towards 
some of their English compatriots. More emphasis could now be laid 
on Verwoerd's ambition to bring English-speaking whites into the 
ranks of the NP. To many of the anti-republicans, however, the 
results of the referendum were a grievous blow and the 
confirmation of the idea that South Africa was now further on the 
road to becoming an international pariah. It represented yet 
another defeat for the UP and its leadership and would cause some 
soul-searching within the party. It would also be a factor in the 
slow but definite drift of English-speaking whites into the ranks 
of the Nationalists as the republican question would not really 
be an issue in the 1961 general election. 
The attitude of the British Commonwealth and the United Nations 
towards South Africa after becoming a republic. 
The feelings 
towards South Africa 
of other members of the 
were very varied. For example, 
Commonwealth 
before the 
Commonwealth Ministers' conference in April 1960, Sir Robert 
Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, said that he hoped that 
the South African question would not be discussed at the 
conference. Instead he wished to have private talks with the 
South African representatives "to become better informed as to 
what goes on". On the other hand however, Hugh Gaitskell, the 
leader of the British Labour Party, said that he thought that the 
South African government's policies should be discussed during the 
Commonwealth conference as it was a multi-racial association and 
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should in his opinion "accept a principle of non-discrimination 
in race relations.'' 24 
Initially it was expected that despite the dislike 
of its racial policies, South Africa would be allowed to remain 
within the Commonwealth after becoming a republic in October 1960. 
The Commonwealth conference which was to debate the matter was 
to meet on 8 March 1961. In an article in the Sunday Times on 
28 February, the political reporter, Stanley Uys, stated that it 
was very likely that South Africa would be allowed to stay in the 
Commonwealth. Among the reasons advanced for this belief were that 
the expulsion of South Africa would create a dangerous precedent 
which could conceivably lead to the eventual disintegration of 
the Commonwealth. The idea that a possible expulsion of South 
Africa would lead to Verwoerd's throwing "restraint to the winds" 
with very unpleasant repercussions for the blacks in South Africa 
was another possibility. There was also the consideration that 
Macmillan was not in favour of expelling South Africa from the 
Commonwealth. Uys also felt that should Eric Louw be "handling the 
conference on South Africa's behalf, we would be as good as out of 
the Commonwealth right now." 25 
A report in the Sunday Times of 5 March 1961, stated 
that South Africa had a "50-50" chance of staying in the British 
Commonwealth and expressed the opinion that while there was 
"little danger of a summary act of expulsion", there was the 
possibility that South Africa might be "forced to walk out of 
the Comrnonwealth 11 • 26 
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great 
In his autobiography, Macmillan recounts how he went to 
lengths to keep South Africa within the British 
Commonwealth. Early in August 1960 he appealed to Verwoerd to 
postpone the referendum which was set for October as he thought 
this would avert a possible crisis in the Commonwealth. Macmillan 
also wrote to the Prime Minister of Australia, Sir Robert Menzies, 
asking him if he could possibly persuade Verwoerd to postpone the 
referendum or alternatively to help persuade the Afro-Asians that 
the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth would be of 
"no benefit to the non-White population of the Union." Macmillan 
writes that in the early months of 1960 he was encouraged when 
both Nkrumah of Ghana and Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia, stated 
that they would not "force the issue" of South Africa's continued 
membership of the Commonwealth, but that he was discouraged when 
Diefenbaker informed him that Canada could not be counted upon 
for support in this regard. This attitude was described by 
Macmillan as being "holier than thou". Nevertheless, when the 
conference opened at Lancaster House on 8 March 1961, Macmillan 
was optimistic that there seemed to be a "fair chance" of finding 
a way out of what seemed to be a serious impasse. 21 
After much criticism of South Africa's policies at the 
Commonwealth conference, Verwoerd withdrew South Africa's 
application to remain a member of the Commonwealth. In a special 
message to South Africa from London on 16 March 1961, he said 
that it had been his firm intention to retain Commonwealth 
membership but that "almost from the beginning of 
discussion", it had become clear that the Prime 
27 H Macmillan, Pointing the way, pp 285 - 297. 
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Canada and the Afro-Asian group had been determined to make it 
difficult for South Africa to do so. According to Verwoerd 
the attitude of these countries had made it impossible for South 
Africa to remain a member of the "changed Commonwealth". After 
some consultations with Louw and Macmillan, he had decided to 
withdraw South Africa's application, not only in the interests 
of South Africa but also in the interests of "the United Kingdom 
and the older members of the Commonwealth". He could not allow 
them to be placed in "the invidious position of having to choose 
between groups". Verwoerd concluded his message by saying rather 
optimistically that he was sure that relations between South 
Africa and the United Kingdom and "other friendly member states" 
would perhaps be placed on an even better and "more mutually 
beneficial footing than before". 28 
Verwoerd's remarks in the communique withdrawing 
South Africa's application for membership were nothing if not 
forthright and hard-hitting. The second sentence stated, "No 
self-respecting member of any voluntary organisation could, 
however, in view of what is being suggested and the degree of 
interference being shown with what are South Africa's domestic 
affairs, be expected to retain membership in what is now becoming 
a pressure group." 29 
Verwoerd's pronouncements show the great resentment 
held by many Nationalists towards overseas countries which in 
the Nationalist opinion did not understand South Africa's racial 
problems and which deliberately or accidentally misconstrued the 
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aims of Nationalist policies. They also show that the Nationalists 
perceived much of the outside world as being a place which 
practised double standards in that they condemned South Africa's 
racial policies while simultaneously condoning or overlooking much 
of the racial, social or political oppression that was prevalent 
in many other countries. 
Chief Albert Luthuli of the ANC expressed his approval 
of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. This would 
bring it home to white South Africans the dislike with which the 
policy of apartheid was viewed overseas. The PAC also expressed 
satisfaction at this decision concerning the "Christian 
barbarians", and said that it would have nothing to do "with 
the Queen of England or any other Queen for that matter." 30 
South Africa's problems were viewed with some sympathy 
by Sir Robert Menzies, then Prime Minister of Australia. Menzies 
did not approve of the idea of "one man, one vote". In his view 
"the right to vote should be approximately related to the capacity 
to vote" and that a "basically uneducated community will mean a 
basically uneducated electorate", which in turn would produce 
''a dictator or a small oligarchy''. 31 
The large Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations was 
also to exert its influence against South Africa during this 
period. On the eve of the 1961 general election, in October 1961, 
the United Nations passed a censure motion against South Africa 
by a large majority. This followed the speech made by Eric Lauw, 
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stating that blacks in South Africa were materially far better 
off than in other African countries. Louw also criticised 
subversive elements in such places as New York, London, Cairo and 
Accra for trying to stir up trouble in South Africa. The delegate 
for Liberia moved a motion censuring Louw and the South African 
government and describing the speech as "offensive, fictitious and 
erroneous". The delegates for the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, 
the United States, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain were among the countries that 
abstained. The Netherlands was the only Western nation to vote in 
favour of the censure motion and South Africa was the only country 
to vote against it. Later the chief United States delegate to the 
United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, criticised the motion and stated 
that the United Nations had been established as a forum for "free 
and untrammelled speech". 32 
However, in South Africa the main outcome in South Africa of 
all this international opposition was that the Nationalists became 
even more resolute to continue on their chosen road. 
Opposition to the Nationalist government in Natal. 
Although there was quite a strong feeling in some 
quarters in Natal in favour of possible secession from the 
rest of South Africa, nothing lasting actually came from such 
sentiments. In a meeting with Verwoerd, Douglas Mitchell argued 
that as Natal had voted overwhelmingly against the idea of South 
Africa's becoming a republic, it should be able to make its own 
decisions concerning its future, but this idea Verwoerd rejected 
32 Cape Times, 12 October 1961. 
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unequivocally. It was just not practicable in the face of such 
opposition from the central government for Natal to secede. 
Furthermore, after Mitchell had consulted the British High 
Commissioner in South Africa, Sir John Maud, in 1960 he realised 
that Britain did not wish to involve itself in the domestic 
affairs of members of the Commonwealth. If Natal wished to "come 
to place itself directly under the Crown, it must do so on the 
basis of one-man one vote". The fear of civil war in South 
Africa, doubts as to the real strength and commitment of the 
anti-republican forces in Natal, and a realisation that many white 
inhabitants of Natal while opposed to Verwoerd and the idea of a 
republic would not wholeheartedly support any attempt at 
secession, all contributed to the gradual subsidence of militant 
anti-republicanism that took place between the announcement of the 
results of the referendum and the proclamation of a republic. 33 
Further evidence of the rift between the government 
and popular opinion in Natal was shown by a serious disagreement 
that arose after the government decided to appoint a certain 
J Stander, previously a school inspector, as Deputy Director of 
Education in Natal. The provincial authorities refused to obey 
a government instruction to appoint Stander in his position but 
the Supreme Court of Natal later ordered the province to do so. 34 
Douglas Mitchell raised the question of Stander's 
appointment in parliament and used it to criticise the government 
for its apparent disregard for the feelings of many Natalians. 
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He described the government as being "not interested in any moral 
claims, in old traditions, in the feelings of the people of Natal", 
and its decision to appoint Stander as being motivated by a desire 
''to teach Natal a lesson''. 35 
A sidelight on the emotions evoked by the referendum 
is also provided by the existence of a secret group formed in 1959 
in Natal known as the ''Horticulturists''. It circulated 
anti-Nationalist propaganda, tried to organise boycotts of 
businesses associated with the Nationalists, and campaigned 
vigorously against the idea of a republic. However, none of these 
pre-election activities had much impact on the outcome of the 1961 
general election. 36 
The Formation of the Pan Africanist Congress. 
In 1958 months of disagreement between certain groups 
within the African National Congress ( ANC finally led in 
November to the secession of some of the more militant members 
who were later to form the Pan Africanist Congress PAC ) . 
One of the points of disagreement concerned the relationship 
between black political organisations and the whites, and Robert 
Sobukwe declared, "We shall think of co-operation with other 
forces when we have come into our own." 37 
According to Nelson Mandela, the immediate cause of the 
breakaway by the "Africanist" group was "its objection to the 
Freedom Charter and the presence of whites and Indians in the 
Congress Alliance leadership", and that it was opposed to the 
35 
36 
37 
Debates of the House of Assembly, 20 January 1960, col 116. 
PS Thompson, Natalians first : separatism in South Africa, 
pp 163 - 166. 
African Digest, vol VI, no 4, Jan - Feb 1959, p 143. 
Page 58 
idea of inter-racial cooperation largely because it believed that 
white communists and Indians "had come to dominate the ANC". 
Mandela also believed that many of those who allied themselves 
with the new movement did so "out of personal grudges and 
disappointments". 38 
The PAC did not initially make the progress or attract 
the support hoped for by its founders. Although the foundation 
congress of this movement had hoped to enrol a total of 100 000 
members by 1 July 1959, it had, according to the party's 
admission, enrolled not even a third of that number by the 
d 39 en of that year. 
In spite of its lack of success in building up a large 
membership, the PAC did have a considerable impact on the South 
African political scene by creating a significant amount of urban 
unrest which would undoubtedly have a far-reaching effect on much 
of the electorate in the 1961 general election. 
In a very revealing article published in January 1959, 
Sobukwe outlined many of the PAC's principles and points of 
difference with the ANC. He stated that the ANC saw "the 
struggle" as a class struggle whereas the PAC saw it as ''a 
national struggle" because Africans were oppressed as "a subject 
nation the African nation". The two movements also differed in 
their views on co-operation of anti-government groups. According 
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to Sobukwe, the PAC saw co-operation as possible "only between 
equals" and that there could be no co-operation between 
"oppressor and oppressed, dominating and dominated", as that 
would be "collaboration". Sobukwe stated very significantly, 
"We claim Afrika for the Africans ; the A.N.C. claims South Africa 
for all". 40 
Later during his speech at the Inaugural Convention of 
the PAC in April 1959, Sobukwe amplified his earlier remarks. In 
discussing the role of the whites in South Africa, Sobukwe said 
"The Europeans are a foreign minority group which has exclusive 
control of political, economic, social and military power. It is 
the dominant group. It is the exploiting group, responsible for 
the pernicious doctrine of White Supremacy which has resulted in 
the humiliation and degradation of the indigenous African people. 
It is this group which has dispossessed the African people of 
their land and with arrogant conceit has set itself up as the 
'guardians', the 'trustees' of the Africans. n 41 
Many whites in South Africa at the time saw these 
utterances as unbridled arrogance and insolence. They were 
encouraged in the coming election to support those parties which 
promised firm measures to suppress what they alleged to be 
''seditious agitation''. 
Domestic disturbances within South Africa. 
The widespread unrest among blacks in 1960 and the 
subsequent proclamation of a state of emergency kept South Africa 
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sharply in the international limelight for some months. It also 
had echoes in the election campaign of the following year when the 
need to preserve law and order became an important issue in the 
general election. The events at Sharpeville in March 1960 
instantly became worldwide news but there were also other 
comparatively minor incidents prior to Sharpeville which should 
have warned South Africans that widespread unrest was imminent. 
During 1959 and 1960 there was rioting and arson in East Pondoland 
following the opposition shown by many blacks to the system of 
Bantu Authorities. 42Although this rural unrest did not attract much 
attention among the white electorate, a violent outbreak in Cato 
Manor on 24 January 1960 shocked many whites. The Minister of 
Justice, FC Erasmus, announced in the House of Assembly that a 
party of 26 policemen were engaged in a search for illicit alcohol 
in Cato Manor when they were attacked by an angry crowd of about 
800 blacks. Nine policemen of whom five were black and four white, 
were killed by the mob. 43 
The disturbances at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960 
overshadowed all other incidents of unrest at the time but 
Sharpeville was not an isolated case. The violence and the 
widespread nature of other disturbances also had a very decisive 
effect on the minds of the white voters. They would have to decide 
the following year whether to adopt a more liberal, tolerant 
racial policy, or an increasingly oppressive hardline stance. In 
March 1960, the PAC announced that it would be launching a 
campaign of passive resistance against the pass system, and its 
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President, Robert Sobukwe, informed the Commissioner of Police, 
Major-General Rademeyer of the plans. Sobukwe asked that the 
police be restrained from taking aggressive action. He said that 
his organisation would be launching a "sustained, disciplined, 
non-violent campaign against the Pass Laws" on 21 March 1960. 
The rest of the letter was couched in terms that would have 
infuriated the average white South African voter. It described 
many of the police as having been brought up "in the racial 
hothouse of South Africa" and criticised the methods adopted by 
the police to disperse illegal gatherings. Sobukwe referred to 
the police as "sadistic bullies" and told Rademeyer that his 
followers could not be expected to run "helter-skelter because a 
trigger-happy, African hating young white policeman has given 
thousands or even hundreds of people three minutes within which 
to remove their bodies from his immediate environment." 44 
The decision by the PAC to launch an anti-pass 
campaign appears to have been partly if not largely animated by 
rivalry with the ANC which had earlier planned a similar campaign 
that was due to begin on 31 March 1960. The PAC plan elicited an 
angry response from the ANC. According to Nelson Mandela, it was 
"a blatant case of opportunism" that was "motivated more by a 
desire to eclipse the ANC than to defeat the enemy." Mandela 
points out that the PAC had not held a conference to discuss the 
date of the launching of the anti-pass campaign, nor had it done 
any "organizational work of any significance". 15 
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The most momentous event of the campaign was undoubtedly 
the incident at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960. Fearing that the 
demonstrators were about to attack the police station, the police 
opened fire on the crowd. Lodge ascribes the action of the police 
partly to their inexperience in dealing with large political 
demonstrations. The police had "an acute if mistaken 
consciousness of their vulnerability", and the events of Cato 
Manor were still fresh in their minds. According to Lodge, 69 
people were killed and 180 wounded in the demonstration. 46 
In order to deal with the civil unrest that had broken 
out the government took some firm steps. On 24 March, public 
meetings in several magisterial districts were banned and on 
28 March the government introduced legislation to ban both the 
ANC and the PAC. On March 30 a state of emergency was proclaimed 
and several hundred people were arrested. 47 Large scale police raids 
took place in various black areas and these were a major factor 
in the suppression of the unrest. The government also introduced 
more sweeping powers of arrest. According to Edward Feit, during 
the state of emergency 98 whites, 36 coloureds, 90 Asians, and 
11 279 Africans were taken into custody. 48 
Five days after the Sharpeville unrest the Commissioner 
of Police declared a moratorium on the enforcement of the pass 
laws. This drew a fiery reaction from the conservative UP member 
for Natal South Coast, Douglas Mitchell. Speaking in parliament 
during the debate on the Unlawful Organisations Bill, Mitchell 
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fiercely criticised what he perceived as the government's weakness 
in dealing with the unrest. He described the moratorium as a 
"shocking exhibition of complete weakness in dealing with the 
matter". 49 The moratorium was lifted on 10 April. It is open to 
conjecture whether Mitchell made this statement out of personal 
conviction or because he wished to make political capital from 
the government's predicament. Nevertheless, this is a very 
striking example of the attitude of the conservative wing of 
the UP and an indication of how it would sometimes attempt to be 
more extremist than the Nationalists in the election campaign of 
the following year. 
The firm action taken by the government to deal with the 
unrest was to pay dividends during the election campaign of 1961. 
When the voters went to the polls in October 1961 the unrest of 
the preceding year was still fresh in their minds and they were 
also very aware of the disturbances and civil unrest in various 
other African countries such as the Belgian Congo. The NP was 
able to depict itself as the party that had saved South Africa 
from a blood-bath. It portrayed itself as the only party that 
could ensure the security of the whites. The NP would also make an 
issue of the UP's supposed inability to deal effectively and 
decisively with such disturbances. 
The UP gave qualified support to the bill banning the 
ANC and PAC. Sir de Villiers Graaff announced in parliament that 
the UP would support the bill in order "to restore law and order", 
and he also thanked the coloured community for remaining peaceful. 
Graaf£ put part of the blame for the riots on the government, 
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claiming that they had created a "ruthless proletariat with no 
real interest in the maintenance of law and order", which was 
"fertile ground for the activities of agitators". As a result 
of this "unrealistic attitude", large numbers of blacks were 
permanently settled in South Africa's urban areas. According to 
Graaff, the government had broken down "all bridges of 
consultation", and had ignored ''the emergent middle class''. He 
expressed the opinion that the detribalised blacks living in the 
cities should be represented in parliament "on a separate roll and 
by Whites", and that there should be a "more humane administration 
of the pass laws". In response to a question from a government 
member, Graaff replied, "I support this Bill because as the result 
of the policies of this Government you have a situation of 
emergency in South Africa". 50 
The police took firm measures in Cape Town early in 
April 1960 to end a stayaway from work in which thousands of 
Africans were involved. These actions attracted much criticism. 
The Cape Argus reported graphically, "Police armed with 
truncheons swooped on all suburbs and towns in the Peninsula today 
to clear the streets of Native intimidators and loiterers. They 
beat any Natives who refused, or were reluctant, to move from 
pavements or street corners ... The Peninsula area is virtually 
under military occupation today." 51 
There were many allegations that police had whipped 
Africans with sjamboks but in parliament in answer to questions 
put by Zach de Beer, Harry Lawrence, and Helen Suzman, the 
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Minister of Justice denied that the police had used undue force. 
As far as he was concerned, "the police and the army had carried 
out their duties in an exemplary fashion and had brought the 
situation under control with tact". He had full confidence that 
the police would not abuse their powers. 52 
The alleged widespread maltreatment of blacks by police 
in Cape Town also attracted a great deal of attention in the 
overseas press. The headlines of some British newspapers read 
"Police whip Africans in streets" (Daily Mail) ; "Day of the 
lash in Cape Town Men whipped in streets ; City of Terror" 
(Daily Telegraph) "Whips out in Cape Town cries of injured 
bring protests by phone" (Daily Express) . 53 
The suppression of the riots shows the firm stance that 
the government was prepared to adopt to restore law and order. It 
was a policy that would win votes for the NP during the following 
year. The electorate was very conscious of its numerical 
inferiority to black South Africans and was, in general, 
uncompromisingly opposed to giving in to the demands of those 
it saw as black demagogues and inciters. 
The attempted assassination of Verwoerd in 1960. 
Soon after the disturbing events at Sharpeville and 
other centres of unrest, South Africa experienced another great 
shock when Verwoerd came very close to death in an attempt on 
his life at the Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg on 9 April 1960. 
After Verwoerd had addressed the crowd in his opening address, 
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an assailant later described by the Sunday Times as "a 
middle-aged European gunman" ) walked up to him and shot him twice 
in the face. The would-be assassin, David Pratt, was described as 
a very wealthy middle-aged farmer who, according to a neighbour, 
had spent much of the preceding week at a mission station near his 
farm outside Johannesburg. 54 
Pratt was later found to have had a history of mental 
instability and was declared unfit to stand trial on a charge of 
attempted murder During his appearance in court, Pratt claimed 
that he had intended only to injure Verwoerd and that the prime 
minister's period of convalescence "would at least give him an 
opportunity to reconsider some of the things that were going on". 
Pratt subsequently committed suicide in October 1961 while at the 
Oranje Mental Hospital in Bloemfontein. 55 
In the political sphere Verwoerd undoubtedly benefited 
a great deal from the attempt on his life. He came to be 
identified almost as a martyr for his cause. In the words of 
Jan Botha, "he had suffered grievously in the cause of 
Afrikanerdom the onslaught on his life was an onslaught on 
their cause, and the human sympathy that went out to him became in 
the case of many an enduring love for a hero who so miraculously 
survived the ordeal to lead them on." 56 
The end of the Treason Trial. 
On 29 March 1961, while the defence at the celebrated 
Treason Trial of ANC activists in Pretoria was in the fourth week 
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of its final argument, Judge Rumpff decided to close the trial. 
He announced an unanimous verdict of not guilty, stating that "the 
cornerstone of the case" was the alleged policy of violence of the 
ANC and that the prosecution had failed to prove the existence of 
this policy. The complexity and length of the mammoth trial can be 
gauged from the fact that the defendants had been arrested in 
December 1956 and the prosecution had examined some 150 witnesses 
and four thousand documents. 51 
The Treason Trial had by this time become a source of 
great embarrassment to the South African government. This was 
because of the periodic acquittal of many of the defendants, the 
long duration of the trial, the vagueness of some of the evidence 
and also the embarrassing testimony given by several witnesses. 
Although the trial was a major event in the history of black 
politics in South Africa, it was not of overwhelming interest to 
the white voters. Some may have seen it as an indication of the 
threat posed by black militants to the whites in South Africa and 
this issue was given great emphasis in the general election later 
that year. 
The Cottesloe Conference of 1960. 
Following a visit to South Africa by Robert Bilheimer, 
the Assistant Secretary of the World Council of Churches, it was 
decided that an inter-church conference would be held to discuss 
the problems that the various churches faced in South Africa. This 
conference was held for approximately a week in December 1960 at 
the Cottesloe residence of the University of the Witwatersrand. 
57 T Karis & G Carter, From protest to challenge, pp 345 - 347. 
Page 68 
It was attended by a number of deputations consisting of ten 
members each. Deputations were sent by the seven South African 
churches which belonged to the World Council of Churches i.e. the 
Church of the Province of South Africa, the Dutch Reformed Church 
NGK ) of the Transvaal and Cape Province, the Methodist Church, 
the Presbyterian Church, the Congregational Union Church, the 
Bantu Presbyterian Church, and the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk of 
South Africa. Each paragraph of the statement reflecting the 
eventual opinions of the conference had to be put to the vote 
separately. Furthermore, each had to receive the support of at 
least eighty percent of the delegates before being adopted. 58 
The statement that was issued by the conference stated 
inter alia that no church should exclude a believer on the 
grounds of his colour or race ; that there were no scriptural 
grounds to justify the prohibition of mixed marriages despite the 
existence of certain "legal social or cultural factors" that would 
make such marriages "inadvisable" that the system of migrant 
labour should be condemned and that job reservation on the grounds 
of colour should be replaced by "a more equitable system", and 
that adult men had the right to own land wherever they were 
domiciled. 59 
When this statement was issued by the conference, the 
delegations from the NGK of the Transvaal and the Cape Province 
simultaneously issued a declaration stating that in their opinion 
"a policy of differentiation" was defensible and that "it provided 
the only realistic solution to the problem of race relations". 
58 
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They also said that as far as they were concerned, the right of 
Africans to own land in white areas and to "participate in 
government" in these areas was applicable only to those Africans 
"who were domiciled there and had no other home land". In a 
subsequent statement they asserted that "if complete territorial 
segregation was impossible then full rights, including political 
rights, could not be witheld indefinitely from Coloured people or 
Africans who were permanent residents of the White areas". It is 
clear that this was a serious, if not very serious, challenge to 
the racial policies of the NP. w 
The delegation from the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk took a 
very different line and published a statement in which they voiced 
their opposition to all the main resolutions of the conference. 
They also reaffirmed their belief that racial separation would be 
the best possible environment for serving "the ideals of 
Christianity". They claimed that they had been outvoted during the 
conference while trying to oppose these resolutions. 61 
The Cottesloe Conference was very severely criticised by 
some sections of the Nationalist establishment. The actuary of the 
Cape division of the NGK, JD Vorster, criticised the members of 
the synod who had been delegates to the Cottesloe Conference, 
and stated that they were expounding "a supremely dangerous 
viewpoint". 62 
''Dawie'' in his column in Die Burger expressed some 
support for the NGK delegates to the Cottesloe Conference, saying 
that the NP had to contend with an acute crisis of confidence 
60 
61 
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within Nationalist Afrikanerdom concerning race relations. It did 
not help to try to conceal this. "Dawie" expressed surprise that 
those NGK delegates who expressed support for the idea of direct 
representation "regstreekse verteenwoordiging" for the 
coloureds should suddenly be labelled as integrationists and 
liberals. Some of the most prominent NGK churchmen had long 
propagated the idea that this was the inevitable and logical 
consequence of the idea of separate development for the 
coloureds. 63 
In contrast to the attitude of "Dawie", Die Transvaler 
was predictably much more critical of the decisions of the 
Cottesloe Conference. In an editorial it claimed that the 
application of these principles would lead to the complete 
collapse and disappearance of Christianity in the southern tip 
of Africa. The editorial sharply criticised the Conference's 
resolutions concerning land ownership, the franchise, and mixed 
marriages. 64 
In his New Year's message of 1 January 1961, Verwoerd 
also made a vigorous attack on the Cottesloe Conference. He 
described it as an attempt by foreigners to interfere in South 
African affairs. He felt that an organisation such as the World 
Council of Churches would have no enduring influence on the ideas 
and feelings of South Africa at all. He believed that the 
resolutions should be seen as nothing more than the opinions of a 
certain number of individuals. 65 
63 
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among some Afrikaans clergymen, many of whom were influential 
Nationalists, and laymen on the issues raised at Cottesloe. This 
could have burgeoned into a severe challenge to Nationalist 
policies had Verwoerd, supported by various clergymen, not taken 
a firm stance in suppressing at least some of these contentious 
arguments. 
The clash between the government and some 
prominent Anglican churchmen. 
During the pre-election period a great deal 
of publicity was given to various clashes between the government 
and some sections of the hierarchy of the Anglican Church. Among 
the "turbulent priests" was Bishop Ambrose Reeves, Bishop of 
Johannesburg, who was later deported from South Africa. It was 
not long after the unrest at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960 that 
Bishop Reeves published his book Shooting at Sharpeville. 66 He 
was extremely outspoken in his criticism of both the South African 
government and the South African Police. This criticism was highly 
damaging to the government's image both overseas and in South 
Africa. 
On 1 April 1960 Bishop Reeves left his Johannesburg 
diocese apparently fearing that he would be detained under the 
emergency regulations. He then drove to Swaziland where he stayed 
temporarily before travelling to England. In September 1960 he 
flew back to Johannesburg to resume his episcopal duties. Less 
than two days after he had returned, a senior policeman visited 
66 AH Reeves, Shooting at Sharpeville ( London, 1960 ) . 
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him at the Priory of St Benedict and issued him with a deportation 
order signed by the Minister of the Interior. He was taken to the 
airport and put on an aeroplane bound for London the same day. 67 
The deportation of the Bishop aroused a storm of 
criticism in many liberal and clerical circles. Die Burger 
published an editorial which must have reflected a significant 
section of Nationalist thought on the matter. The newspaper 
claimed they were sick and tired of this man and his kind who 
were brought from England to shout at them in the name of God 
and to treat them like dirt "om ans in die naam van God te kom 
beskreeu en rand te foeter asof ans hulle vuilgoed is" ) . They 
were unknown and unsung in their own country "onbekend en 
onbesonge" but in South Africa they received pompous titles and 
sham authority "hoogdrawende titels met die skyngesag wat 
daarrnee saamgaan" ) . 68 
The Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Joost de Blank, 
was also a celebrated figure among the campaigners against 
apartheid in the Anglican Church. According to the Archbishop, 
"This hideous doctrine of apartheid must be openly condemned. 
The Africans must be shown by constructive action - not words 
alone that the churches have turned their backs on compulsory 
apartheid." Time magazine also described De Blank as demanding 
that the Dutch Reformed Church should repudiate the policy of 
apartheid on pain of losing the recognition of the world's 
religious bodies. 69 
67 
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refused to meet a delegation from the Church of the Province of 
South Africa which was calling for the abolition of the Group 
Areas Act "in the name of God". Part of Verwoerd's letter read, 
"The Prime Minister is not prepared to receive the deputation for 
whom you request an interview since the terms of the resolution 
clearly demonstrate that the spirit in which the request is made 
would make such an interview utterly futile." 70 
It is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the 
significance that these clashes had on the English-speaking 
electorate. Although many English-speaking whites were members of 
the Church of England, it is very likely that some would have been 
as irked by the utterances of Bishop Reeves and Archbishop de 
Blank as was the government. They might also possibly have 
differentiated between official church doctrine and what appeared 
to be the private opinions of these bishops. It is noteworthy that 
the government tried to refrain from criticising the Church of 
England as this would have given graver offence. Thus, while many 
people may have felt that the government should merely have 
ignored such clerical criticism and may also have thought the 
government to be heavy-handed in its dealings with Reeves, it is 
unlikely that the government would have lost a great deal of 
support from Anglican quarters. In truth it would not have had 
very much support there to lose in the first place. 
The attitude of the Catholic Church towards the government. 
70 
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of the government's racial policies at the time. In February 1960 
the Catholic Bishops issued a moderately worded pastoral letter in 
which they declared that people were justified "in striving for 
their legitimate rights" but should use peaceful means to do so. 
The letter warned "those who are impatient" that they should be on 
their guard lest "they be misled by men who do not desire the real 
and true good of the people, but only selfish and destructive 
ends." The Bishops recognised the existence of social and racial 
divisions and argued that although it was true that men gather 
together in groups with loyalties that arise "from the bond of 
relationship or association", these loyalties should be 
"subordinate to the great overriding fact of the human person's 
dignity and his unity with all fellow men." The Bishops considered 
that "a just wage adequate to the needs of the man and his family" 
be paid to employees, and they condemned the system of migratory 
labour and the imposition of restrictions on "free movement" as 
these hampered the ability to work and earn a living. The letter 
recognised 
advanced 
part in 
that it would be wrong to allow people of "a more 
culture to be deprived at this stage of an effective 
the government, and to have their economic status 
reduced". At the same time it felt that the desire of one section 
of the population to protect itself "need not and must not operate 
oppressively on the other sections." In discussing the question 
of the franchise, the Bishops wrote, "It does not follow that the 
giving of the vote directly to all qualified members of the 
community will result in the domination of one section over 
another." They felt that colour should not be the criterion 
in determining the right to exercise the franchise but the 
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qualification to do so "should be the ability to exercise the vote 
in a truly responsible manner." 71 
Here again, it is difficult to determine the effect of such 
opposition on the NP's chances of attracting English or Catholic 
votes. It is very likely that it would have influenced the small 
but not insignificant Catholic electorate only in conjunction with 
various other factors such as the recent riots. 
Support given to the government by the Afrikaans churches. 
There were, however, other churches that were fully 
supportive of the government's policies. An example of this was 
provided by the Moderator of the Dutch Reformed synod of Natal, 
Rev H Snijders. While opening the NGK synod he said that nowhere 
in the scriptures were men commanded to wipe out the idea of 
racial segregation. On the contrary he believed that putting all 
races on the same level was against the rule of God. According to 
Snijders, what God had severed no man might bring together, and 
they "as Europeans" were "far more advanced on the road of 
Christian civilization". He also said that there was no other 
nation that had sacrificed more to raise the "non-European". 72 
As the great majority of Afrikaans-speaking whites were 
members of the Dutch Reformed Church or its sister churches, such 
views would have had a significant effect on their belief in the 
value and morality of government policies. Their church would 
undoubtedly have encouraged at least an appreciable number of them 
to vote Nationalist in the forthcoming general election. 
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Events in the Belgian Congo. 
The disturbances in the Belgian Congo also had a 
profound psychological effect on many whites in South Africa, 
partly because of the large numbers of refugees who were brought 
to South Africa. Many white South Africans took a great interest 
in the rapid way in which Belgium decided to grant independence 
to the Congo. They took note of the inability of the new 
administration to prevent the chaos and the disturbances that 
followed. ow Kruger expressed what would have been a widespread 
attitude at the time when he wrote : 
The events in the Congo had instantly shattered the 
imposing facade liberals had laboriously built up that 
once the black peoples had established their national 
states everybody would be happy .... White public feeling 
in the Union was inflamed as a result and Verwoerd's policy 
of separate development received a new impetus. 73 
The effect of the events leading up to the 1961 
general election : an overview. 
In general the events of the few years preceding the 
1961 general election show a considerable drift towards South 
Africa's isolation in international affairs. The domestic 
situation was such that many voters in South Africa had come 
to regard developments with acute tension and anxiety. Many of 
these events in South Africa, Europe and the rest of Africa, 
tended to propel white South Africans towards greater 
conservatism. During these years the Nationalists attained 
one of their long-cherished goals when on 31 May 1961 South Africa 
was proclaimed a republic. Likewise, many English-speaking white 
73 ow Kruger, The making of a nation (Johannesburg, 1969 ), p 327. 
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South Africans suffered a traumatic blow when South Africa's 
formal constitutional links with Britain were severed. In addition 
the British government made it apparent that in future it would be 
increasingly unsympathetic to the beliefs, principles and policies 
of the English-speaking whites in South Africa, many of whom had 
been fervent supporters of the imperial connection. This would 
make English-speaking voters more susceptible to the propaganda of 
the NP the need for the two main white groups had to stand 
together in a country that was threatened both internally and 
externally by various dangers. 
These pre-election years also saw the deterioration of 
race relations in South Africa and foreshadowed the wave of 
sabotage and terrorism which was launched by black political 
organisations soon after the 1961 general election. This made 
both English and Afrikaans-speaking whites very unsympathetic to 
any suggestion of more liberal racial policies. The electorate 
wanted a feeling of security and a firm hand in dealing with 
problems of this nature and this caused many floating voters 
to drift in the direction of the NP. 
CHAPTER THREE. 
THE NATIONAL PARTY FROM 1958 TO 1961. 
As mentioned earlier, the 1958 general election put 
the NP in 
Nationalists 
a comparatively unassailable position and 
could now justifiably be confident that nothing 
the 
but 
a major political swing could unseat them. This chapter will 
examine some of the other important events that influenced the NP 
during the period between the general elections of 1958 and 1961. 
As the NP made concerted efforts during this period to attract 
the votes of more English-speaking whites in South Africa, this 
aspect of NP strategy will also receive attention. It should be 
remembered that the English-language press in South Africa was 
virtually if not entirely anti-Nationalist during this period 
and that it played a significant role in forming the political 
opinions of the English-speaking community at the time. It was 
thus an important factor in the NP's attempts to gain English 
support. Much of what appears in this chapter will be from the 
perspective of the English-language press : its views on the NP's 
strategies, policies, leaders and members. 
The election of HF Verwoerd as Prime Minister and its impact on the 
National Party. 
Although Verwoerd in his later years as Prime Minister 
achieved the respect if not adulation of the NP, it should be 
remembered that at the time of his election in September 1958, 
his popularity in the party was far less widespread. His election 
to the premiership came after a vigorous and at times bitterly 
fought campaign in the Nationalist caucus between his supporters 
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and those of Donges and CR Swart. His appointment was seen by 
many as emphasising the divisions in the party between the rigid 
and the more flexible proponents of apartheid and nationalism, 
as well as a cleavage between the Nationalists of the Transvaal 
and those of the Cape. 
Early in the course of the election the Cape Times 
commented that the campaign to elect Verwoerd as Prime Minister 
was a case of a 'now or never' effort as his supporters realised 
that the decisive gains made by the NP in the general election of 
that year could very well usher in a greater feeling of security 
among the Afrikaans-speaking whites. This in turn could lead to 
the adoption of a more liberal approach towards other sectors of 
the population and could cause a decline in the influence of 
Verwoerd, whose more "hard-line" approach would then become less 
acceptable. 1 
The mammoth campaign in the mid-1950s to remove the 
coloureds from the common voters' roll involved the extensive 
enlargement of the Senate. It had the unforeseen result of 
allowing 
enabled 
Verwoerd to create a power-base in the Senate that 
him 
from most 
to attain the premiership in the face of opposition 
of the cabinet and what was possibly a majority of the 
House of Assembly. Verwoerd was proposed by De Wet Nel, who was a 
junior member of the cabinet, and according to the Cape Times 
his election was opposed by ten cabinet ministers and supported 
by only three. In commenting on the powerful hold that Verwoerd 
had gradually come to exert on the Senate, the Cape Times noted 
that the Senate had been enlarged by 41 members in 1955 and that 
1 Cape Times, 30 August 1958. 
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it had been "Dr Verwoerd's private preserve for so long that, when 
it became enlarged, it became even more his reserve of 
support". 2 
It is also possibly significant as an indication of 
Verwoerd's strength in the Senate that his nomination as a 
candidate for the leadership of the NP was seconded by Senator 
MJ Vermeulen, the deputy president of the Senate. Donges and Swart 
were proposed by cabinet ministers of considerably greater 
seniority than Verwoerd or his proposer, Daan de Wet Nel. Donges 
was proposed by FC Erasmus, the Minister of Defence, while Swart 
was proposed by BJ Schoeman and seconded by Jan de Klerk. In the 
first round Verwoerd received 80 votes while Donges and Swart 
received 52 and 41 votes respectively. The fact that Verwoerd did 
not receive an outright majority meant that a second round of 
voting had to take place, and on this occasion Verwoerd received 
98 votes to Donges's 75 votes. 
According to MC Botha, the amount of support gained by the 
various candidates on the basis of provincialism was not worth 
mentioning. Botha also believes that there is inadequate evidence 
to support the theory that the members of the enlarged Senate were 
the decisive factor in Verwoerd's election. 3 BJ Schoeman holds a 
different view. He believes that the extra Senators gave Verwoerd 
the edge over Donges, who enjoyed the support of most of the 
members of the House of Assembly. 4 
In his memoirs, BJ Schoeman, then Minister of Transport, 
gives an indication of how deeply he disliked Verwoerd when he 
2 
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says that in nominating Swart for election, he was motivated 
largely by a desire to prevent Verwoerd from winning at all costs. 
Schoeman was also convinced that his career in the cabinet was 
over and recounts how when he was summoned to Verwoerd's office 
that afternoon he expected to be told that he was being replaced. 
Instead to his surprise, he was invited to remain in the cabinet. 
Verwoerd told him that they should forget their quarrels of the 
past and make a new beginning. 5 This, to some extent, indicates the 
apprehension that at least some of the senior Nationalists must 
have felt about Verwoerd's election. 
The reaction of the Nationalist press to Verwoerd's election. 
In an editorial Die Burger claimed that nobody had been· 
subjected to more merciless discussion in the previous few years 
than had Verwoerd, and that a mighty propaganda campaign had been 
concentrated upon him. Nobody could doubt the new Prime Minister's 
immense intellectual abilities, his intense perseverance and his 
sense of application. Verwoerd's career as Minister of Native 
Affairs was described as being a history of clashes on basic 
principles, great periods of agitation, bitterly disputed measures 
but also certain noteworthy successes in unexpected areas. 6 
In his regular column in Die Burger, "Dawie" examined the 
personality of Verwoerd, and stated that he had the ability to be 
one of South Africa's great Prime Ministers but that his critics 
regarded him as having the ability to cause disasters. This, 
according to "Dawie", was the case with many brilliant men in 
5 
6 
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positions of power. "Dawie" compared Verwoerd with Lloyd George's 
assessment of Churchill in his earlier years : when he erred, his 
strength made the consequences disastrous not just for himself but 
for the issues with which he was engaged, and the people with whom 
he was co-operating. In an emergency such a person would be more 
of an asset than a legion of normal individuals provided that a 
vigilant eye be kept over him. 7 One should be wary of reading too 
much into a newspaper article but Dawie's comments indicate a 
certain attitude towards Verwoerd that was not wholeheartedly 
supportive or laudatory. 
In its editorial on Verwoerd's election Die Transvaler 
emphasised the close links that the new Prime Minister had had 
with Strijdom for many years, stretching back to the establishment 
of Die Transvaler in 1937. It mentioned what a strong and 
determined leader Verwoerd was, and how he could be relied upon to 
preserve the traditions and the ideals of the NP to which he had 
dedicated himself and given so much for so many years. In the 
editorial there were also echoes of DF Malan's sentiments : one of 
Verwoerd's tasks would be to maintain ties within the party and 
to strengthen the NP cause by encouraging others to join their 
ranks. 8 
Speculation in the English-language press on the political futures 
of some senior Nationalists. 
The election of Hendrik Verwoerd as Prime Minister in 
September 1958 was without a doubt a watershed in the history of 
7 
8 
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the NP. To many observers it illustrated a marked clash of wills, 
opinions and temperaments between the supposedly more liberal, 
tolerant and compromising Nationalists of the Cape and the more 
conservative, dogmatic and intolerant Nationalists of the 
Transvaal. The English-language press took a great interest in 
speculating on the future of some senior Nationalists who were 
perceived to be 
this speculation 
in disfavour with their leader. In some 
would have created the impression 
cases 
among 
English-speakers, including some prospective converts to the NP, 
that there was no place for moderates or lukewarm Nationalists 
in Verwoerd's party. 
Soon after the election of Verwoerd, the political 
columnist, "Backbencher", wrote a memorable article in the 
Cape Argus, entitled "Malan's Old Guard is in eclipse 
Transvaal in Power". This provided a very lucid and vivid 
description of what was seen as a conspicuous division between the 
provinces. It was alleged that Stellenbosch was no longer the 
"fount of Nationalism's philosophy", and that political power was 
now firmly established in "the powerful hands of the Transvaal 
extremists and the rigid theorists of Potchef stroom and Pretoria 
Universities." In the light of the political careers of several of 
the top Nationalists in later years, it is worth paying some 
attention to what "Backbencher" had to say about some of 
Verwoerd's possible "victims". He pointed out that there were 
already rumours that some cabinet members would be going "to the 
wall" as soon as Verwoerd had the opportunity to rearrange his 
cabinet. "Backbencher" speculated that Paul Sauer might soon be 
appointed Union High Commissioner in London in an attempt to 
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remove him from the cabinet as the new Prime Minister, "the 
tireless, slave-driving Dr. Verwoerd", would not regard Sauer "as 
the ideal Cabinet colleague in the relentless prosecution of 
ideological obsessions such as apartheid and the republic". 
"Backbencher" also regarded Frans Erasmus's position as being in 
jeopardy and said that it was an "open political secret" that the 
growing strength of Transvaal nationalism was a cause of concern 
to him. In discussing the potential nominees for vacant cabinet 
posts, "Backbencher" suggested that they might include Carel 
de Wet, Nico Diederichs, Willie Maree who was described as "a 
loyal apartheid acolyte of Dr. Verwoerd's", and Jan Haak. 
"Backbencher" thought it strange that Professor Avril Malan 
father of General Magnus Malan ) had apparently been ignored as 
a possible cabinet minister. One statement from "Backbencher" was, 
however, off course. He observed that "another forgotten man" 
appeared to be PW Botha, the MP for George, who although being a 
successful organising secretary with ten years' experience in the 
House of Assembly, appeared to have been overlooked. 9 ( Verwoerd 
subsequently appointed Botha as Deputy Minister of Internal 
Affairs in 1958 and Minister of Coloured Affairs and Community 
Development in 1961. ) 
These differences following Verwoerd's election were 
mild compared with the dissension that came to light in the 
following few years and became apparent not only in the NP 
caucus but also in the cabinet. The opposition press was to 
analyse these signs of dissent in quite exhaustive detail. It paid 
particularly close attention to what was perceived as a gulf 
9 Cape Argus, 5 September 1958. 
Page 85 
between the Transvaal and the Cape sections of the party. In 
October 1958 when AJ van Rhijn, the Minister of Economic Affairs 
and Mines, was appointed as Union High Commissioner in London, 
the Cape Times claimed in an editorial that this was the Prime 
Minister's first step towards his goal of reconstituting the 
cabinet "closer to his heart's desire". It also thought that 
van Rhijn had been brought into the cabinet by Malan to counter 
''the stranglehold" which the Transvaal section of the party was 
trying to establish. 10 
In November 1960 a public disagreement between Verwoerd 
and Franz Mentz, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, led 
to the latter's resignation. The resignation also proved to be the 
source of much interest to the English-language press. According 
to Mentz, who was also the MP for Westdene, he had had a 
difference of opinion with the Minister of Bantu Administration, 
De Wet Nel, with whom Verwoerd had subsequently sided. Mentz also 
denied the claims made by Die Burger and the SABC that he was 
resigning for health reasons. 11 
The appointment in July 1961 of the Minister of Justice, 
FC Erasmus, as the Ambassador to Rome, was also the cause of much 
speculation in the opposition press. Why, they asked, was a man of 
his seniority, position and experience in the NP, parliament and 
the cabinet, being given such an insignificant position ? The 
Sunday Times expressed the view that Erasmus had been on 
Verwoerd's "black list" for "several years" and that his changed 
status was seen "as the start of a Cabinet Purge" that would 
culminate in a complete reshuffle after the coming general 
10 
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election. The newspaper also speculated that Eric Lauw and Paul 
Sauer might possibly be dropped in the near future. 12 
On one occasion Time magazine described Erasmus as being 
one of the "Four Horsemen of Apartheid", the others being 
Verwoerd, Swart and Eric Lauw. It also regarded Erasmus as largely 
responsible for taking the effective measures that had ended the 
disturbances in 1960. 13 In his announcement of Erasmus's 
appointment, Verwoerd said that Erasmus had asked several months 
earlier to be given some less arduous duties as "he would prefer 
a less strenuous life". In its editorial the Cape Times said 
that whether his new appointment was due to his ill-health or the 
state of his politics, it would naturally be the topic of debate. 
It pointed out that Erasmus had recently had two serious 
operations. 14 
In his memoirs BJ Schoeman claims that Verwoerd had long 
been unhappy with Erasmus's lack of ability as a Minister of 
Defence and refers to the remark made in certain circles that 
Erasmus was nothing more than an effective designer of uniforms. 
Schoeman also writes that Erasmus was bitterly disappointed when 
he was assigned the portfolio of Minister of Justice. According to 
Schoeman, Erasmus approached Verwoerd with the request that he be 
given a more restful position with fewer responsibilities as his 
heal th was giving cause for concern. 15 
In her dissertation on Erasmus's role as Minister of 
Defence, Louisa Jooste mentions that his health deteriorated 
noticeably in the late 1950s and that he suffered a serious heart 
12 
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attack in March 1959 while on a visit to London. Although he had 
been a confidant of Malan, Erasmus was apparently on much less 
intimate terms with Malan's two successors from the north. 16 
Whatever the true position and making due allowance for 
newspaper speculation and exaggeration, it is quite likely that 
the relationship between Verwoerd and Erasmus was not particularly 
harmonious. This must have added to the conjecture about the 
differences between the Cape and the Transvaal Nationalists. 
The English-language press also occasionally speculated on 
the future of Eric Louw. Such conjecture was possibly influenced 
by the fact that he had long been their bitter critic. These 
sentiments seem to have been reciprocated as he came in for 
regular criticism in their editorial pages. A report in the 
Sunday Times at the end of July 1961 claimed that during 
the recent parliamentary session it had been "freely stated" that 
Louw, who was 70 years old at the time, would be retiring from 
the cabinet that year. He was not "physically able to continue 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs" as he had undergone a major 
operation and he was "temperamentally unfitted" for the portfolio 
because he made too many enemies". Louw was, according to the 
report, "making a bold bid to be retained in the Cabinet", and had 
said in a speech at Fraserburg that he would be willing to stand 
for parliament in the event of a general election that year. 17 
Louw's position in this respect was rather anomalous. He 
had been a senior member of the NP for many years and must have 
had a great deal of influence within its ranks. He was also 
16 
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admired for his undoubted intellectual ability, and for the 
aggressive, uncompromising way he had defended South Africa in his 
position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, he had many 
enemies partly because he was perceived as having a difficult 
personality. However, the fact that he only retired at the end of 
1963 shows that the speculation in the Sunday Times was not 
entirely accurate. Interestingly, press speculation that Louw was 
unpopular goes back as far as 1947. 18 
Any leader of the NP would have been aware of the 
existence of provincial differences and allegiances within the 
party as well as the need to avoid the unnecessary alienation of 
Nationalists in any particular province. Erasmus, Sauer, Louw, and 
Donges were the senior and most influential Cape representatives 
in the cabinet. If they were to be removed under possibly 
acrimonious circumstances, there might have been very adverse 
repercussions for the NP in the Cape and on the 1961 general 
election as well. 
The relationship between Paul Sauer and Verwoerd. 
Although Paul Sauer managed to retain his position in 
the cabinet throughout Verwoerd's premiership, there is a great 
deal of evidence to indicate that his position was very tenuous 
at times and that relations between him and Verwoerd were 
frequently strained. In their biography of Paul Sauer, Dirk 
and Johanna de Villiers recount how Mrs Sauer had on one occasion 
in 1961 told the ambassador to France, Jan Jordaan, that Verwoerd 
wanted to remove her husband from the cabinet. Less than three 
18 Sunday Express, 22 June 1947. It was claimed that Louw was 
a "liability'', who often made "offensive" counter-productive 
remarks. 
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weeks after Verwoerd became Prime Minister, he tried to persuade 
Sauer to accept a move to a less important portfolio in the 
cabinet but Sauer refused. 19 
Further evidence of the poor relationship between Sauer 
and Verwoerd is given by Jaap Marais. He claims that on one 
occasion Verwoerd said to him, "I have never known why Paul Sauer 
is a Nationalist." 20 Apparently Verwoerd also expressed similar 
sentiments to Albert Hertzog and sometimes anglicised the 
pronunciation of Sauer's Christian name as a subtle insult to him. 21 
Shortly after the Sharpeville riots and the attempted 
assassination of Verwoerd, Sauer made his famous speech at 
Humansdorp. He pleaded for a revision of certain legislation 
relating to blacks. After stating that the old book of South 
African history had been closed a few weeks earlier at 
Sharpeville, he said that there would have to be a considerable 
change in the practical applications of the government's policy 
even though such changes did not imply any deviation from the 
declared policy of the government. Among the changes he felt 
necessary were the revision of the pass system wherever it caused 
ill-feeling, the revision of the laws relating to the use of 
strong drink by black people, an increase and improvement in the 
amount of contact between whites and peace-loving urban blacks, 
earnest attention to the improvement of wages paid to Africans, 
and extensive development of areas for black settlement. This 
speech had a considerable impact in both government and opposition 
19 
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circles and for a time was taken by some as heralding a very 
significant change in the implementation of government policy. 22 
Sauer appeared to retreat slightly after the controversy 
had begun to rage and when a reporter from the Cape Argus asked 
him whether his speech reflected any actual change of policy, 
he replied, "It was a statement of my opinion on the question and 
that is all." 23 
The fact that Sauer was merely expressing some of the 
sentiments held by other NP cabinet ministers shows how invidious 
his position was. At the last cabinet meeting held before the 
unsuccessful attempt on Verwoerd's life, Sauer, Donges and Ben 
Schoeman had all argued in favour of considering the abolition of 
pass books for blacks. 24 
In an editorial entitled "Politieke Fantasie", Die Burger 
attempted to allay suspicions that Sauer's speech indicated 
dissent within the NP or a sharp break with traditional 
Nationalist policy. It also ridiculed any idea that it was the 
harbinger of a realignment of South African politics. It felt 
that the speech had been distorted by devious individuals in 
order to deceive fools. Sauer was the third minister to have made 
such a plea within the space of a few days, the others being 
Erasmus and Maree. In conclusion, the extraordinary importance 
attached to Sauer's speech by opposition circles was discounted as 
a desperate attempt to spread dissension and division among the 
Nationalists. 25 
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On 20 May 1960 Donges read a statement to parliament 
that had been prepared by Verwoerd who was recovering from the 
assassination attempt which was seen as definitely laying to 
roost any ideas raised by Sauer's speech that the NP would 
consider embarking on a more liberal course. 26 
At a press conference in London, Eric Louw also reacted to 
Sauer's speech and noted that before he had left South Africa he 
had had a long discussion with Verwoerd in which the Prime 
Minister had said that he saw no reason for changing South 
Africa's basic policy of separate development. Verwoerd had 
pointed out that such riots were not uncommon in South Africa and 
other African territories. The recent riots had been chiefly 
confined to three main urban centres. He also emphasised that the 
government's policy of separate development "was intended equally 
for promoting the welfare of the non-European peoples", and that 
it was a pity that the overseas press were not prepared to give 
the whites any credit for their attempts to improve the welfare of 
the blacks. 27 
Many of the English-language newspapers in South Africa 
took great interest in the relationship between Sauer and Verwoerd 
for some time afterwards. In July 1961 the Sunday Times, for 
example, published an article entitled, "Verwoerd axe hangs over 
Louw, Sauer". The Sunday Times political correspondent wrote 
that after Sauer's controversial speech at Humansdorp, Verwoerd 
had tried to persuade him to become the Speaker in parliament 
but Sauer had refused "point-blank" and had told Verwoerd that he 
26 
27 
Debates of the House of Assembly, 20 May 1960, col 8837. 
INCH, PV4, Eric Louw Collection, File 55, Reply to question 
concerning the Sauer broadcast statement, September 1960. 
Page 92 
would have to dissolve the cabinet and then reconstitute it 
with out him. 28 
Notwithstanding his differences with Verwoerd, Sauer 
remained a loyal apologist for the NP. This may be seen in a 
letter that he wrote in August 1961 to JC Wilkinson of "The 
Unification Movement", a very minor political group that was 
concentrated largely in Natal. Wilkinson had attacked the NP for 
supposedly following policies that divided the nation and Sauer 
defended the government on all counts. 29 
Indications of dissent by junior members of the NP caucus. 
The NP caucus during this period appears to have been a 
remarkably cohesive body and there were very few indications of 
public dissent from Nationalist doctrines by its less influential 
members. Although the opposition press was quick to comment on 
rumblings of discontent, there were only two really 
well-publicised cases of division in the NP caucus during this 
period - those of J du Pisanie, and Japie Basson. 
In the NP caucus a simmering dispute between the Minister 
of Labour, Senator Jan De Klerk, and the MP for Germiston, 
Du Pisanie, showed a certain dissatisfaction with Verwoerd's plans 
to encourage the development of the homelands and the realities of 
bread-and-butter politics as they affected the needs of the white 
worker. At the beginning of 1961 the Sunday Times described how 
the development of the clothing industry on the borders of the 
Natal homelands and the concomitant employment of cheap black 
28 
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labour had led to the closure of various textile factories in 
Germiston and had caused a great deal of distress to the white 
garment workers in that area. Du Pisanie was strongly opposed 
to such industrial development development which would 
understandably cause unemployment and poverty in white working 
class areas. The newspaper stated that the feud between the 
minister and Du Pisanie had been going on for "two or three years" 
and that de Klerk's address to a meeting of garment workers in 
this constituency without first informing Du Pisanie of his 
intention to do so had led to an acrimonious debate between the 
two men in the Nationalist caucus - a debate which had to be 
resolved by Verwoerd himself. 30 
Matters did not improve in the Germiston constituency and a 
severe clash broke out between Senator De Klerk and the Germiston 
Klerewerkersunie, which, according to the Sunday Times was 
"Nationalist controlled". The Klerewerkersunie alleged that 
De Klerk had broken the promises that he had made to them in 
April 1959 that the workers would be protected from the 
competition presented by cheap black labour. According to the 
newspaper, De Klerk had written a letter to Du Pisanie in which 
he accused them of "ingratitude", and was critical of Du Pisanie 
of "attacking Government Policy at a caucus meeting on 
February 26". 31 
Within a week the Klerewerkersunie reacted by petitioning 
all cabinet ministers to support their requests to protect them 
against the competition of cheap black labour, to institute 
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effective wage control and to protect "European standards". The 
union pointed out that the number of white clothing workers in 
Germiston had decreased from 1 591 in 1954 to 610 in 1961. 32 
In April the Deputy Minister of Labour, Marais Viljoen, 
"reported" Du Pisanie to his divisional committee for 
11 indiscipline 11 in that Du Pisanie allegedly threatened to 
"raise his differences" with De Klerk in parliament. Du Pisanie 
denied that this was the case. 33 
In November 1959 Du Pisanie offered his resignation to 
Verwoerd, effective from 1 March 1960. In his letter of 
resignation he did not state any reasons for his decision but 
merely affirmed that he would continue to do his best for the NP. 
Verwoerd replied that he would have asked him to reconsider his 
decision if he thought that such a request would have any effect. 
He asked Du Pisanie to postpone the effective date of his 
resignation from 1 March to 1 July or 1 August, as the NP would 
be severely discomfited by the resignation of a MP during a 
parliamentary session, particularly during the year of the 50th 
anniversary of the establishment of the Union. 34 
Du Pisanie showed some of his feelings in a letter that he 
wrote to Eben Donges in March 1961. He told Donges that the NP was 
experiencing the greatest crisis in its history - a crisis which 
would have grave ramifications for the party should adequate 
leadership not be forthcoming. Du Pisanie expressed his belief 
that the prime minister was not equal to dealing with such a 
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situation and that he should receive immediate help. Du Pisanie 
was of the opinion that Donges deserved to be prime minister and 
that he would have a decisive part to play in preventing any 
disaster from striking their people. 35 
It is easy enough to dismiss the entire Du Pisanie 
"rebellion" as being of trivial importance - he commanded little 
overt support from fellow parliamentarians his "rebellion" did 
not thwart Verwoerd in his plans for the homelands, and the whole 
episode was soon relegated to history. Nevertheless it was 
evidence of a growing disenchantment with the ideology and the 
labour policies of the NP on the part of those white workers who 
had traditionally supported the NP. They had not been as 
successful as they had hoped in reaping the economic benefits to 
which they felt they were entitled. It was from such workers that 
the Conservative Workers' Party would look for support later 
that year. 
The white population of South West Africa ( now Namibia 
was represented by six Nationalist representatives in parliament 
and one of them, the MP for Namib, Japie Basson, attracted a great 
deal of attention in 1959 with his quite spectacular one-man 
revolt against the rule of Verwoerd. Basson had come from a 
political family and had already changed allegiance from the UP 
to the NP. He was the son of a former Nationalist senator and had 
later, after gaining a law degree at Stellenbosch University been 
a journalist on the staff of the Suiderstem which was a pro-UP 
newspaper. In the 1943 general election he had stood for the UP 
in Moorreesburg against Frans Erasmus. In 1947 he left the UP 
35 CACT, A 1646, Dr Donges Collection, vol 322, J du Pisanie -
TE Donges, 16 March 1961. 
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"because he disagreed with its anti-Republican policy" and in 
1950 he was elected to parliament as the Nationalist candidate 
for Namib. 36 
In 1959 the NP introduced legislation in parliament to end 
the representation of blacks in both the House of Assembly and the 
Senate. Basson disagreed strongly with these steps and was 
subsequently expelled from the caucus of the NP because of his 
refusal to accept the discipline of the party in this matter. In 
July 1959 the Head Committee of the NP in South West Africa met 
to discuss what steps should be taken concerning his future in the 
party. After deliberating for two days, the committee decided not 
to expel him from the party but instead to offer him "the 
opportunity to make proposals to bridge the gap between himself 
and the party." 37 
During this difficult period in Basson's career, some NP 
parliamentarians were quick to distance themselves from him. 
Eric Lauw addressed a meeting of his constituents in Beaufort West 
in May 1959 and told them that it had been apparent during the 
previous two parliamentary sessions that Japie Basson had adopted 
a position of dissent. Lauw cited Basson's recent call for the 
speedy exchange of diplomats between South Africa and black 
African states as an example of his dissident tendencies. 38 
Japie Bass on received support from at least one 
Nationalist MP, namely P du Plessis, the MP for Brakpan. In a 
letter to Basson in July 1959, Du Plessis wrote that it appeared 
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from the newspapers that the gears of the "steamroller" had begun 
to grind a little. Du Plessis described himself as one of the few 
in the party who believed that it was better to build than to 
destroy. He was therefore pleased that Japie Basson was still 
in their midst. 39 This letter is particularly interesting in the 
light of Jaap Marais's opinion that Basson "was promised support 
which was not forthcoming when the die was cast." 40 
In October 1959, however, the Head Committee reversed its 
earlier decision and by eighteen votes to six, decided "with 
regret" to expel Bass on from the NP. 41 In a letter to the Chief 
Management Council of the NP in South West Africa in October 1959, 
Basson pointed out that in all his public actions since May 
earlier that year, he had been inspired by only one motive 
namely to work for the best interests of the NP. His years in 
the NP had been the happiest in all his political career and the 
NP deserved unending credit for the great and historic task that 
it had performed in South Africa. However, he acknowledged that he 
felt less happy with their current leader, who had made great 
mistakes that had proved unfortunate for himself, for the country 
and for the NP. He was nevertheless prepared to give Verwoerd a 
reasonable chance as the leader of the party and as prime 
minister. 42 
In an editorial soon after Japie Basson's expulsion, the 
Cape Times pointed out that the decision to expel Basson had not 
been unanimous and had taken longer than was really necessary. It 
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expressed the opinion that "the dissatisfaction with Verwoerd and 
sympathy with Basson must be much more widespread in the 
constituencies." The issue of the abolition of the Natives' 
Representatives, which was the reason for Basson's breakaway, had 
not been discussed by the caucus and had been "exclusively" the 
idea of Verwoerd. 43 
Basson resisted all attempts and appeals made to persuade 
him to resign his seat in parliament after he left the NP. In 
April 1960 he refused to accede to a request made by the Head 
Management Council of the NP in South West Africa that he should 
resign his seat. In a letter to Basson in April 1960, the 
assistant secretary, JWF Pretorius, notified him that the Council 
had asked him to resign without delay as he had irrevocably broken 
with the NP and was currently acting in opposition to that 
44 party. 
In May 1960 the chairman of the Oranjemund branch of the NP 
notified Basson that at a public meeting held there and attended 
by 269 people, a motion had been passed unanimously asking for 
his resignation. The motion pointed out that although he had been 
elected to represent the Nationalists, he was now campaigning 
against NP policies. He was now apparently the chief parliamentary 
spokesman for the coloureds and for the UP of South West Africa. 
The motion also reminded Basson of his own motto, 11 Hou Namib 
Nasionaal 11 • 45 
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In July 1960 Basson addressed a meeting of his constituents 
for the first time since his expulsion from the NP. He described 
Verwoerd as an "out-and-out dictator" who wanted no-one but 
"yes-men" around him, and said that this dictatorial attitude 
would be the downfall of the NP. Referring to the issue of South 
Africa's becoming a republic he told his constituents that this 
would neither make it more independent nor unite the Afrikaans 
and English-speaking whites. He reaffirmed his refusal to resign 
his seat in parliament and claimed that he still had the 
"confidence of his constituents". 46 
According to H Kenney, one of Verwoerd's biographers, not 
all the Nationalist MPs had been in favour of ending the system 
of Native Representation at that time. Although this matter had 
been discussed in the Nationalist caucus, no final decision had 
been reached and Verwoerd did not discuss it again with the caucus 
before he announced his intentions in parliament concerning this 
matter. Kenney describes this as "a typical high-handed action by 
Verwoerd ... accepted with typical docility by his party." 47 
Verwoerd's actions may also have caused some MPs to feel resentful 
against him. 
It is easy to exaggerate the importance of Basson's 
well-publicised rebellion against Verwoerd's leadership. With 
hindsight it is clear that some sections of the English-language 
press did overemphasise the real strength of Basson's support, 
much of which was a spin-off from dissatisfaction with Verwoerd's 
style of leadership. One thing is however certain whatever 
Cape Times, 18 July 1960. 46 
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support Basson might have thought he had within the ranks of the 
NP and whatever the publicity the press might have accorded him, 
Verwoerd's hold over the NP did not suffer as a result of the 
Basson issue. In the subsequent general election in 1961 there was 
a further swing in favour of the NP in both South Africa and South 
West Africa. 
Murmurs of discontent among the Nationalist rank-and-file. 
The occasional rumblings of dissatisfaction among ordinary 
Nationalists also received a certain amount of attention from the 
English-language press. Towards the end of 1959 there was a minor 
upheaval among some of the Nationalists on the Orange Free State 
goldfields, and this received some publicity. In a series of 
meetings in the Odenaalsrus and Virginia areas approximately 50 
former Nationalists signed declarations rejecting Nationalist 
policies and affirming support for the UP. The signatories 
included the secretary of the NP in the Welkom I Virginia I 
Hennenman area, JC Grundling. One of the statements accused the 
government of "grossly neglecting the interests of the European 
worker", and described the miners as being "over-taxed". 48 
Although the effects of this discontent were rather 
ephemeral, they did indicate a certain resentment in some 
working-class circles in the NP. In an editorial in the 
Cape Argus, the writer cautioned readers against entertaining 
hopes of a serious split in the NP, at the same time emphasizing 
that the government's racial policies and its Bantustan policy 
could be expected to affect the economy. The editor wrote 
48 Cape Argus, 24 November 1959. The report erroneously referred 
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A few miners renouncing their support of the 
Nationalist Party does not mean a landslide, but what 
the movement on the Free State goldfields does mean is 
that persistent neglect of the economic factor is 
beginning to cause trouble for the party. 49 
In the ranks of the opposition press, inspecting the NP 
for any signs of dissension or possible rupture was understandably 
a popular pursuit. Thus, in The Forum, a comparatively liberal 
journal, one political columnist, called "Scrutator", wrote in 
the January 1960 issue that at the "humbler party levels" of 
the NP, 
there have been signs 
would be too strong a word 
brackets little breezes 
blowing through the stale 
the same story. 50 
of fractiousness rebellion 
- and in the upper intellectual 
of self-criticism and candour 
political atmosphere have told 
Opponents of the NP recognised that the party's hold 
on the support of the white working-class was not as strong as 
it had previously been. The journalist Scott Haigh writing in 
The Forum, described the urban and peri-urban constituencies 
in the Transvaal and the Cape as the "Achilles heel of 
Nationalism". He saw these constituents as "railwaymen trying to 
come out on their wizened pay packets, white-collar Afrikaners 
struggling on meagre salaries, artisans whose earnings buy less 
and less as prices rise." 51 
Dissent in academic and intellectual circles. 
Academics had always played a significant role both in 
supporting and formulating the policy of the NP, and although the 
vast majority of NP-supporting academics remained loyal to the 
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party during the early years of Verwoerd's rule, there were small 
but significant signs of dissent on the part of some academics at 
a few Afrikaans universities. It is tempting to draw similarities 
between these signs of dissent and the memorable period in the 
middle 1950s when a number of academics at the University of 
Pretoria vehemently opposed the attempts of the NP to remove the 
coloureds from the common roll. This attracted much opprobrium 
in NP circles. In 1959 the University of Potchefstroom was the 
scene of minor dissent against Verwoerd's leadership of the NP, 
staged by two influential academics, Professor HJ Coetzee and 
Professor LJ du Plessis. 
Du Plessis was influential, not only because of his 
position as Professor of Law and Politics and Dean of the Faculty 
of Commerce at the University of Potchefstroom, but also because 
of the significant role he had played in various Afrikaner 
institutions. He had been one of the founders of the Broederbond 
in 1918 ; he was a director of the newspaper, Dagbreek ; he had 
been a co-author of the 1942 Nationalist "Draft Constitution for 
the Republic" ; he had been influential in formulating the policy 
of Christian National Education, and was also the first chairman 
of Volkskas Bank. In 1939 he became a director of the Transvaler 
when Verwoerd was editor of that newspaper, but later he resigned 
his directorship after clashing with Verwoerd over the question 
of the Ossewabrandwag. His influence in NP circles was thus 
considerable. 52 
52 
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Cape Times in which he criticised certain aspects of National 
Party doctrine and practice. In his opinion, "Dr. Verwoerd's 
policy was the main obstacle to national progress" and the Prime 
Minister's Bantustan policy was not "in the interests of South 
Africa" but was instead in the "sectional interests" of the NP. 
In an interview with the Cape Times he also expressed his view 
that a coalition between sections of the UP and NP was imminent 
but that something would be necessary to "trigger off" such a 
coalition. Subsequently, Du Plessis was expelled from the NP. 53 
Verwoerd expressed his disdain for the "professors" in a 
letter to Professor Abel Coetzee of Parktown, Johannesburg. 
Coetzee was of the opinion that the intellectual revolt stemmed 
from the fact that the NP was so strong in parliament and the 
opposition so weak. This meant that the NP had to act as its own 
opposition as well and had to subject its own actions to 
criticism. Such criticism from within the party would then be 
seized upon and exaggerated by the English press which was 
determined to sow confusion among the Nationalists. Verwoerd told 
Coetzee that he would rather refer to these academics as 
dissenters instead of intellectuals, as the dissidents were 
greatly outnumbered by academics who did not stir up trouble. 
The NP preferred to remain silent as far as possible, in the hope 
that these "dissenters'' would be dealt with by their own friends. 
According to Verwoerd, the NP caucus had been more unified during 
the previous parliamentary session than ever before and public 
reaction to the revolt of the academics had been more gratifying 
53 Cape Times, 9 March 1959, 11 April 1959. 
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to the NP than they had expected. Verwoerd attributed this to 
the NP's progress in its racial policies. 54 
In a letter to a NP supporter Verwoerd's private 
secretary wrote that Verwoerd had frequently tried to persuade 
Du Plessis to abandon such UP ideas as political integration 
with the blacks in white areas, the creation of a racial 
federation, and co-operation with the ANC leadership. Although 
Verwoerd had been unsuccessful in this respect, he was convinced 
that Du Plessis and his fellow thinkers represented only a few 
dissident voices and that virtually the entire Potchef stroom 
community and the Reformed Church were still solidly Nationalist. 55 
Du Plessis was not alone in expressing his dissent. He 
was supported by Professor JH Coetzee, of the same University. 
Professor Coetzee was described by the Cape Times as "a leading 
Nationalist intellectual" who had also been one of the founders 
of the Ossewabrandwag. He was jailed during the Second World War 
for his part in the Stormjaer movement. He was on record as 
saying that ''voluntary apartheid" was the answer to South Africa's 
problems, that the government's policies on blacks were 
"irnpractical 11 , showed a "lack of tact" and also placed too 
much reliance on the "negative aspects of apartheid" such as the 
pass laws and "discriminatory practices". Regarding segregation, 
he was of the opinion that South Africa did need segregation, but 
that it should not be based on a "baasskap or Herrenvolk ideal" 
but rather on the reality of the existence of the "diversities 
54 
55 
INCH, PV 93, 
HF Verwoerd, 
INCH, PV 93, 
J Venter, 29 
Dr HF Verwoerd 
19 May 1959 ; 
DR HF Verwoerd 
May 1959. 
Collection, file 1/30/1/4, A Coetzee -
HF Verwoerd - A Coetzee, 1 July 1959. 
Collection, file 1/30/1/4, F Barnard -
Page 105 
of race" in South Africa. Coetzee also urged much greater 
consultation and co-operation with the leaders of the ANC and 
described Chief Luthuli as a man for whom he had "the deepest 
respect". Not surprisingly, Coetzee stated that the reception 
he had received from some cabinet ministers in ''personal 
discussions'' had been ''cool''. 56 
Du Plessis and Coetzee were also supported by a 
prominent historian at the University of Potchefstroom, 
Professor DW Kruger, who subsequently announced that he had 
resigned from the NP. In an interview with the Cape Times 
he expressed his support for Graaff's opinion that the coloureds 
should be returned to the common voters' roll. He also felt that 
economic integration was not a ''policy'' but a ''fact'', and that 
skin colour was not important but Western values certainly were. 57 
In his article on the "professors' rebellion" of 1959, 
CJ Coetzee describes graphically how much pressure was exerted 
on these academics to recant or to remain silent. This pressure 
was exerted by other academics, the students at the university, 
the Council of the university, the Nationalist press, some 
clergymen, and various other people. The chairman of the Council 
of the university informed the three professors of the "damage 
they had caused the university", and he asked them to act as 
circumspectly as possible ; to abstain for a while from making 
public appearances ; "to attend to their work" and to "carefully 
conduct themselves in classes in front of students". 58 
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Another Nationalist thinker, FA Floors ) van Jaarsveld, 
wrote a letter to Die Transvaler under the pseudonym 
"Nasionalis-Realis". He argued that the whites had tried for three 
hundred years to segregate themselves from the blacks, but this 
policy had not advanced one iota. The question of rights for the 
permanently settled urban blacks formed the kernel of South 
Africa's racial policies but whites continued to ignore their 
legitimate grievances, in the process labelling their leaders as 
"agitators" who were under the influence of communists. 
Flexibility was not an indication of weakness. In his view the 
coloureds should also be granted the concession of representation 
by their own people in parliament and this would win half a 
million more friends for the whites. 59 
Professor CJ Uys, Professor of History at the University 
of the Orange Free State, attracted some attention when he told 
his audience at a "Wonder of Afrikaans" festival in Molteno that 
sooner or later the control of South Africa had to pass into the 
hands of the black majority. He was of the opinion that the 
attitude of the whites towards the Africans had to undergo a 
drastic and immediate change. As the result of the actions of 
"a hostile press and short-sighted politicians", the blacks were 
under the impression that "Afrikaans-speaking South Africans 
were their particular arch enemies". This idea had been emphasised 
by Chief Luthuli. 60 
The dissatisfaction of the academics at the University 
of Pretoria about the removal of the coloureds from the common 
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roll most probably had very little ultimate effect on the NP other 
than to embarrass it temporarily. Likewise the "revolt" of 
academics such as Du Plessis, Kruger and Coetzee had little 
impact on the NP or the government. The great mass of 
Nationalist-supporting academics remained loyal to the party 
whatever their private reservations or objections. It should 
be remembered that there was a distinct gulf between the 
"intellectuals" in the NP who deliberated about policy partly on 
intellectual grounds, and the rank-and-file supporter of the party 
who based his support for the NP largely on emotional and personal 
issues. Nevertheless these events in academic circles would have 
had some effect, caused as they were by men who had been prominent 
in Nationalist politics or in the field of Afrikaner interests for 
a long time. 
No mention of the dissent in the NP in the early 1960s 
would be complete without a passing reference to the Hermanus 
Conference held in April 1961 by what the Sunday Times described 
as a group of "Nationalist intellectuals and 'other thinkers' " 
This conference resulted in the formation of an "action 
committee" of about a dozen members which in the words of the 
newspaper had the intention of forming "pressure groups" in order 
"to bring pressure to bear on the government to modify its 
race-policies immediately". Some influential figures in 
intellectual circles served on the committee. These included 
Professor NJ Olivier, who was vice-chairman of the South African 
Bureau of Racial Affairs ( SABRA ) and who was also an academic 
at Stellenbosch Professor SP Celliers, who was from Stellenbosch 
University and an executive member of SABRA, and the Afrikaans 
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writer, WA de Klerk. In the report in the Sunday Times an 
unnamed Nationalist MP was quoted as saying that any Nationalist 
who joined such pressure groups and who persisted in criticising 
the government would face expulsion from the party. 61 
A subsequent report in the Cape Times commented on a 
"scathing attack" made in parliament by BJ Vorster, then Deputy 
Minister of Education, Arts and Science, on the "intellectuals" 
who were involved in the Herrnanus conference. The newspaper saw 
this speech "as a warning to all Afrikaner intellectuals who 
claimed to be Nationalists and yet who ventured to criticize the 
Government and apartheid". 62 
The controversial position adopted by Die Burger. 
Any students of South African politics at this time, 
who were speculating on the existence and extent of dissension 
within the ranks of the NP, would have viewed the controversy 
surrounding "Dawie", i.e. Pi et Cillie, the editor of 
Die Burger, with great interest because it was another 
indication of the difference between the supposed hard-liners 
of the Transvaal and the more conciliatory and liberal Cape 
Nationalists. 
In November 1960 there was a significant and embarrassing 
clash between Cillie and the Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Development. Die Burger speculated on the ''possibility" 
of the coloureds' being represented by "their own people" in 
parliament. De Wet Nel denied that he had ever referred to "the 
possibility of direct representation for Coloureds and Indians in 
61 
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Parliament", whereupon Die Burger then published a photocopy of 
his statement on the matter that had appeared in Die Transvaler. 
The Cape leader of the NP, Donges, apparently then visited Cillie 
to discuss the matter and allegedly told him that the newspaper 
should be more "careful". To this, Cillie replied that it was a 
"newspaper's duty to allow free discussion among its readers." 63 
Die Burger criticised De Wet Nel in its editorials of 
28 and 30 November 1960 in terms that effectively accused him of 
tampering with the truth. The newspaper claimed that it had not 
been the intention to "affront" De Wet Nel but that it was clear 
from an article published in Die Transvaler, that Nel's opinion 
was that as the coloureds increased in number and maturity, they 
should gradually be given more representation on a basis which 
would hold no danger for the whites. The editorial then went on to 
say that Nel had no reason to be ashamed of expressing such 
sentiments as they were typical of the trend of thought in 
Nationalist circles. 64 
The editorial of 30 November 1960 was much harsher in its 
criticism. It began with the statement that two days earlier it 
had regretfully published a sharp statement by De Wet Nel and 
that it now felt compelled to publish an even more hostile letter 
from Nel including several inaccuracies. This letter, it said, was 
bitterly damaging to the Nationalist unity which Nel should, after 
all, be as eager to defend as they were. The editorial also 
accused Nel of expressing his disagreements with Die Burger in a 
way which would delight only his political opponents. It 
reaffirmed the newspaper's belief that Nel had indeed expressed 
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the sentiments that he was now denying and that Die Burger had 
been accurate in its reporting. It suggested that Nel should, for 
once, read the newspaper for himself and not rely on an unreliable 
clipping service. It reiterated that he had no reason to be 
ashamed of his utterances and deprecated any attempt to have a 
witch-hunt in NP circles as this would have very unfortunate 
repercussions on the political unity of the Afrikaners. 65 
It would have been less noteworthy if an opposition 
newspaper had launched this kind of attack on a cabinet minister. 
The fact that it had been made by a newspaper that had been a 
staunch supporter of and propagandist for the NP ever since its 
establishment, gives an indication of the feelings aroused in some 
NP circles by this incident. 
The opposition press naturally paid much attention to these 
tempestuous events reported in Die Burger. The Sunday Times 
in its edition of 9 April 1961, devoted a great deal of attention 
to Cillie's position. It also presented an article written by him 
in Die Burger of the day before, in which he had criticised 
certain aspects of the NP leadership. Cillie stated that in the 
previous few years a certain tendency to follow public opinion 
rather than to mould it had crept into Nationalist circles. He 
posed the question whether the NP was the political schoolmaster 
of the people and whether its leaders spoke primarily to be 
applauded or to keep the public fully informed. He also commented 
that there was a great deal of talent on the fringes of the NP 
that was not being utilised effectively. The Sunday Times 
reported that in 1960 "extremist Nationalists" had attempted to 
65 Die Burger, 28 November 1960 & 30 November 1960. 
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force Cillie out of his editorial position. This occurred when 
Die Burger had supported a "New Deal" policy for the coloureds. 
On that occasion Cillie had resigned but his board of directors 
had refused to accept his resignation and had instead stated their 
confidence in him. 66 
Another example of Cillie's demonstration of 
independence was a discussion that he had with Dr Donges when 
the government was intending to lower the voting age to eighteen 
years so that its republican campaign could reap the benefits 
of the high percentage of Afrikaans-speakers in that age group. 
Cillie was not in favour of this and when Donges said that it was 
necessary for the attainment of a republic, he retorted that they 
would then simply have to wait another three years for their 
republic. 67 
In June 1961, PW Botha, then Deputy Minister of the 
Interior, wrote a letter to Cillie, complaining that Die Burger 
had not given adequate coverage to one of his recent important 
speeches. Cillie replied in conciliatory terms. Botha actually 
threatened that he would refuse to give copies of his speeches 
to Die Burger in future. Cillie asked him to reconsider this 
threat and told Botha that he was always at Botha's disposal for 
a personal conversation about such problems. He reminded Botha 
that honest reporting was the primary function of Die Burger. 68 
During the 1961 parliamentary session, the board of 
directors of Nasionale Pers received a delegation from the 
66 Sunday Times, 9 April 1961 ; Die Burger, 8 April 1961. 
67 WD Beukes I ed. ) ' Oor grense heen : op pad na 'n nasionale pers 
1948 - 1990 I Cape Town, 1992 ) ' p 15. 68 CACT, Dr Donges Collection, A 1646, vol 322, Pi et Cillie - PW 
Botha, 12 June 1961. 
Page 112 
Federal Council of the NP, which complained about certain 
attitudes adopted by Die Burger. One of the members of the 
NP delegation, Dr Donges, requested that there be closer contact 
between the NP and the newspaper in order to avoid unpleasant 
estrangements. Ben Schoeman added his voice by insisting that the 
newspaper should stay in line with Nationalist policy. 69 
In any discussion of the role played by NP-supporting 
newspapers during this period, it should be remembered that the 
Afrikaans-language press was not as strong or influential as its 
English-language counterpart. William Vatcher points out that the 
circulation of the nineteen daily newspapers which he calls 
"pro-Afrikaner", was 165 600 while that of the English newspapers 
was 731 000. 70 
Feelings of disquiet in Nationalist circles about the Immorality 
Act. 
The English-language press at this time also gave some 
prominence to feelings of disquiet on the implementation of the 
Immorality Act Act 21 of 1950 ) . In a report in August 1961 
the Cape Times claimed that in the space of one week 
Die Burger had published 24 letters about the Immorality Act. 
Widely contradictory views were expressed ranging from those of 
the reader who wrote that all the law had achieved was "dreadful 
heartbreak and the destruction of homes" to those of another, who 
stated that in his opinion the punishment for contravention of the 
act was too light. In his view, the guilty ones should be branded 
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or have an iron ring put through their noses as such people were 
"nothing but barbarians and should be treated as such." 71 
During the following month there was a discussion on the 
effects of the Immorality Act at the NP's Cape Congress. A report 
in the Sunday Times prior to the congress predicted that some 
delegates might ask that the police should intervene only when 
there were "flagrant violations of the Act". No resolution was 
adopted and after a debate lasting an hour, the matter was 
referred to the Head Committee which would "raise the matter" 
with the government. One demand put forward was that hearings 
under this act should be held in private. The reporter for 
the Sunday Times stated that the general view of delegates 
who criticised the Immorality Act was that the act had failed 
to serve as a deterrent. It was causing misery to innocent people 
such as wives, children and other relatives. 72 
The utterances and conduct of Albert Hertzog. 
In its attempt to win votes from UP supporters, 
the NP was probably hampered by some of the actions and 
utterances of the right wing members of the party. Prominent among 
these was Dr Albert Hertzog, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, 
who was later forced out of the NP. A small selection of Hertzog's 
speeches will illustrate that he may well have alienated UP 
supporters who might otherwise have switched allegiance to the NP. 
In a speech at the Strand in December 1958, Hertzog was 
reported as saying 
71 Cape Times, 19 August 1961. 
72 Sunday Times, 20 August 1961 & 3 September 1961. 
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that the South African War had never ended. It 
continues today with its form changed. It was no 
longer the British Tommy v. the Boer ; the soldier 
today was the Black man - the Native, the Coloured 
man and the 'koelie'. The weapons were ideas ; 
half-truths, which included lies like 'You have 
been stealing their lands', 'You cause the greater 
number of them to face hunger and starvation', 
'Apartheid is a form of slavery', and so on. 73 
Hertzog was also a fierce opponent of what he saw as 
English "liberal" institutions such as the Universities of Cape 
Town and the Witwatersrand. In a speech in parliament in May 1960, 
he criticised the University of the Witwatersrand for employing 
Robert Sobukwe. He said, "For the university authorities to keep 
a lecturer there, a man who was educated at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, a man whose salary was paid by them, whilst at the 
same time he was the organizer and leader of the Pan Africanists, 
shows the greatest irresponsibility or else ill-will towards the 
White man in this country." 74 
Hertzog had an extreme dislike of the South African 
mining capitalists, and he criticised them severely in speeches 
delivered in July 1960. Opening the 21 st Congress of the 
Nasionale Jeugbond he said that the mining capitalists, using 
an "English Press which they had systematically built up since 
1896" were trying to "destroy the Nationalist Government and the 
White man". In his view there was a choice between breaking this 
mining press or witnessing the destruction of the white man. He 
accused the press of being largely responsible for what had 
happened at Sharpeville, Nyanga and Langa. 75 
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Attempts by the National Party to improve its overseas image. 
As the Nationalist government was desirous of improving 
its image overseas it tended to welcome influential pro-South 
African overseas visitors such as Field-Marshal Montgomery. 
In December 1959, after visiting South Africa and meeting 
Verwoerd, Montgomery described him as an "obviously sincere, 
quiet-spoken and kindly man", who was a "leader, a man of decision 
and action." Montgomery said that he did not think that racial 
barriers in South Africa "could be suddenly swept away because of 
the social differences and varying standards of civilization in 
the country." He described Verwoerd's plans as being a "sincere 
attempt to work out a solution that would be acceptable to the 
White people and which would not be unjust to the Native 
population." 76 With the 1961 general election looming, this kind 
of publicity could conceivably have increased the credibility of 
the NP in the eyes of the white electorate, especially among 
those English-speaking voters who might have been concerned with 
the negative international image of South Africa. 
The effect on the National Party of memories of the Second 
World War. 
When BJ Vorster became Minister of Justice in 1961 
the Sunday Times published an article on his internment during 
the war, and how he had been rejected by the NP as its candidate 
for the Brakpan constituency in 1948 because he was considered 
too extreme. Until 1952 Vorster had regarded the NP as too 
76 Cape Times, 21 December 1959 
Page 116 
moderate. He was also accused of referring to Queen Elizabeth as 
"the Medem in England". The newspaper quoted Vorster as having 
said in 1942, 
We stand for Christian Nationalism, which is an ally 
of National Socialism. You can call the anti-democratic 
system dictatorship if you like. In Italy it is called 
Fascism, in Germany National Socialism, and in South 
Africa Christian Nationalism. 77 
In an interview with his biographer, John D'Oliviera, 
Vorster claimed that he was originally nominated as the Afrikaner 
Party candidate for Brakpan but Malan had refused to accept this 
because Vorster was an officer in the Ossewabrandwag. 78 
Many voters were aware that Verwoerd had opposed the 
immigration of Jewish refugees to South Africa when he was still 
a professor at the University of Stellenbosch. He had also opposed 
the royal visit in 1947, not even mentioning it in his newspaper. 
Most importantly a judge in the Transvaal Supreme Court, who was 
passing judgement in a case of defamation brought against 
The Star by Die Transvaler, said that Verwoerd had supported 
nazi propaganda, and had made his paper a "tool of the nazis in 
South Africa". 79 
Thus, during this period the NP was hindered in its 
attempts to attract support from some sections of the electorate 
by the fact that some of its influential members were seen or 
remembered as having taken extremist positions during the Second 
World War an event which was still fresh in many people's 
memories. 
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The National Party attempts to attract English support. 
A conspicuous aspect of the NP's activities during the 
period 1958 - 1961 was an attempt to broaden its base of support 
by attracting more votes from the English-speaking electorate. 
This was possibly related to a feeling within the party that as 
South Africa would soon be a republic, English-speaking whites 
would become more aware of their South African identity and would 
in some way be more amenable to the ideals and goals of the 
Nationalists. Japie Basson, shortly before his expulsion from 
the NP, told parliament : "For historical reasons, with which 
we are well acquainted, the National Party to-day consists 
practically only of Afrikaans-speaking people." 80 This was to change 
slightly in the years to come. WA Kleynhans estimates that only 
about ten percent of the English-speaking voters in Natal voted 
for the republic in the referendum of 1960. This shows the 
magnitude of the task which the NP had set for itself. 81 
After the announcement of the results of the referendum, 
Verwoerd expressed the hope that if English-speaking whites found 
it difficult to join the NP they would establish their own 
conservative political party which could then co-operate with the 
Nationalists on racial matters. Die Burger saw Verwoerd's speech 
as an intimation that English-speakers might soon be included in 
the cabinet. This would attract the English vote in the next 
general election. 82 
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A letter that Verwoerd wrote to a SJ Suchet of 
Vereeniging in September 1959 also provides insight into 
Verwoerd's thinking on the matter. He said that it was a matter 
of great regret that English-speakers had not been included in 
the cabinets of Malan and Strijdom. He claimed that those 
English-speakers who joined the NP often found themselves 
"ostracised, intimidated or harmed in their business life". This 
had been the case with Senators Struben, Miles-Cadman and Mc Cord, 
who had been raised to the former Senate but who had then been 
regarded as outcasts by their own people. Likewise, when Alf 
Trollip, "a front-bencher United Party man who remained United 
Party, was appointed Administrator of Natal, he was often treated 
badly and even called a tool of the Government". 83 
In 1961 there was indeed speculation that the NP was 
devoting serious thought to the idea of appointing one or two 
English speakers to the cabinet. The Cape Times mentioned press 
that there was a possibility that Verwoerd would appoint Sir 
Francis de Guingand to the cabinet. Sir Francis had been chief 
of staff to Field-Marshal Montgomery during the Second World War 
and had later settled in South Africa where he was head of the 
South African Foundation. But nothing came of this suggestion. 84 
One of the logical English-speaking contenders for a 
cabinet post during this time was Frank Waring, whom Verwoerd 
approached during the middle of 1961. In a letter to Verwoerd, 
Waring summed up his position. Since his break with the UP, he 
and his wife had taken "a pro South African independent line", 
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which had closely followed the "broad principles" of the NP 
concerning both "Native policy" and "constitutional independence 
culminating in the Republic". Nevertheless, Waring expressed the 
opinion that it would defeat the "object of bringing English 
speaking support" to the Nationalists, were he and his wife to 
join the NP. "As English speaking independents what we say or do 
cannot be readily discredited by the opposition press but as 
members of your party it would be a different matter 
Differences, however slight, would be exaggerated and be used to 
frighten English support away, and both of us would be on the 
defensive." Waring was however of the opinion that there was a 
role to be played by "selected Independent candidates" in seats 
which the Nationalists could not win as they could attract "a 
substantial floating vote plus Nationalist support", and thus 
reduce the voting strength of the Opposition as well as give the 
English vote "a new directive". 85 
In his subsequent letter to Waring, Verwoerd expressed 
disappointment that Waring was reluctant to play a more public 
and forceful role in the NP. In his view, Waring would fill a much 
more important role "as a full-fledged leading member of the 
government party, who in your person would symbolise both the fact 
that the government and its party do not wish to be sectional, as 
it may seem to be against its wish, and the fact that 
English-speaking whites ) also subscribe fully to the policy of 
separate development." Verwoerd told Waring that he was putting 
these ideas to him as he would not like to see him entering "a 
85 UNISA, Joyce and Frank Waring Collection, file 20.2.4, 
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futile dead-end lane in political life", and that he was proposing 
such ideas only as ''a friend interested in your future". 86 
The general position of the National Party in 1961. 
The NP was able to approach the 1961 general election 
very confidently. It was a remarkably cohesive party at the time 
although there were undoubtedly feelings of disquiet in certain 
circles of the party - a disquiet, which to a large extent, was 
magnified by sections of the opposition press. It was a period in 
which Verwoerd was able to consolidate his position as leader of 
the party, partly by successfully bringing the Nationalists' 
republican ideals to fruition, and partly by exerting his very 
forceful personality among his fellow Nationalists. Verwoerd's 
close encounter with death also contributed to the growth of his 
prestige. Many of the electorate felt that he was a man with a 
mission and that his task had not yet been accomplished. In short, 
an element of hero worship crept into their regard for Verwoerd. 
Most of the factors influencing the South African political scene 
were also to the advantage of the Nationalists these would 
include the delimitation of certain constituencies the lowering 
of the age requirement pertaining to the franchise the 
preponderance of Afrikaans voters among the younger electorate 
the fact that the Afrikaans newspapers played a great role in 
propagating the ideals of Nationalism, as well as the way in which 
the NP was able to identify itself so successfully with the 
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current aims and beliefs of the Afrikaans-speaking whites. The 
firm way in which the NP dealt with those academics, journalists 
and rank-and-file Nationalists who publicly deviated from 
Nationalist doctrine also had some impact on the consolidation of 
the position of the party. During this period the NP began to 
feel more secure of its position in white politics in the light of 
the results of the 1958 general election. This feeling of greater 
security manifested itself in the Nationalists' attempts to 
attract greater support from English-speaking voters. The attempts 
made in certain overseas quarters to discredit South Africa, as 
well as the domestic disturbances in South Africa in 1960, 
probably also played a part in the party's attempts to persuade 
the electorate that South Africa was a beleaguered nation which 
would be defended most easily only if many whites were to move in 
a more conservative direction and to fall in under the 
Nationalist banner. 
Over and above all this, the personality of Verwoerd 
loomed large. Professor Nie Olivier gives a very lucid 
description of the way that Verwoerd managed to assert his 
dominance over the NP. He wrote 
Verwoerd, because of his intellect and ideological 
commitment to a particular approach and vision his 
ability to provide an intellectually acceptable and 
logical motivation for apartheid, the consistency he 
displayed in implementing the principles of that policy ; 
his ability to render his opponents' arguments worthless 
or illogical his ability to utilise the political 
forces at his disposal both within and outside the NP 
and, some would say, his ability to exploit the innate 
prejudices of the white electorate, was able to squash 
effectively the opposition which existed or arose within 
the NP against his policies. The fact that he provided 
the NP with what appeared to be a logical and coherent 
racial policy ; that he stood up to Harold Macmillan's 
'winds of change' speech ; that he stood firmly against 
the vendetta waged against South Africa by and in the 
United 
South 
Nations 
Africa 
on this issue 
reproach. 87 
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that he was the man who 
into a republic ( and won the 
) - all these tended to promote 
transformed 
referendum 
him beyond 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
THE UNITED PARTY IN THE PERIOD 
LEADING UP TO THE 1961 GENERAL ELECTION. 
Although the results of the 1958 general election were 
a grievous disappointment to the UP, it could derive some 
consolation from the fact that there were now very few 
constituencies left and that the political situation 
marginal 
in this 
respect had become relatively stable. Unless a new delimination 
commission 
some very 
were to make very far reaching changes 
extraordinary shift of population or 
and barring 
some great 
calamity for the UP, there would be relatively few UP seats at 
risk in the forthcoming general election. The only UP seats won 
with majorities of fewer than 2 000 votes were Benoni ( 1 247 ) , 
Pretoria-Sunnyside 614 ) , Queenstown 13 ) , and Drakensberg 
1 530 ) . This shows that only a small number of UP seats were 
then at risk of being lost to the Nationalists. This was of some 
slight comfort to the UP. 1 
Several important factors influenced the UP between 
the general elections of 1958 and 1961. One of these was the 
rancorous soul searching within its ranks after its bitter defeat 
in the 1958 election. Another important factor was the campaign 
launched by several of the conservatives to regain some of the 
party's lost support by trying to dispose of their liberal 
colleagues. There was also the spectacular split within the party 
at the congress in Bloemfontein in August 1959. The following 
year saw the UP's inability to prevent Verwoerd from winning the 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 346 - 365. 
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republican referendum. Some observers also maintained that in 
parliament the UP was drifting uncomfortably nearer to the 
Nationalists. Later, in the months preceding the 1961 general 
election, the UP also entered into a pact with the National 
Union Party in an attempt to attract what was hoped would be a 
significant number of dissatisfied Nationalists. This pact did 
not bring the UP any noteworthy rewards and in the opinion of 
many, caused it to move even closer to the right. 
The period leading up to the 1959 congress and the conservative 
campaign against the liberals. 
general 
Bekker 
Some attention was paid in the chapter 
election to the breakaway from the UP of 
group years 
on the 1958 
the Bailey 
of Bernard 
Friedman, the 
and 
MP 
the departure in later 
for Hillbrow. 2 In 1959 the third and arguably 
the most spectacular breakaway from the UP occurred. After years 
of antagonism between the right and left wings of the UP, most 
members of the liberal faction broke away at the Bloemfontein 
Congress. These members were to establish the Progressive 
Party (PP) later that year. Although the immediate cause of the 
breakaway was Mitchell's motion against the granting of more land 
for the prospective black homelands, there had been a great deal 
of tension for some time between the progressive and the 
conservative factions in the party. There seems to be a certain 
amount of evidence that there was a concerted campaign on the part 
of some members of the right wing to drive the liberals out of the 
2 See Chapter 1, pp 24 - 30. 
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party. Ray Swart, for example, cites the case of the MP for 
Turffontein, Badenhorst Durrant, who told him after the split, 
"I travelled all over the country, covering thousands of miles, 
visiting party members in the platteland and organising to get rid 
of you liberals at the congress - and see how well it worked !" 3 
Mitchell opposed the government's plans to obtain more lands for 
the black homelands on two main grounds. He was against the idea 
of expropriating land in the white areas of South Africa for the 
purpose of establishing autonomous black states independent of 
South Africa. He was also of the opinion that such land would not 
be properly looked after and would be ravaged by over-grazing and 
soil erosion. Although the progressives were opposed to Verwoerd's 
policy of independent homelands, they were not against the 
purchase of more land for the reserves. 
According to Joanna Strangwayes-Booth, Graaff had expected 
that Suzman, Wilson and Cope would resign from the UP after the 
Bloemfontein Congress and he had told the chairman of the South 
African Associated Newspapers "not to be upset if he heard that 
a few MPs had left the Party." 4 
Graaff states that he was unaware of any concerted 
effort on the part of the conservatives in the UP to get rid 
of the progressives. He writes, "If this was so I was certainly 
not aware of it and although I did not like the ideas of some of 
the so-called Progressive members I did everything in my power 
to prevent the party from splitting." 5 It is possible that Graaff 
3 
5 
R Swart, Progressive Odyssey, pp 51 - 52, 66. 
J Strangwayes-Booth, A cricket in the thorn tree, 146 - 147. 
Sir de Villiers Graaff - Author, Cape Town, 19 December 1995. 
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would not have known about the campaign. However, as the leader 
of the UP he must have been well aware of how frustrated the 
progressives were feeling and how strong the conservative 
sentiment in the party had become. Even had there not been a 
campaign to expel the progressives, it was surely on the cards 
that at a congress dominated by conservatives, a few progressive 
MPs would decide to leave the UP. 
Even as early as July 1959 there had been comment in 
the press about the likelihood of a split or a purge at the 
UP congress in August. The Eastern Province Herald commented 
that a plan to drive the "progressive wing" out of the UP was 
being openly discussed by conservative members of the UP on the 
Witwatersrand and an unknown conservative was quoted as saying, 
''To get rid of these liberals would win us many votes". The 
conservatives hoped to exploit conservative sentiment on 
the platteland where many people were concerned about the 
implications of Verwoerd's Bantustan policies. According to the 
newspaper the conservatives were gathering around Douglas Mitchell 
and his ''lieutenant'', Vause Raw. 6 
An article in The Forum of September 1959 soon 
after the breakaway - provides further illustration of the idea 
that there had been a plan among some conservative members to 
cause some of the liberals to resign or be ejected from the UP at 
the 1959 congress. According to The Forum, "If a Progressive 
conspiracy did not exist, a right-wing conspiracy certainly did, 
and there is plenty of evidence to show it." 7 The article referred 
6 
7 
Eastern Province Herald, 31 July 1959 
31 July 1959. 
The Forum, September 1959, p 5. 
See also Cape Times, 
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to certain resolutions that were "submitted to Congress and 
approved" and that were aimed at "putting the liberals in their 
place". These included a resolution that any public statement in 
conflict with the colour policy of the UP as laid down in 1954 
should "be dealt with as an act hostile to the interests of the 
party". Another resolution called for stronger discipline to 
ensure that nobody should use the UP to propagate personal views 
that conflicted with the "basic direction outlined in 1954". It 
was also resolved that, "In view of the liberalistic principles 
attributed to our party, we ask Congress to reaffirm our policy 
on matters of race relations". One significant resolution also 
called on the UP to be conservative in its approach to South 
African problems and to avoid at all times "the liberal view so 
prevalent in the party's debates in Parliament." 8 
The leader of the UP in Natal, Douglas Mitchell, was, 
however, adamant that there was no conspiracy to drive the 
liberals out of the UP. He spoke disparagingly of them in an 
interview with his biographer, Terry Wilks, claiming that the 
liberals had seen "expulsion facing them", but had not wanted to 
be expelled in disgrace, preferring to go out as "martyrs". 
Mitchell thought that it was in the UP's interests that a more 
left-wing political party should be formed as "all the curious 
people with their curious political ideas" could be put into this 
"political rubbish bin" to the left of the UP. 9 Mitchell's views 
are open to criticism as he seems to ignore the fact that the UP 
and not the NP would be the loser in any long-lasting contest 
8 
9 
The Forum, September 1959, p 5. 
T Wilks, Douglas Mitchell (Durban, 1980 ), pp 120 - 121. 
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between the UP and the PP. Furthermore, it can be asked, on what 
grounds were these members going to be expelled from the UP ? 
Furthermore, the UP congress would not have had the power to 
expel the "liberals". 
Mitchell was also adamant that the liberals had 
planned their departure at a meeting held on Steytler's farm prior 
to the congress. He said that on the day before that fateful 
congress began, "most of the leading members of the progressive 
wing" had gathered at Jan Steytler's farm in order to consult one 
another on their breakaway from the UP. Mitchell said that he 
heard about the meeting afterwards "chapter and verse", and that 
these progressives had forgotten that they had "spies in their 
own camp". According to Barnard and Marais in their history of 
the UP, it would appear that besides Steytler there were only 
two other MPs at his farm, namely De Beer and Colin Eglin. 10 
Colin Eglin denies strongly that there was any such 
meeting at Steytler's farm. His version of the incident is that 
he and Zach de Beer met Steytler on his farm and then travelled 
with him to Bloemfontein. According to Eglin, while they were 
at his farm, a certain MEC, Mannie Goldberg and his wife, neither 
of whom were "rebels", also called in on their way from Port 
Elizabeth to Bloemfontein. 11 The lack of any really conclusive 
evidence from Mitchell leads one to place more faith in the 
testimony supplied by Eglin. 
Mrs Jacqueline Beck, then an UP MPC and subsequently 
the PP candidate for Simonstown, remembers that before the 
10 
11 
SL Barnard & AH Marais, Die Verenigde Party - Die groat 
eksperiment, p 114. 
Colin Eglin - Author, Cape Town, 7 November 1995. 
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congress she was aware of a campaign to get rid of the liberals. 
On one occasion while she was working in the UP offices in Cape 
Town, Jack Basson, the MP for Green Point, said that he was going 
to "get" Jan Steytler at the forthcoming congress. She recollects 
that when she asked Graaff whether there was any truth in the 
rumour that the conservatives, with Douglas Mitchell at their 
head, were going to try to drive the liberals out of the party, 
he replied that there was no such campaign and that Douglas 
Mitchell was the "truest friend" one could possibly hope 
to have. 12 
Catherine Taylor, then an MPC and later the MP for 
Wynberg, writes in her memoirs that "the Progressive wing in 
the UP obtained information that Raw had gone so far as to issue 
instructions to Party organisers to arrange to send delegates to 
Congress who would drive the liberals out of the Party." 
Interestingly, Taylor describes Vause Raw as being the "key 
figure" among the right wing opponents of the liberals, and 
she states that Raw was obviously "looking for blood" at the 
congress. 13 
It should be added that it is not surprising that there 
was so much anti-liberal feeling at the UP congress when one 
considers the preponderance of delegates from the rural areas 
where the spirit of conservatism would be particularly strong. 
Helen Suzman comments on the difficulty of getting policy 
changed in a more liberal direction at the congress. This was 
because of the "absurdly large representation of the conservative 
12 Personal interview with Jacqueline Beck, Kalk Bay, 15 March 
1996. 
13 c Taylor, If courage goes (Johannesburg, 1976 ), pp 83 - 84. 
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rural constituencies at Congress, compared to the unrepresentative 
number from the urban areas where the United Party had much more 
solid support." 14 
In 1959 the divisional committees of the UP in all 
constituencies were each entitled to elect four delegates to the 
Union congress. In addition senators, members of parliament, 
members of the provincial council, and chairmen of provincial 
general councils, women's councils and youth councils were 
ex officio members of the congress. The congress was attended by 
about 700 delegates. 15 
The attitude between the conservatives and the liberals 
at the 1959 congress is possibly best exemplified by what Frans 
Cronje told Helen Suzman when she complained about the poor 
reception accorded to her fellow liberals. Cronje said, "Don't be 
such a starry-eyed idealist, Helen. You can only go as far as your 
electorate will let you and they won't let you go very far at all 
in this country." According to Helen Suzman's biographer, Joanna 
Strangwayes-Booth, the progressives were encouraged to leave 
the UP because of the sustained barracking and abuse at the 
congress while they were presenting their views. Certain speeches, 
such as that of Miles Warren, also played a role. Warren 
apparently accused Helen Suzman in a "tone of hysteria" of 
betraying the UP. Graaff himself was of the opinion that some of 
the delegates had overstepped "the normal limits of debate." 16 
14 
15 
16 
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incensed at a speech by John Cope, praising the great merits and 
unanimity of the UP, that he went to the microphone and "told the 
six hundred delegates that they had been told a lie ; the united 
party [ sic ] was harbouring two groups, those loyal to the party 
principles and those who flouted the party line at every 
opportunity, were caucusing on their own and had taken over much 
of the United party organisation." Miles Warren writes that "this 
caused pandemonium among the liberals, while the rest of the 
congress roared their approval." 17 Graaff admitted in a letter to 
Harry Lawrence that at the congress there were "some quite 
stupid and provocative statements from people who should have 
known better". 18 
The events at the stormy UP congress in Bloemfontein in 
August 1959 have been well described by many authors. Joanna 
Strangwayes-Booth gives a very succinct account of the entire 
congress and the breakaway of the progressives. There were several 
important stages concerning the congress. At the meeting of the 
Head Committee before the congress, Mitchell announced his 
intention to use the occasion of the congress to raise the issue 
of further purchases of land for the Bantustans. Graaff asked him 
not to raise the matter at the congress but Mitchell was adamant 
that he would do so. In the words of Strangwayes-Booth 
"Reluctantly, Graaff, reiterating his disapproval, suggested that 
it be referred to Congress for an expression of opinion." Later at 
the congress Graaf f put forward his suggestions that he had 
17 
18 
UNISA, Miles Warren Collection, 
from UP. 
File 4.3, Liberal break away 
UCT, BC 640, Harry Lawrence Collection, Hl.64, Sir de Villiers 
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divided into five parts. He proposed that the "Natives in all four 
provinces" would be given representation in the House of Assembly, 
that this representation would be on the basis of a separate roll, 
that this would be "primarily based on the 'responsible class' of 
Native", that the representatives in the House of Assembly and the 
Senate would be whites, and that there would be not more than 
eight Natives' Representatives. Another resolution from the Head 
Committee praised Graaff for accepting the idea that "future 
political relations between Europeans and Africans would be on the 
basis of group representation of Africans on the separate roll." 
During the discussion of these resolutions, the debate 
became very heated, provocative and personal. One example of the 
style of debate was seen when Steytler took the chair and was 
abused with cries of "We will not have that ultra liberal." Later, 
Miles Warren made his memorable speech attacking the liberals 
within the party. When one of the future Progressives, Ronald 
Butcher, asked Graaff why he did not put an end to this unpleasant 
debate and the airing of untrue allegations, Graaff replied, 
" 
just 
that." 
when I have two dogs and they don't get on with each other, I 
let them fight it out and then they are good friends after 
Graaff subsequently appealed to the delegates to observe 
the decencies of debate. During the more peaceful evening session 
that followed Graaff's appeal, Leo Boyd moved an amendment that 
the Native Representatives should be of any colour. This 
amendment, however, received the support of only thirty delegates. 
In Graaff's opinion the public were not ready for such 
"revolutionary suggestions". 
The congress knew that Mitchell's resolutions on the 
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issue of land for the Bantustans were still to be discussed. 
Strangwayes-Booth writes that during the congress Helen Suzman 
and "several other progressives separately made up their minds to 
leave the party if Mitchell's land resolutions were passed." On 
the last day of the Congress, Mitchell moved that the Congress 
"expresses its entire opposition to the acquisition and 
alienation of more land for the Government's avowed purpose of 
giving it to Bantu tribes which under the Bantustan policy of the 
Government are to form independent sovereign Bantu states " 
Mitchell also called upon the Prime Minister to define the 
boundaries of the new independent Bantustans. Graaff informed the 
Congress that he would not support this resolution but he would 
not regard it as a challenge to the Party leadership should it be 
passed. He mentioned his belief that Verwoerd would not stay in 
power long enough for the Bantustan policy to be made irreversible. 
In the words of Strangwayes-Booth, 
Very few political leaders have ever made a public 
statement before a vote that if it went against them, 
they would not take it as a vote of no confidence in 
their leadership. It seems that it was only the regard 
the conservative rank-and-file had for Graaff, and the 
fact that Mitchell, Steenkamp and Raw can have had no 
desire to lose so compliant a figurehead, which enabled 
him to retain the leadership at all at this crucial 
juncture. 19 
Mitchell's resolution was the prelude to a momentous and 
heated debate which saw many delegates again indulging in 
personalities and abusive comments and recriminations. Mitchell's 
motion was, however, carried by an overwhelming majority. It was 
after this debate that most of the progressives held a meeting in 
the Maitland Hotel in Bloemfontein, and decided to leave the UP. 
19 J Strangwayes-Booth, A cricket in the thorn tree, pp 147 - 157. 
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Reasons for the breakaway of the liberals in the United Party. 
It is extremely difficult to determine exactly what 
caused so many of the liberals in the UP to decide to leave that 
party after the Bloemfontein congress. Nevertheless, it would seem 
that "the spark that lit the tinderbox" was the motion proposed by 
Mitchell that was so enthusiastically accepted by most of the 
delegates. The constant and unpleasant barracking of the liberals 
at the congress together with the general animosity displayed 
towards them doubtless also contributed to their decision to 
secede. The congress was, in short, the outcome of years of 
bitterness and dislike felt by the conservatives and the liberals 
towards each other. There was also a strong conservative campaign 
to attract the votes of conservative voters by driving the 
liberals out of the party. Personal antipathies also played a very 
significant role. 
Perhaps, from a tactical perspective the liberals 
miscalculated when they left the UP. After all, in leaving, they 
were merely doing exactly what Mitchell and the conservatives 
wanted them to do. It would have been very difficult for the 
conservatives to succeed in formally expelling the liberals from 
the UP and there would have been little to prevent the liberals 
from using their positions in the UP to propagate their policies, 
much to the discomfiture of the conservative wing. Going out into 
the political wilderness as many of them were soon to do, would 
deprive them of this opportunity. Possibly, however, the liberals 
saw this as a contest between morality and expediency. 
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The establishment of the Progressive Party. 
In November 1959, very soon after 
Bloemfontein Congress, the Progressive Party 
the 
was 
celebrated 
formally 
established at its inaugural congress in Johannesburg. According 
to the Cape Times, the aim of the PP as enunciated at this 
congress was "a complete reform of the South African constitution" 
which would "contain adequate safeguards for each of our racial 
communities and will accord to each a share in the government." 
The newspaper described the "main principle" of the new party as 
being based on the assumption that "any attempt by one of our 
racial communities indefinitely to dominate others is doomed 
to failure." 20 
The impact of the breakaway on the United Party and its attempts 
to neutralise the effects of the departure of the 
progressive wing. 
After the momentous UP congress in Bloemfontein in 
1959 a total of twelve MPs left the party permanently. They were 
Helen Suzman, John Cope, Owen Townley Williams, Ronald Butcher, 
Ray Swart, Zach de Beer, Clive van Ryneveld, Colin Eglin, Harry 
Lawrence, Professor I Fourie, Boris Wilson, and Jan Steytler. 
Harry Lawrence left the party later as he was overseas at the 
time of the congress. Five MPCs also left the UP. Fourie initially 
allied himself with the liberals and then left them after their 
first congress because he disagreed with their policy on 
2° Cape Times, 14 November 1959. 
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republicanism. After the referendum in 1960 he returned to their 
ranks. The list of resignations would have been even longer had 
Graaff not been able to persuade Sydney Waterson, the MP for 
Constantia, and Hamilton Russell, the MP for Wynberg, to remain 
in the UP. It is perhaps significant that both these 
parliamentarians represented constituencies in the Cape Peninsula, 
where Graaff's influence was very strong. In this respect Graaff 
was partially successful in limiting the extent of the damage to 
his party by the departure of the progressives. Hamilton Russell 
was however to leave the UP in 1963. 21 Although Graaff tried his 
best to keep Clive van Ryneveld, the MP for East London North, in 
the UP he was unsuccessful. 22 
Graaff appears to have had made vigorous attempts to 
retain certain MPs, particularly those from the Cape Peninsula, 
while accepting that others were irretrievably lost to the UP. 
He seems to have made little or no effort to keep members such 
as Helen Suzman within the fold. Helen Suzman recounts, "The 
impression I obtained when Sir de Villiers Graaff interviewed me 
in Cape Town was that he was heartily glad to be rid of me." 23 
Thus, within the space of little more than five years, 
there were two large scale defections from the UP's parliamentary 
caucus as well as the much smaller but still significant 
rebellion of Bernard Friedman. The enormity of these defections 
21 
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can be calculated by taking a look at the list of UP members of 
parliament elected in the 1953 general election. Excluding the 
Natives' Representatives, the 1953 general election sent 57 UP MPs 
to parliament. Of these 57 members, the following had left or 
resigned or were expelled from the UP parliamentary caucus before 
the end of 1959 : O Townley Williams, VL Shearer, IS Fourie, 
B Friedman, AG Barlow, H Suzman, PB Bekker, AH Jonker, 
HF Oppenheimer, z de Beer, B Coetzee, F Waring, J Cope, 
J Steytler, H Lawrence, and Ray Swart. 24 Members such as Colin 
Eglin and Ronald Butcher, who also left the UP in 1959, were 
elected to parliament after the 1953 general election, and thus 
are not included in the ranks of these 57 MPs. 
There were thus sixteen members of the 1953 parliamentary 
caucus who left the party. This number does not include Miles 
Warren whose departure from the caucus was comparatively brief. 
When one also looks at the various UP members of parliament who 
at times teetered on the brink of leaving but who subsequently 
stayed, then it can be appreciated that there were many problems 
facing the UP in the 1950s. 
The remaining UP MPs displayed very varied reactions 
to the departure of the progressives. Some saw them as troublesome 
and too liberal and thought that their departure was advantageous 
for the party, which would now have more appeal to the 
conservative electorate. Badenhorst Durrant expressed what must 
have been the hope of many conservative UP members when he said, 
"With the departure of the Liberals from our ranks we of the 
24 BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 316 -
333. 
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United Party can now talk to moderate members of the Nationalist 
Party and they to us." 25 
Other UP parliamentarians adopted a very different 
approach. Possibly they hoped that a reconciliation might still 
be feasible. Amidst all the recriminations and the rancour of 
the breakaway, two UP MPs, neither really associated with the 
liberal movement, pleaded for a calmer approach to the dispute 
and an end to the bitterness and "witch-hunting". The MP for Port 
Elizabeth South, HO Frielinghaus, was reported as saying 
Personally, I am standing by our Leader, Sir de 
Villiers Graaff, but I hope he takes firm action 
against the agitation to rid the party of the 
so-called liberals. There is no question that 
this organized agitation has been going on for 
some time. It was deplorable of Mr Mitchell, as a 
Provincial leader, who knew full-well that Sir 
de Villiers was not in favour of preventing the sale 
of further land to Natives under the 1936 agreement, 
went ahead and introduced an amendment to this effect. 
Furthermore, I resent the personal attacks against 
our Cape Leader, Dr Jan Steytler. There is no finer, 
or more loyal man in the party. 
In the same report, the UP MP for Albany, TB Bowker, was 
quoted as saying that "the witch-hunt engineered by the 
'ultra-conservatives' should be stopped immediately." 26 
The official United Party view of the 1959 split. 
A very illuminating document was produced by Marais 
Steyn, one of the leading propagandists of the UP. 27 This statement 
was circulated among the members of the UP's Parliamentary and 
Provincial Council teams and gave what seemed to be the 
25 
26 
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conservative view of the split in the party. Steyn's opinion was 
that "the Bantustan Motion was merely the occasion" and not "the 
fundamental cause" of the progressives' departure. He believed 
that most of the liberals had been seen by the press as a 
"separate pressure group" within the UP as early as July 1954, 
and he quoted an article written at the time by Joel Mervis 
in The Forum in support of his view. Steyn also cited the 
series of articles that were written on the editorial page of 
the Rand Daily Mail prior to the Bloemfontein congress. These 
were an attempt "to compel the United Party to adopt a much more 
liberal policy". He also alleged that the liberal members had 
actually been told by the Chief Whip "to desist from caucassing 
sic as a separate group" while they were still members of 
the UP and that at no time while discussing the Bantustan 
motion before the Bloemfontein congress "did they even hint that 
it was a matter of conscience and irreducible principle to them 
and that its acceptance would compel their resignation." Marais 
Steyn also pointed out that several of the Progressives such as 
Boris Wilson, and Leo Kowarsky had not regarded the Bantustan 
motion "as sufficiently important" for them to stay and cast their 
votes on it. Both Wilson and Kowarsky subsequently helped 
establish the PP. Significantly, Marais Steyn wrote that 
Mitchell "did not move the Bantustan Motion for any ulterior 
motives or in order to be provocative", and that this motion had 
already been discussed several times during the parliamentary 
session and at meetings of the Central Executive Committee "in 
Durban and elsewhere". According to Marais Steyn, shortly before 
the Bloemfontein congress, the Head Committee had asked Mitchell 
to submit this motion to the congress, and that it was not 
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therefore "a rebellious Mr. Mitchell who acted at Congress, but a 
co-operative Mr. Mitchell acting at the leader's request to seek 
clarification." On the question of whether the UP had become a 
"backward-looking party", Marais Steyn expressed the view that 
nobody could accuse it of being backward when it supported "the 
restoration of the Cape Coloureds to the Common Roll in the 
Cape", the granting to the "non-European people" of "greater 
representation in the Senate", the restoration of the system of 
Native representation to the Cape and the extension of that 
representation to the North. Furthermore, the UP was responsible 
"for the concept that a responsible class of Natives should be 
given more individual rights and a larger individual say in the 
election of their representatives." Steyn wrote that the question 
was sometimes posed whether the UP was "not expedient rather than 
realistic", and he answered this in a very illuminating manner 
"The United Party is not expedient, but it frankly states that its 
approach to the non-European problem is empirical." He added that 
the UP did not profess to have "super-natural insight into the 
distant future". 
Douglas Mitchell gave his side of the story to an 
audience in Durban : the "real bone of contention" at the congress 
was the amendment moved by Leo Boyd, proposing that "non-Whites 
should have the right to represent non-Whites in Parliament". He 
denied that Graaf f had fought his Bantustan motion but said that 
when it had been introduced, "Sir de Villiers said that after some 
considerable hesitation, he felt there was the gravest risk of the 
resolution being misunderstood." 28 
28 The Natal Daily News, 21 August 1959. 
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Mitchell's statement that Graaff had not resisted 
his land resolution is debatable in the light of a statement made 
by Graaff himself at a public meeting in Durban. Here Graaff said 
that he had been against it for two reasons - the first being that 
it might be misunderstood and the second being that he believed 
that the UP ''could get rid of Verwoerd" before they were "too far 
on the road to Bantustan." He described the land resolution at the 
congress as "the occasion, not the cause of the break". He told 
his audience that the real cause of the break had been the 
liberals themselves, as "They could no longer associate themselves 
with the conservative South African approach of the United Party, 
which sees growing living standards and increasing opportunities 
for all the peoples of the Union under the guidance and control 
of vigorous White leadership." 29 
The Natal Mercury tried to refute Mitchell's claim 
that the resolution of Leo Boyd was a prime cause of the split. 
In an editorial it pointed out that Boyd's resolution had been 
debated and rejected on the first day of the congress and that the 
breakaway had had not occurred until the end of congress, two days 
later. It expressed the opinion that the resolutions passed by 
Boyd and other members of the progressive wing "could have done no 
more than set the tone of the hostility that developed towards 
them." 30 
Thus, the 1959 split had the effect of severely 
fragmenting the parliamentary opposition. During the 1960 
referendum the Progressives were to enter an agreement with 
29 
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the UP in order to prevent a victory for republicanism. This, 
however, was to be an uneasy and very temporary relationship. 
There were to be no other serious attempts at reconciliation. 
This is hardly surprising as it would have been a crucial part of 
the UP's tactics to destroy the Progressives as quickly and as 
ruthlessly as possible. The UP and the Progressives spent much 
of the 1960 and 1961 parliamentary sessions attacking each 
other much to the delight of the Nationalists and concern of 
those who saw the need for a more united opposition. The 
conservatives in the UP were very aware of the conservatism of the 
South African electorate and the absence of any strong signs of an 
emergent liberalism among the voters. They also remembered that 
the realities of South African politics had traditionally been 
unfavourable to the existence of small breakaway parties. These 
factors would have reassured them in their belief that the 
liberals would soon be swept away. This would leave the UP in the 
position of being able to gather in the votes of as many 
disaffected Nationalists as possible and also to win the "floating 
vote". This stategy was successful to a certain extent as the UP 
was able to win back all but one of the seats that it had lost 
with the departure of the liberals. After the breakaway, although 
numerically weaker, the UP caucus was certainly much more unified 
than it had been previously. Although the Progressives did 
entertain 
the UP 
surprising 
hopes of concluding an electoral agreement with the 
leadership refused to countenance this. It is 
UP, 
not 
that the UP preferred instead to enter into an 
agreement with the National Union Party as this was in line with 
to win votes from the ranks of "moderate their strategy 
Nationalism". 
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The relationship between the United Party and the English press. 
What would become increasingly disadvantageous to 
the UP was the gradual loss of support from the English press that 
the party had enjoyed for many years. This was to have an effect 
on the 1961 general election, particularly in Johannesburg where 
the Rand Daily Mail supported the PP wholeheartedly. Graaff 
describes in his memoirs how the editor of the Cape Times, 
Victor Norton, came to see him at the time of the liberal 
breakaway, and "begged me not to hound those who had broken away 
as he regarded their break as a most important step in South 
Africa's development." Graaff writes : "It was clear to me that 
there was a section of the press which had a lot of sympathy with 
the new Progs." 31 
Anthony Heard, a Cape Times reporter who later became its 
editor, states that Victor Norton "despised" Sir de Villiers but 
faced the dilemma that if he followed his natural inclination to 
support the Progressives, he might encourage the splitting of the 
anti-Nationalist vote. 32 
Joel Mervis gives a very lucid description of how the 
Rand Daily Mail decided to support the new PP in preference 
to the UP soon after the progressive breakaway. He also discusses 
the reasons why the Sunday Times continued its long standing and 
vigorous support of the UP. 33 
Although most sections of the English press maintained 
their support for the UP, this did not prevent them at times 
31 
32 
33 
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from criticising certain members of the party, notably Douglas 
Mitchell. This was perhaps attributable to a feeling that 
Mitchell was particularly responsible for what they saw as as 
a needless split in 1959. An example of such criticism is the 
editorial in the Daily Dispatch which once slated Mitchell, 
saying "There is no difference between the policy he advocates 
and the policy that Dr. Verwoerd advocates." 34 An editorial in 
The Natal Witness in August 1959 also makes interesting 
reading "The amount of mischief which Mr. Douglas Mitchell, 
M.P., is doing - either wittingly or unwittingly - seems to us to 
be almost incredible. 11 35 
Graaff did not escape criticism in the editorials 
of this Pietermaritzburg newspaper either. An editorial published 
the previous day described him "as an amiable but somewhat 
bewildered figurehead" who together with the rest of the UP was 
"tied firmly to the triumphant chariot wheels of Mr. Douglas 
Mitchell, who is careering madly to the fools' paradise of 
Nationalist measures without Nationalist men." 36 
Understandably, during and after this momentous split 
there was a great deal of acrimony expressed by members in 
vilifying the motives and actions of their former allies. The 
English-language press frequently deplored this, regarding it 
as both puerile and uncalled for. The political columnist, 
"Backbencher", of the Cape Argus commented on a speech delivered 
in Parktown by Douglas Mitchell. Mitchell was reported to have 
34 
35 
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said that the Progressives were "nothing more than a group of 
spoilt children and deserve a good hiding". "Backbencher" rebuked 
Mitchell for this, saying, "Really Mr Mitchell ! The people of 
Parktown are intelligent and such a silly statement is an insult 
to their intelligence." 37 
The reasons for dwelling at some length on the 
attitude of the English-language press towards the UP are many. 
The most important is that the press was an extremely significant 
moulder of opposition opinion, and much of what they reported and 
commented upon would ultimately have an effect on the decision 
of the English-speaking electorate in 1961 either to stay with 
the UP or to make a break and vote for the PP. It also showed that 
many editors were becoming disenchanted with the UP. They saw the 
party as being more interested in scoring petty debating points 
against the PP than acting as an effective opposition to the 
Nationalists. 
The Nationalist view of the breakaway from the United Party. 
Die Burger saw the liberal breakaway as the outcome 
of an opportunistic decision by Douglas Mitchell to capitalise 
on the unpopularity of the government's desire to acquire more 
land for the development of the Bantustans. It mentioned the over 
representation of the conservative platteland element at the 
Bloemfontein congress and saw the issue as being motivated by a 
desire to tell the government, " ... julle wil oom Jan van der 
37 Cape Argus, 27 November 1959. See also Cape Argus, 18 September 
1959. 
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Merwe se plaas vir die Kaffers gee." The newspaper praised the 
eleven rebels for their opposition to this "cynical opportunism", 
and saw their breakaway as a victory for decency in contrast to 
the double-faced attitude of the UP. 38 
The United Party fends off the Progressive Party 
challenge at the polls. 
In the period leading up to the 1961 general 
election, the poor performance of the PP in one by-election 
and various provincial council elections reassured the UP that 
it was not a particularly serious electoral threat. This must 
also have encouraged the UP leadership in their belief that they 
could safely destroy the PP at the polls while simultaneously 
attracting dissatisfied Nationalists by means of the pact with the 
National Union. In the 1959 provincial elections, held soon after 
the breakaway at Bloemfontein, the three Progressive Party 
candidates, campaigning as "Independent Progressives", all lost to 
the UP opposition, one rather narrowly. Leo Boyd lost Durban 
Gardens by 1 954 votes to 2 639. WG Mc Conkey lost the election 
in Pietermaritzburg South by 1 964 votes to the 2 692 votes cast 
for the UP candidate and to the 559 votes cast for the Federal 
Party candidate. In Pinetown the "Independent Progressive" 
candidate, L Hall, lost to the UP by 2 719 votes to 2 879. 39 
Dr Boris Wilson, the PP member for Hospital, resigned 
his seat in parliament at the beginning of the 1961 parliamentary 
session and the by-election was subsequently held in 
38 
39 
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constituency on 3 May 1961. In a very low poll of 43,5 %, the PP 
candidate received 1 703 votes against the 2 993 votes obtained by 
the UP candidate - a majority of 1 290. ' 0 
In the important provincial by-election held at Green 
Point in February 1961, both parties fielded strong candidates. 
The UP candidate, o Newton Thompson, obtained 5 518 votes, 
decisively defeating the PP candidate, Rupert Hurley, who polled 
only 1 710 votes. The percentage poll was 58,9 0 41 ~. The PP came 
closest to shaking the complacency of the UP in July 1960 in a 
municipal election in Ward Six in Johannesburg when its candidate, 
Mrs Jean Sinclair, obtained 1 779 votes to the UP candidate's 
1 878, thus losing by only 99 votes. Only 62 % of the eligible 
voters bothered to cast their votes in this election. 42 
"Backbencher", one of the political columnists for the 
Cape Argus wrote a perceptive article soon after this 
municipal election. He pointed out that municipal elections are 
never "reliable barometers politically". To substantiate his point 
he showed that at one time official Communists had won seats on 
the Cape Town City Council, yet later three Communist candidates 
standing in various seats in the Cape Peninsula in the 1943 
General Election all lost their deposits. "Backbencher" added, 
"In times of unrest the politically uncommitted nearly always turn 
timidly Right." He attributed the failure of the PP in the council 
election to the disturbances in the Congo and at Sharpeville which 
most probably prompted a certain number of hesitant voters to vote 
for the UP. 43 
40 BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, p 388. 
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All these results would no doubt have encouraged the 
conservatives in the UP in their belief that the PP had 
overestimated its appeal to the electorate. They probably felt 
that the 1959 split was beneficial to the UP, signalling the 
end of the liberal element in its ranks while also appeasing 
the Bloedsappe i.e. those traditionally dyed-in-the-wool 
supporters of the UP who while taking a resolutely 
anti-Nationalist stance on historical or cultural grounds still 
took a very conservative position on the colour issue ) . It 
would also have soothed the feelings of the conservatives among 
the electorate, who might well have been disturbed by the 
utterances of the liberals. 
The United Party loses ground to the Nationalists. 
What concerned the UP leadership at this time was 
the fact that in the two by-elections held in 1961 ( which were 
fought in straight contests between the NP and the UP the UP 
fared even worse than in the previous general election in 1958. 
On 19 April 1961, the UP in Bethal-Middelburg obtained 32,1 % of 
the votes cast which was a significant decline from the 37,7 % 
that they had polled in 1958. In the by-election held in 
Swellendam on 3 May 1961, the UP's share of the votes cast dropped 
to 39,8 % from the 42,3 % obtained in the 1958 general election. 
This did not augur very well for the future. 44 It should be 
remembered that in these rural seats the impact of the progressive 
breakaway would have been very slight. 
44 BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 347, 
361 & 388. 
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The United Party loses the referendum battle. 
In 1960 the UP suffered another reverse when Verwoerd 
triumphed in his efforts to have South Africa declared a republic 
with a majority of 74 580 votes. In the campaign the enfranchised 
eighteen-year-olds were an important factor. The morale of many UP 
supporters suffered another blow when it became clear later that 
South Africa would also leave the commonwealth. 45 
Graaff held the PP partly responsible for the defeat 
of the anti-republicans in the 1960 referendum. According to him 
they "made it a practice to try and put across their nonwhite 
policy at public meetings and frightened many anti-republicans 
into the republican camp." 46 
Nevertheless, after its defeat in the republican 
referendum, the UP showed a certain resilience. In a declaration 
drawn up by Graaff in June 1961, bemoaning the straits into which 
South Africa had supposedly been led by the Nationalists, he 
called upon all those who could forget "past differences for the 
sake of our joint future" to combine their talents and their 
influence. Significantly he described one of the "basic aims" of 
such an "almighty common effort" as the recognition of the 
republic : he saw this as an "accomplished fact". 47 
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The United Party moves closer to the Nationalists. 
During the 1960 parliamentary session the UP voted 
with the Nationalists for the extension of several apartheid 
measures and this was seen by the Progressives as evidence that 
the UP was moving closer to the Nationalists. The UP voted with 
the Nationalists on the Reservation of Separate Amenities 
Amendment Bill and the Factories, Machinery and Building Work 
Amendment Bill. At the third reading of the former, there were 
114 votes in favour and only fifteen against. Only the 
Progressives and the Natives' Representatives voted against 
the Bill. 48 
The UP explained its view on the Separate Amenities Bill 
saying that it "involved no extension of the principle of 
segregation but only an extension of the area over which 
segregation could be applied." It also claimed that it had merely 
been responding to requests from local authorities and the 
Provincial Administration in Natal for the right to enforce 
apartheid on beaches between the high-water and low-water marks 
and in the sea its elf. 49 
In what was perhaps a rather tongue-in-cheek 
article entitled "V.P. Nou Apartheidsparty ? Word Gevra", 
Die Burger commented that the UP had voted with the 
government on two consecutive days, extending the principles of 
apartheid in factories, on the beaches and in the sea. The UP 
48 
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appeared to be trying to show that it had been purified of all 
liberal elements after the split the previous year. The newspaper 
also saw this as an attempt by the Graaff leadership to attract 
votes from the Nationalists in the forthcoming election by the 
expedient of moving closer to the government and by ostensibly 
accepting the idea of apartheid. 50 
In an interesting article written in 1959 about the 
position of the UP, Edward Tiryakian of Princeton University 
expressed the view that the "ultra-right wing of the Party led 
by Mitchell" held views on the racial policy that were "hardly 
different from that of the Nationalists." This was seen as 
undermining the position of Graaff. 51 
The United Party enters into a pact with the National Union. 
As the 1961 general election approached there seems 
to have been an idea prevalent among the UP leadership that 
there were a number of Nationalists who had become disenchanted 
with Verwoerd and the more extreme Nationalist leadership and 
with the NP's doctrines, but were not well disposed enough towards 
the UP to vote for it. Such voters, it was felt, might be 
attracted to the National Union Party which had recently been 
established by Japie Basson and included an appreciable number of 
former Nationalists within its ranks. Consequently an election 
pact not a coalition ) was formed between the two parties. The 
details of this pact will be studied more comprehensively in the 
discussion of the general election campaign in Chapter Seven. 
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Advantages enjoyed by the United Party in 1960 and 1961. 
It is significant to assess the relative strength of 
the UP as South Africa moved towards republican status. The UP was 
able to obtain some support because of its image as the party most 
likely to protect the rights of English-speaking whites in the 
Republic. Matters such as the role of the Broederbond, the 
decline of English influence in the government service and other 
spheres of South African life all played an important role. The 
NP was seen as often favouring its supporters in organisations 
that were supposed to be free of political influence, such as 
school boards, censorship boards, the SABC and various other 
government institutions. All these factors aided the UP to some 
degree in turning conservative English-speaking whites away from 
the NP. Many of the articles in the Sunday Times in 1961 show 
how significant this problem was at the time. A report on 
16 April 1961 provides an interesting example of the attitude of 
the Sunday Times to the demotion of Gideon Roos and his 
replacement at the head of the SABC by Piet Meyer. This incident 
was seen as detrimental to the interests of non-Nationalist 
whites. 52 
The UP also drew advantage from Verwoerd's plans to 
develop the African homelands in the 1960s. Many whites felt that 
this would lead to much greater expense for the white taxpayer 
and a dislocation of the economy in certain areas. Another factor 
which carried some weight was the purchase or expropriation of 
land in the rural areas for the purpose of homeland development 
52 Sunday Times, 16 April 1961. 
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and consolidation. This gave rise to the idea that independent 
African governments which might be hostile would be established 
within South Africa. A soundly organised campaign outlining the 
implications of such a policy would also have been very beneficial 
to the UP. Indeed the issue was to become important in the 1961 
general election although the UP did not draw maximum advantage 
from it. 
Problems facing the United Party in 1960 and 1961. 
The bitter feud between the UP and the newly founded PP 
was certainly damaging to the UP prior to the 1961 general 
election. An example of this enmity can be seen in a report in 
the Cape Argus in February 1960 describing how "Nationalists 
laughed in Parliament last night as Progressive and United Party 
speakers came to grips with one another, egged on from the 
Government cross-benches." This was on the occasion when the 
Progressives introduced a motion calling on parliament to accept 
"the permanent multi-racial character of the South African nation 
and society." According to the report, "The Nationalists were able 
to sit back and enjoy the spectacle of a divided opposition 
carrying on a running fight to the accompaniment of Government 
interjections and laughter." 53 
Demographically too, the UP was at a severe 
disadvantage. While it is obviously incorrect to assert that every 
Afrikaans-speaking white voter supported the NP, it is very clear 
that in the 1950s the NP drew most of its support from the 
53 Cape Argus, 16 February 1960. 
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Afrikaans-speaking community. The greater the number of Afrikaans 
voters in a constituency, the better were the chances of success 
for the NP in any election. The data supplied by the 1951 census 
was therefore extremely disturbing for the UP because they showed 
an increasing preponderance of Afrikaans voters, especially among 
the younger age groups and in the rural areas. The age group from 
25 to 29 years would have been the youngest age group to vote in 
the 1948 general election and the greater preponderance of 
Afrikaans voters in this group approximately 1 450 Afrikaans 
speakers for every 1 000 English speakers ) must have been crucial 
in the success of the NP. It is perhaps best to give the ratios of 
Afrikaans-speaking whites to their English-speaking compatriots in 
tabular form. 
******************************************************************* 
* TABLE 1. * 
* * 
* Ratio of Afrikaans-s2eakin2 whites to English-s2eaking whites * 
* * 
* in various age grou2s as shown by the 1951 EOEulation census. 54 * 
* * 
* Age grou2 Number of Afrikaans-speaking whites for * 
* * 
* I in years every 1 000 English-speaking whites. * 
* * 
* 0 - 4 1 750 * 
* 5 - 6 1 918 * 
* 7 - 9 1 893 * 
* 10 - 14 1 900 * 
* 15 - 19 1 941 * 
* 21 - 24 1 730 * 
* 25 - 29 1 450 * 
* 30 - 34 1 316 * 
* 35 - 39 1 176 * 
* 40 - 44 1 107 * 
* 45 - 49 1 050 * 
* 50 - 54 1 027 * 
* 55 - 59 1 175 * 
* 60 - 64 1 161 * 
* 65 - 69 1 052 * 
* 70 - 74 897 * 
* 75 - 79 915 * 
******************************************************************* 
54 Department of 
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The position of the United Party in 1961. 
The events of 1960 were generally unfavourable for 
the UP. They had lost prestige by being unable to prevent South 
Africa from becoming a republic and from leaving the Commonwealth. 
The riots, and disturbances and the state of emergency in South 
Africa, the problems in such places as the Congo, the increasing 
hostility of some overseas countries, the attitude of the British 
government as exemplified in Macmillan's "Winds of Change" speech 
and the emergence of additional independent African states all 
combined to make the South African voters look more to the 
Nationalists than to the UP for protection, security and 
reassurance. At times the UP was vague in its policy or appeared 
to contradict itself. Furthermore the UP carried the stigma of 
years of unsuccessful opposition to the Nationalists both at the 
polls and in parliament. As the general election approached in 
1961, the UP was a far more cohesive party following the departure 
of the liberals, but it was certainly not in any condition to 
make the breakthrough at the polls that it desired so ardently and 
which was so urgently necessary for the maintenance of a spirit of 
enthusiasm in the party as a whole. 
CHAPTER FIVE. 
THE PART PLAYED BY OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES FROM 
1958 TO 1961. 
THE POSITION OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY. 
The Progressive Party was officially established in 
Johannesburg in November 1959 and it is therefore a very 
valuable and instructive exercise to examine the circumstances 
that led to its establishment. In August 1959 the campaign 
waged by the conservatives in the UP to get rid of the liberals 
reached its zenith at the Bloemfontein Congress of the party. 
Many of the conservatives did their best to make the position of 
the liberals as untenable as possible. This campaign and the 
subsequent breakaway of a large and significant segment of the 
party have already been discussed in the section on the UP. In 
this section brief comment will also be made on the way the 
dissidents perceived their departure from the UP.' 
Views of various Progressives on the breakaway in 1959. 
In the previous chapter the reaction of the UP to the 
split has been discussed. How did the progressives view the 
breakaway ? The views of some of these progressives on the 
split at the 1959 congress are very revealing, partly because 
they show the resentment displayed by the conservatives towards 
the progressives. Walter Stanford felt that the animosity of 
the conservative delegates had a major role to play in the 
progressives' decision to leave the UP. He also expressed 
dissatisfaction with the composition of the congress and the 
1 J Strangwayes-Booth, A cricket in the thorn tree, pp 147 - 158. 
See also Chapter 4, pp 124 - 133. 
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unduly high representation of the rural districts. Stanford 
thought that Graaff made "a great deal of maintaining white 
baasskap, more so than in the House." He was also of the opinion 
that there might not have been a split at all if it had not been 
for "the terrible debate on Wednesday in which personalities were 
indulged in to a great extent", and in which Miles Warren 
"absolutely screamed with rage at the betrayal of the U.P. by 
the progressives." According to Stanford, "The whole object of 
Mitchell's resolution on land was to be able to call the Nats 
kafferboeties on the platteland and he forced it through after 
Div had told him he was against it." Stanford also wrote that 
he did not know how Graaff was going to lead a party "with a 
policy whose main plank is simply to out Nat the Nats." 2 
Unlike the UP stalwarts, Zach de Beer is of the opinion 
that the breakaway from the UP was not inevitable. In his words, 
"If Graaff had resisted the proposal to shut the door on the 
common roll vote for Africans and the 'land resolution', we would 
certainly not have broken away, and I do not think he would have 
lost any right-wingers either." 3 
In a letter to Harry Lawrence, De Beer told him that 
what had happened at the congress was "almost exactly what we 
had feared. ... Douglas, Louis, Vause and Sannie [ van Niekerk 
had organised the whole congress to 'kick out the liberals'." 
De Beer also wrote that "The venom of the speeches was quite 
unbelievable." 4 
2 
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Similarly, Ray Swart believed that Graaff could have 
averted the split in the UP if he had exercised "strong and 
principled leadership". Nevertheless Swart thought that such a 
split would perhaps have come later as "The U.P. was made up of 
far too many differing factions to really be a cohesive force." 5 
The idea that Graaff could have prevented the 1959 
breakaway is also supported by Colin Eglin, who wrote, "Sir 
de Villiers Graaff could have certainly averted the split in 
the United Party in 1959, however, stung by the UP's electoral 
defeat in 1958, he decided that he wanted his Party to project 
a more conservative rather than a more progressive image." Eglin 
emphasises that none of the MPs who broke away went to the 
Bloemfontein Congress "wanting to leave the United Party". Eglin 
thinks that Graaff also relied heavily on the "loyalty to Div 
factor" to limit the extent of the breakaway. 6 
The progressives gain the support of Oppenheimer and Lawrence. 
The cause of the progressives received a stimulus in 
September 1959 when Harry Oppenheimer resigned from the UP and 
announced his support for the new group. The Cape Argus quoted 
him as saying "After careful consideration of the issues involved 
I find myself in general sympathy with the progressive group. 
I have accordingly tendered my resignation." 7 
The Times of London saw Oppenheimer's resignation as 
having a momentous effect on opposition politics in South Africa, 
5 
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partly because it soon precipitated a decision by Harry Lawrence. 
Oppenheimer's resignation was described as "a courageous action" 
from a man, ''who has long and consistently supported the view 
that you cannot unscramble eggs ... industrial integration is an 
undeniable fact ; and ... should be pursued, not halted." 8 
Oppenheimer had already made his sympathies with the 
liberals clear in a letter written to Harry Lawrence in June 1959. 
"I had a talk with Div and was pretty frank. I feel very sorry 
for him ... Is there any hope of keeping him on the side of the 
angels ? I am not optimistic - he seems convinced that the only 
thing is to accept, or appear to accept, the Nat view on race 
relations " 9 
Shortly after his return to South Africa from overseas, 
Harry Lawrence also allied himself with the Progressives. In 
his memoirs, Graaff is of the opinion that although Lawrence 
"had indicated his disagreement with Mitchell's motion", he did 
not seem to be determined to leave the UP. 10 It appears that 
Lawrence had already decided while overseas that he was going to 
resign from the UP on the grounds that the UP was "irretrievably 
split", and he had no other option "on grounds of principle and 
conscience'1 but to go. 11 
The value which the Progressives attached to the 
acquisition of such a "senior parliamentarian" as Lawrence is 
clear in a letter from Zach de Beer : "One thing we lack a 
9 
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really senior parliamentarian. The implication is obvious. 
We have taken the whole future of progressive thought into our 
hands. We may stand or fall by what you do. I do hope you will 
think it right to join us." 12 
The inevitability of a split in the UP is perhaps 
illustrated by a memorandum drawn up by Harry Lawrence in 
conjunction with Zach de Beer and Colin Eglin in April 1959. This 
memorandum was entitled, "The Irreducible Minimum". It proposed 
that the UP should declare itself in favour of "overt 
consultation with truly representative African leaders", and 
that it should accept the principle of "a continuous process of 
extension'' of political rights. It also stated very significantly, 
"While it need not be explicitly advocated at present, the common 
roll for Africans, either instead of or in conjunction with the 
separate roll, must not be excluded as a future possibility." 
The memorandum went on to say that "men of colour must not be 
indefinitely debarred from participating personally in the 
government of their country, as members of legislative bodies." 
When one considers the conservatism and influence of many members 
of the UP right-wing, it is hardly surprising that members with 
political views such as these quoted here would soon be forced 
to leave the UP. 13 As the PP had no official election manifesto 
in 1961, this memorandum formed the basis on which the party 
carried out its election campaign. " 
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The Progressives incur criticism for 
failing to resign their seats. 
After the formation of the PP in November 1959, its 
members of parliament, all of whom had originally been elected 
under the banner of the UP, suffered a certain stigma because 
they did not resign their seats after their change of political 
allegiance. The UP was to use this as a weapon against them, 
purportedly to show their "lack of honesty". What was particularly 
damaging was that some of the Transvaal members of parliament had 
earlier signed a pledge that they would resign their seats should 
they leave the UP. This pledge, the Borkum pledge, had been 
instituted partly as a result of pressure from the liberal wing 
after the defection of Bailey Bekker and his four supporters soon 
after the 1953 general election. Helen Suzman remembers that she 
and the MP for Parktown, John Cope, favoured resigning their seats 
and fighting by-elections but after a great deal of discussion it 
was decided against this. 15 
The PP incurred a great deal of criticism for this 
decision and its MPs had to defend themselves vigorously against 
what was seen as an act of bad faith. When asked at a public 
meeting in Sea Point why he had not resigned his seat, Harry 
Lawrence replied that, "A member of parliament owes his duty 
not to those who voted for him, but first of all to his country." 16 
The MP for Pinelands, Colin Eglin, gave a similar answer to 
demands that he should resign from parliament. At a public meeting 
15 
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in his constituency, he quoted Sir Winston Churchill 
"an MP's first responsibility was to his country, his second to 
his constituency and his third to his party." He went on to say 
that he had been given a mandate to fight the Nationalists and 
''baasskap" and that he would continue to do so. 17 
In a statement on the possible resignation of the 
dissident MPs, Steytler wrote, "Without arrogating to themselves 
a superior moral law, these ten Members of Parliament have, after 
a great deal of heart searching, come to the conclusion that they 
are not prepared to put the fettish ( sic ] of a narrow political 
loyalty above the national interest." In his view, holding 
by elections throughout the country " would engender a 
spirit of bitterness unparalleled in the history of this 
country. " 18 
In what was seen as a "surprise decision", the UP 
divisional committee in Queenstown declared that it would not 
ask its MP, Jan Steytler, to resign as he had a record of 
"invaluable service". The committee however pledged "wholehearted 
support" for Graaf£ and for the UP. The report in the Cape Times 
described the support for the motion as being "virtually 
unanimous". The same report stated that four of the five 
constituency branches in the seat of Durban Musgrave had passed 
an unanimous vote of confidence in their MP, Townley Owen 
Williams. 19 
17 
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to resign their seats by The Natal Witness which devoted an 
editorial entitled "A duty not to resign" to the matter. 
The editorial commented, "Their moral case for retaining their 
seats is unassailable. We would, indeed, go further than that, and 
confidently assert that they would be failing in their moral duty 
if they did resign their seats, should they do so on the ground 
that there is a disagreement between them and the majority of the 
United Party." 
deal of ill 
election. 
20 Be that as it may, this question led to a great 
feeling between the two parties during the 1961 
The Progressives formulate their basic principles. 
Soon after their departure from the UP, the 
dissidents issued an important statement outlining their beliefs 
and their reasons for resigning from the UP. This statement did 
not differ much from the policies that they expounded during the 
1961 election campaign, eighteen months after the official 
formation of their party. The statement expressed the signatories' 
convictions that South Africa should face up more squarely than 
it had done in the past to the problems which flowed from the 
multi-racial composition of the nation. It was its duty to 
maintain Western civilization and to extend this progressively to 
all the people of South Africa. This would lead to the increasing 
participation 
the country. 
should be 
multi-racial 
of all races in the economic and political life of 
Restrictions which prevented such participation 
gradually removed. The party believed that the 
character of South Africa demanded that such 
20 The Natal Witness, 26 August 1959. 
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development should take place by co-operation based on 
consultation and on the recognition of individual aspirations, 
group sentiments and the right of groups to maintain their own 
character. The South African constitution would have to be 
reformed so as to entrench civilized standards, protect the 
rights of minorities, and promote the harmonious co-operation of 
all groups in one great and growing South Africa. 21 
The policies of the Progressives will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6 but the above sentiments have 
been quoted as they indicate a certain need felt by many of 
the Progressives to justify their leaving the UP and their 
establishment of a new party with a widely different policy on 
the racial and franchise issues. 
The attitude of the press towards the Progressives. 
The press coverage of the Progressives was very 
varied it ranged from favourable to frankly condemnatory. 
Initially only the Rand Daily Mail supported the PP openly. 
The Sunday Times complimented them for the forthrightness but 
did not believe that they would have much chance of success in 
the conservative world of South African politics. The editorial 
congratulated Steytler and the PP on the bold stance which they 
had presented to the nation. Their move was of some significance 
as it was the first time since Union in 1910 that a 
parliamentary group with more than ten representatives had 
openly advocated the presence of black participation in 
parliament, the admission of Africans to party membership, and 
21 Daily Telegraph, 26 August 1959. 
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a vote for Africans ( subject to a qualification ) on a common 
roll with whites. The newspaper was of the opinion that everyone 
would agree that the Progressives had the merit of being honest 
and forthright, but doubted whether it would have much popular 
appeal as the Progressives could not hope to attract Nationalists 
"by advocating greater tolerance and by urging more rights for 
Natives". If the party was to win any support, it would have to 
come from the ranks of the UP and even from that quarter the 
signs were not hopeful. The UP supporters had shown themselves, 
at heart, to be ''intensely conservative.'' 22 
The Evening Post, published in Port Elizabeth, also 
complimented the Progressives on their honesty in the 
presentation of their beliefs and principles. It expressed 
cautious optimism for the PP, pointing out that far from 
"betraying" Graaf f at the congress, the Progressives had 
actually been "manoeuvred out" by the Mitchell group. 23 
The Natal Mercury also had some praise for the Progressives and 
their policies. It put forward the theory that the Nationalists 
had managed to persuade the electorate that there were only two 
choices for South Africa's future - the first being that of "a 
grim, shrunken and palisaded police state regimented under some of 
the strangest laws in the modern world and permanently ruled by a 
Transvaal Nationalist Afrikaner oligarchy", and the other choice 
being "a seedy and shabby multiracial slum presided over by 
inefficient and probably revengeful Black demagogues." The 
editorial congratulated the Progressives for insisting that there 
was another ''clear perspective" for South Africa's future. 24 
22 
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Die Transvaler condemned the Progressives 
unequivocally. In an editorial entitled, "Gevaarlike Beginsels", 
the newspaper described the Progressives' proposals as being a 
prescription for chaos and the collapse of society. It commented 
that the kernel of the Progressive Party's policy lay in the 
acceptance of the idea that South Africa consisted of one nation 
irrespective of race, religion, language and tradition. This would 
mean that "Boer, Brit, Jood, Bantoe, Indier en Kleurling" would 
all be brought together in one national group. This, it said, was 
the most lethal position ever adopted by a political party in 
South Africa. 25 
Die Burger took a more sympathetic line towards 
the Progressives than did its Johannesburg counterpart. It 
acknowledged the fact that the new party possessed some 
first-class parliamentary talent as well as a certain sympathy 
from sections of the English- language press but at the same 
time pointed out that the South African electorate had proved 
historically that it had little sympathy with smaller political 
parties. In its view, the most important role the Progressives 
had to play in South African politics was to bring clarity and 
honesty to the various colour policies, particularly those of 
the UP. 26 
The general position of the Progressive Party in 1961. 
When the dissidents from the UP broke away from that 
party in 1959, they could not have been unaware of 
25 
26 
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conservative nature of the South African electorate at the time. 
Nevertheless, in 1959 there were some factors that favoured 
this new political party despite other factors militating against 
their success. For many years the UP had suffered the disadvantage 
that its support tended to be concentrated in large numbers in a 
disproportionately small number of constituencies. These seats 
were very often won by the UP with very large majorities, with 
many "wasted" votes. The PP thus had the advantage that most of 
its prospective supporters were gathered together in a small 
number of predominantly urban constituencies where they could 
be more readily canvassed. Its supporters were not spread 
throughout the country in small "penny packets". However, in 1959 
even the most optimistic PP supporter could not have identified 
many constituencies that would be likely to return PP candidates 
to parliament. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the PP could count on the 
support of the Rand Daily Mail which circulated in Johannesburg, 
the business and industrial heart of South Africa. 27 It was here 
that the PP was to win its only seat in the 1961 general election 
and come close to winning the constituency of Parktown. It could 
also rely on fair treatment from much of the English-language 
press even though it could not count on its wholehearted support. 
In his memoirs Ray Swart recounts that many of the senior 
reporters in the press gallery at parliament, some of whom were 
later to become editors of influential newspapers, developed an 
antipathy towards some of the senior parliamentarians in the UP, 
27 See Chapter 4, p 143. 
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and this could only be of benefit to the PP. As Ray Swart 
' 28 expressed it, 
Few of the papers were openly hostile towards us, 
however, and by and large we were given reasonable 
coverage in their news pages, but in those early days 
one had the feeling that we were being tolerated and 
no more by those occupying editorial chairs. Indeed, 
the extent of support or hostility seemed to depend 
very much on the personal views of individual editors. 
He also cites the Evening Post, the Daily Dispatch 
and The Natal Witness as showing "sympathy and understanding" 
for the Progressives. 29 
Also to the advantage of the PP in the early years of its 
existence was the fact that it included some very capable 
parliamentarians and public figures. Perhaps the best example 
was Harry Lawrence. Whereas all the other PP members of parliament 
had been elected no earlier than 1953, Harry Lawrence had been a 
member since 1929. He had been an influential member of the 
cabinet from 1938 to 1948 and General Smuts had relied upon 
him a great deal, even sending him as a delegate to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1946. In his many years in 
parliament, he had established a reputation as a fine and forceful 
speaker and debater. When he joined the PP, the Cape Times 
commented in an editorial that, "The adherence of Mr Harry 
Lawrence, plus the background support of Mr Harry Oppenheimer, 
makes the Progressives a formidable parliamentary group, whether 
or not the group has a substantial 
constituencies.'' 30 
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In fact, the PP regarded its parliamentary performance 
during the 1960 and 1961 sessions as another of its assets. It 
felt that it and not the UP had put up the stoutest resistance 
to the government's policies. In its opinion the pp 
parliamentarians had exposed the closeness of many of the UP MPs 
to the government on several crucial issues, and they had shown 
the electorate that the PP had their own characteristic, 
unambiguous and distinctive policy. Joanna Strangwayes-Booth 
reviews the Progressives' parliamentary performance : 31 
The new party had already earned a reputation for 
itself as a first-rate parliamentary team. In its 
first session, its members had asked more questions 
than the whole of the official Opposition, especially 
on aspects of the emergency .... ; and the Progressives 
and their supporters were well satisfied that they at 
least had been able to present a consistently solid 
opposing front. 
In similar vein, the political commentator of The Forum 
praised the Progressive MPs in August 1961, comparing them to 
the OP to the latter's disadvantage • 32 
When the Progressive M.P.s broke away from the U.P. 
I there are 11 Progressive M.P.s ), someone made the 
quip that the O.P. had blown out its brains. Certainly, 
this was largely true of the Natal Progressives. 
Natal's contribution to the O.P. Parliamentary caucus 
has been appalling. With some exceptions, the Natal 
M.P.s are the most bewildered, ineffective, futile 
M.P.s in Parliament. 
However, the PP also faced some serious problems. It 
was seen as a party that was entirely English orientated and 
thus its appeal, if any, to the Afrikaans community was 
insignificant. Jan Steytler, as the son of the South African 
war hero, Louw Steytler, was the only senior member of the 
31 
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Progressives to have an Afrikaans background although Zach de Beer 
does have some Afrikaans ancestry. 
The pp was also hurt at an early stage by the 
departure of Dr Boris Wilson, the MP for Hospital. In his 
memoirs Wilson mentions the frustration that he experienced in 
parliament, his party's ineffectual role in opposition, and what 
he perceived as inefficiency in the party's ranks. He also did 
not get on very well with Colin Eglin and Zach de Beer. In his own 
words, "Had I not been one of the original founders of the PP, I 
might have ignored the unco-operative attitude of De Beer and 
Eglin, and their desire for control. I felt very deeply the 
continued mismanagement by my political colleagues, which was 
associated with an emerging struggle for power in the party." 
These factors encouraged him to resign from parliament in 
January 1961. 33 
Colin Eglin writes that Wilson's reasons for resigning 
from parliament were never clear. Eglin thinks that Wilson was 
by nature a "loner" and suggests that "his reasons reflected 
his personal style rather than any significant political or 
philosophical issues." 34 Zach de Beer recalls that he and Dr Wilson 
never became "close friends'' - "I don't actually think there was 
a serious difference of opinion, but we often differed on 
tactics." 35 
Small splinter parties have often been doomed to 
extinction in South African politics and the Progressives would 
naturally have experienced a feeling of trepidation on their 
33 
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possible fate. Nevertheless, they did feel that they had no other 
alternative than to leave the UP. They were under no illusions as 
to the difficulties facing them. South Africa was drifting in a 
more conservative political direction and events in South Africa 
and the rest of Africa were reinforcing a sense of conservatism 
among the South African electorate. The Progressives would have 
to contend with opposition from the UP, which was still a powerful 
voice and was determined to crush the Progressive threat for ever. 
It would have to contend with propaganda from both the NP and 
the UP. This was designed to show that the Progressives were at 
best naive, impractical idealists and at worst, proponents of a 
doctrine that would lead to the extinction of the white man in 
South Africa. Thus, even though the Progressives had virtually 
only two years to prepare for the 1961 general election and to 
spread their message among the electorate, they enjoyed some 
significant advantages that other minor parties did not have. 
These advantages should not be underestimated because they did 
have a significant influence on the 1961 general election campaign 
and its aftermath. 
THE POSITION OF THE LIBERAL PARTY. 
The Liberal Party was established in 1953 and did not have 
very many members at any time in its existence. Its membership 
peaked in 1961 when it had a total of about five thousand members 
of all races. In addition to the cities, certain rural areas such 
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as Rustenburg, Northern Natal, and the Transkei had a fair number 
of Liberal Party followers. 36 This was an improvement on the 
situation in January 1959 when the membership figures for the 
Transvaal, Cape and Natal were 1 000, 670 and 850 respectively. 37 
The party had always dedicated much of its effort 
to building up support among the Africans, coloureds, and Asians, 
and thus its participation in the election of 1961 was not as 
crucial as it was to the leading white political parties. The 
party had been monumentally unsuccessful in contesting white 
seats in the 1958 general election. It contested only three 
constituencies and lost heavily in all of them. In the seats of 
Orange Grove, Pietermaritzburg District and Sea Point the Liberal 
Party obtained 7,1 %, 8,2 % and 18,3 % respectively of all the 
votes cast. 38 
During the period from 1958 to 1961 some important 
changes took place in the Liberal Party, causing it to move much 
closer to the left. Its representation in parliament was ended 
when the government abolished the system of representation of 
Africans in 1959. In 1960 at its congress in Green Point the 
party took a significant step when it decided that it stood for 
universal adult suffrage and an entrenched bill of rights. In a 
statement issued after the congress the party declared that, 
"the racial exclusion of the majority of the South African nation 
constitutes a gross insult to that majority ... as long as the 
36 
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republic is not accepted by the majority of the nation it will 
not survive". At this congress Alan Paton was elected the 
national president and Jordan Ngubane, Jack Unterhalter and 
Jean van der Riet were chosen as vice-presidents. 39 
The white electorate was generally very apprehensive 
of the emergent African nationalism in the rest of the continent. 
Political figures such as Nkrumah of Ghana were regarded with 
grave suspicion by many whites and with extreme dislike by others. 
Thus the Liberal Party did not improve its image with the white 
electorate on occasions such as their well-publicised "Africa Day" 
meeting on the Grand Parade in Cape Town in 1959. The meeting was 
held to commemorate the Pan African Congress in Accra the previous 
year and a message from Nkrumah was read to the audience, 
congratulating "those Europeans in the Union who have the moral 
courage to identify themselves with the cause of racial equality". 
Senator Leslie Rubin, then one of the natives' representatives in 
the Senate, described Nkrumah as being the "inspiration of African 
people in their struggle for freedom in South Africa". According 
to Rubin there was no better person than Nkrumah "to act as 
inspiration, as he was the embodiment of the spirit of 
co-operation between white and black in the whole development of 
Africa and in every aspect of its life. Nkrumah would go down in 
history as an architect of unity, just as Verwoerd would go down 
as an architect of disunity." At the same meeting, which was also 
addressed by Thomas Ngwenya, chairman of the Cape Town branch of 
the African National Congress ( ANC ), Ngwenya told the audience 
39 Cape Argus, 30 May 1960 Cape Times, 30 May 1960. 
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that, "The Dutch Reformed Church must learn to think in terms of 
humanity, not in terms of the Afrikaner nation." 40 
In December 1958 the Liberal Party had antagonised 
many white South Africans when it sent Jordan Ngubane, Patrick 
Duncan and his wife Cynthia, as its representatives to the 
All-Africa People's Conference which was held in Accra, Ghana. 
On his return to South Africa, Duncan commented that Ghana was 
"the nearest thing to Utopia I have seen". His biographer writes 
that on this occasion Duncan was criticised by many whites for 
praising Nkrumah and simultaneously ignoring "the thousands of 
people Nkrumah had locked up". 41 
Many white South Africans would have been highly 
aggrieved at a letter sent by Alan Paton to the New Zealand 
Herald, praising the "efforts made by many New Zealanders to 
prevent the exclusion of Maoris from the famous All Blacks Team 
soon to tour our country". In his letter, Paton wrote "We hope 
also that your sportsmen will refuse to give any further support 
to the practice of Apartheid in South Africa, and will therefore 
cease to play against a country that excludes all non-white 
players from its football sides." 42 
In the provincial elections held in 1959, Patrick 
Duncan, the Liberal Party candidate for Sea Point, told his 
audience that he thought that overseas trade boycotts of South 
Africa were a "good thing". By contrast the chairman of the 
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meeting, Gerald Gordon, who had been the Liberal Party's 
candidate in Sea Point during the general election of the 
previous year, said that he was opposed to such boycotts. Such 43 
episodes were evidence of the differences in opinion between the 
various factions of the Liberal Party. Although the party was 
small, it had a distinct lack of cohesion not usually associated 
with small political parties. 
In September 1960, two prominent members of the Liberal 
Party in Cape Town, Oscar Wollheim and Gerald Gordon, resigned 
from the party, as they supported the idea of a qualified 
franchise whereas the Liberal Party had recently decided to 
adopt a policy of universal franchise. According to them they 
had wished to resign earlier but had postponed their resignations 
until the end of the state of the emergency that had been 
proclaimed after Sharpeville. The chairman of the Liberal Party 
in the Cape, Peter Hjul, told the press that about fifty members 
of the party in that province had resigned their membership 
during the previous two years. They included Donald Molteno 
and J Gibson, a prominent early member of the party, as well 
as B Curran, who was a member of the provincial council. 44 Earlier 
in 1960, Margaret Ballinger and her husband, Senator Ballinger, 
announced that although they were not going to leave the Liberal 
Party, they did not support an overseas boycott of South African 
goods. 45 In his letter of resignation, Wollheim told Peter Brown 
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that he had disagreed with the party's views on the franchise 
issue for many years and that he believed that the qualification 
for the franchise should not be lowered to allow voters "to vote 
without any clear conception as to the issues involved". In a 
letter to Margaret Ballinger, Wollheim also mentioned his 
differences of opinion with Patrick Duncan. 46 
The differences between the more militant and the 
peaceful wings of the Liberal Party are exemplified by the 
position of Margaret Ballinger, who took care not to express 
her opinions too publicly for fear of hurting her own party. 
She strongly disapproved of such methods as encouraging overseas 
trade boycotts of South Africa and she was disturbed by the 
increasing radicalism of some of her more militant colleagues 
such as Patrick Duncan. At one time she and some of her fellow 
thinkers sent a letter to the Liberal Party leadership urging 
a return to a qualified franchise policy and an end to the 
encouragement of overseas pressure on South Africa. The chairman 
of the Liberal party, Peter Brown, was not prepared to accede to 
these requests. Apparently Brown also thought it was inevitable 
that she would also leave the party after it adopted universal 
franchise as one of its policies. Significantly, after her 
departure from parliament in 1960, she had very limited contact 
with the Liberal Party. 47 
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state of emergency in 1960. These included the national chairman, 
Peter Brown, the national vice-chairmen, J Isacowitz and 
H Meidner, and the Transvaal secretary, Ernest Wentzel. 48 Patrick 
Duncan and the vice-chairman of the Liberal Party in the Cape, 
Joseph Nkatlo, were both banned towards the end of March 1961 
under the Suppression of Communism Act. Nkatlo had been listed 
as a Communist in 1950. According to the Cape Argus he left 
the Communist Party in 1945 and joined the Liberal Party 
in 1958. 49 
The attitude of the government towards the Liberal 
Party can be gauged by the accusations levelled against it. 
In January 1961 the prime minister accused the Liberal Party of 
"conspiring with foreign allies to overthrow the Government by 
force 11 • 50 Later the Minister of Native Administration and 
Development, De Wet Nel, while speaking in the Senate accused 
Patrick Duncan, one of the more prominent Liberals, of trying 
to stir up trouble in the reserves. He told the Senate that 
the Liberal Party was carrying on a campaign of "sowing 
suspicion among the Bantu" in order to cause the failure of the 
government's racial policies. According to him, Patrick Duncan, 
"the son of a very honourable Governor-General of South Africa", 
was one of those who did not hesitate to carry on a campaign of 
trying to cause suspicion against the government amongst 
Africans. 51 
The Liberal Party sometimes found it difficult to 
disseminate its views through the medium of Contact, the 
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periodical that was associated with it. The agents selling it 
were sometimes "harassed" by the police. During the state of 
emergency in 1960, the police also raided the offices of Contact 
several times and confiscated copies of certain issues. 52 Individual 
members of the Liberal Party occasionally complained of police 
harassment and in January 1961 it was reported that no meetings 
of the Liberal Party had been permitted in Orlando or the 
south-west townships of Johannesburg. 53 
While South Africa was moving towards becoming a republic, 
Alan Paton, Peter Brown, and Jordan Ngubane, wrote an open letter 
to Verwoerd in which they stated some of their feelings : 
Your new Republic will have no friend in the world, 
unless it be the tottering regime of Portugal 
You are called by your followers the saviour of 
Afrikanerdom, but History will call you its destroyer 
Even amongst your own, the will to dominate is 
losing its ancient power. 
In reaction to this letter, the Prime Minister's secretary wrote, 
"Due to the distorted outlook and wrong statement of facts the 
Prime Minister does not regard it as deserving any reply." 51 
It was during 1961 that Alan Paton suspected that 
some members of the Liberal Party, namely Adrian Leftwich and 
Randolph Vigne, were contemplating violent methods of trying to 
force the government to change its policies. Alan Paton 
describes how he felt qualms of conscience when he was asked 
to address a meeting of the Liberal Party in Constantia during 
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the 1961 general election in support of Vigne who was the party's 
candidate in that constituency. Leftwich was to turn state's 
witness in later years after he was implicated in trying to blow 
up a radio mast in Constantia. 55 
The establishment of the PP in 1959 meant that the 
Liberal Party would be facing far greater opposition in future. 
Both parties would be appealing largely to the same type of 
voter in a country where the electorate was becoming more 
conservative. In a statement in November 1959 the Liberal 
Party sharply criticised the PP as being "clearly tied to the 
environment of the White electorate". It felt that it was 
significant that no "non-Whites'' had been elected to the new 
party's National Executive, and characterised the Progressives 
as "still thinking in terms of consultation with non-White 
leaders rather than working with them to mould policies". In 
the opinion of the Liberal Party the Progressive policy of 
guaranteeing minority group rights was "their means of 
maintaining White rights and privileges", and such a policy was 
"exceedingly vague" and would arouse "non-White suspicion that 
it was designed to maintain White supremacy over non-Whites". 56 
The National Chairman of the Liberal Party, Peter 
Brown, had some harsh words to say about the newly established 
Progressives in his quarterly report in November 1959. He 
described the launching of the new party as an all-white affair 
and he also doubted whether "Non-Whites" would join the 
Progressives in large numbers as the new party would be sure to 
take on "a White South African colouring which it will be 
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extremely difficult for it to put off". Nevertheless it was 
Brown's opinion that "time and events" would drive the 
Progressives towards the Liberal Party. 57 
Soon after the formation of the PP, Walter Stanford, 
who was one of the most capable members of the Liberal Party 
hierarchy, left the party. His main difference with the Liberal 
Party lay in their policy of adult universal suffrage and "other 
similar trends" concerning which he felt deeply. Stanford praised 
the policies of the Progressives who in his opinion, "aimed at 
doing away with the prime evils in South Africa". In an interview 
with the Cape Times he expressed the belief that the "policy 
of adult universal suffrage" propagated by the Liberal Party was 
certain to lead to "bad government and illiberal results". 
Although he thought that the Liberal Party had played a "very 
important" part in the history of South Africa "in educating 
the public and acting as a catalyst for the emergence of the 
Progressives", he was of the opinion that "the best way of 
alleviating the injustices to the African in the shortest 
possible time" lay in the policy of the Progressives. 58 Margaret 
Ballinger, however, exhibited a hostile attitude towards the 
newly established PP. She thought it would divide and fragment 
the liberal opposition even further. 59 
Thus, as the Liberal Party approached the 1961 general 
election, it was in a beleaguered position. It had lost many of 
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its most capable and prominent members, some of its senior 
members had been banned, and it had very little support from 
the major newspapers. Its policies were regarded by the majority 
of the electorate as idealistic at best and close to treasonable 
at worst. It was fighting the new and much stronger Progressive 
Party for the allegiance of a comparatively small section of the 
electorate. The party had lost its small but vociferous 
parliamentary representation after the abolition of the system 
of natives' representatives in parliament. It was therefore not 
surprising that the Liberal Party contested only two white 
constituencies in the 1961 general election and fared rather 
badly in both of them. 
THE POSITION OF THE NATIONAL UNION PARTY. 
The National Union Party ( NUP owed its existence 
largely to the efforts and initiative of one man, Japie Basson, 
who had been an Independent MP after being expelled from the 
NP in 1959. Although the NUP had only a short existence and 
ultimately gained only one seat in parliament, it attracted the 
attention of the press and the public, and its establishment 
was regarded by some as being a portent of a possible split 
in the NP. 
In February 1960 the Sunday Times announced 
that Basson had launched a new political party in South Africa 
that was to be called the NUP. According to the newspaper, Basson 
had outlined the aims of the party on the previous Thursday "at 
secret talks in Johannesburg attended mainly by Nationalist 
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dissidents". Basson told the Sunday Times that the principles 
of the new party "broadly speaking would be those of Hertzogism". 
Basson also said that he was convinced that "the time is ripe 
for a new party that will bring the English and Afrikaans-speaking 
people closer together and will acknowledge the brainpower and 
experience of both groups". 60 It would appear, however, that there 
were significant differences between Basson's policies and those 
of Hertzogism. The latter entailed a two-stream policy in which 
the two main language groups were separated to a large extent and 
allowed to maintain their own identities and cultural values. 
Nevertheless, the word "Hertzogism" might have attracted some 
voters, particularly older ones who hankered after a bygone era 
in South African history. 
In reviewing the 1961 general election, the political 
scientists, Stultz and Butler, saw the purpose behind the 
establishment of the NUP as a desire "to create a political 
force between the National Party and the United Party and 
therefore to provide a basis for a political reunion of the two 
European linguistic groups." 61 
In April 1961, the South African Bond, a very minor 
political group, decided to join forces with the NUP. The points 
on which the two parties agreed included a desire to have a 
national government of Afrikaans and English speaking people, 
"the implementation of a virile economic policy based on private 
enterprise", and an "immediate return to what was the natural and 
traditional form of White and non-White relations in place of the 
60 
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present extreme, compulsory and impractical implementation of 
apartheid and State intervention in regulating and policing the 
private lives of people." It also recognised that "a minority of 
the Bantu are permanently settled outside the Bantu territories", 
and urged the acceptance of the Republic "as a fact". The 
coloureds should also be granted "direct election to parliament 
... on the present basis of representation as a group." 62 After the 
signing of the election pact between the UP and the NUP, 63 the South 
African Bond decided to withdraw its support from the NUP. 64 
It was hardly surprising that the alliance between the NUP and 
the South African Bond should have ended so quickly as discussions 
between the two parties in July 1960 had also ended in failure. One 
of the NUP delegates, HL Schachat, in a letter to Japie Basson 
mentioned that agreement could not be reached on two issues, namely 
the republic and the right of the coloureds to elect their own 
people to parliament. According to Schachat, the South 
African Bond was not in favour of a republic. He also mentioned 
that the delegates for the South African Bond had taken the view 
that as soon as the coloureds were in parliament, "the African 
and Indian would follow with similar claims, and that by granting 
62 
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the right to Coloureds you are immediately conceding the same 
right to the other non-European sections." 65 
In July 1961 Mr Justice Henry Fagan became the leader 
of the National Union Party and Basson became the National 
Chairman. Fagan's inclusion in the party gave it considerably 
more stature. Fagan was the secretary of the founding committee 
of Die Burger, and from 1916 to 1919 he was assistant chief 
editor when DF Malan occupied the editorial chair. He was elected 
to parliament as the member for Swellendam in 1933 and in 1938 
he was appointed by General Hertzog as the Minister of Native 
Affairs and Social Welfare. After opposing South Africa's entry 
into the Second World War, he left the cabinet with General 
Hertzog. In 1943 he became a judge and later Chief Justice of the 
Union, retiring from that position in 1959. 66 
Brian Bamford, who was to stand for the NUP in George, 
regards Japie Basson as "a remarkable leader by any standards". 
He describes him as a splendid orator, hard working, imaginative, 
with a great sense of humour and showing unquestionable 
loyalty to his supporters. Bamford also remembers how the 
Afrikaans press gave Fagan "a hard time" as they regarded him 
as a ''traitor to Afrikanerdorn''. 67 As the NUP was so small, newly 
established and so fraught with difficulties, the personality 
and leadership of Basson were undoubtedly of great importance. 
The party was to a large extent his creation and bore all the 
imprints of his beliefs and character. 
65 
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misgivings in August 1960 on the party's approach to the 
referendum. Several members of the Cape branch including 
Brian Bamford wrote a letter to Japie Basson informing him : 
The 
We are ourselves absolutely and irrevocably opposed 
to the referendum - if only for one reason, which, 
to us, is crystal clear. We believe that there is a 
risk, however slight, that South Africa will not be 
re-admitted to the Commonwealth, and in any event, 
that this is the view of the electorate. We 
believe that, having regard to the disrepute in which 
South Africa stands, there must remain at least a 
possibility of such non-readmission. 
correspondents thought that the party would alienate 
"a vast section of potential supporters" should they officially 
support the referendum. They did not, however, oppose the issue 
of republicanism : "If the referendum is lost, we shall continue 
to advocate republicanism ; if it is won, we can honestly state 
that we were wholeheartedly republican on terms which were 
nationally acceptable, and did not endanger the very cause of 
republicanism itself." 68 
Any potential success of the NUP would depend largely 
on its ability to attract disillusioned Nationalists. It was a 
party which revolved largely around the personalities of Basson 
and Fagan and which in general did not have candidates with much 
popular appeal or charisma. Although it did have some newspapers 
such as Werda and The Realist under its auspices, it also 
lacked press support, and most of its support was as a result 
of its alliance with the UP. The party was established only a 
short while before the 1961 general election and had even less 
time than the Progressives to present itself and its views to 
the electorate. 
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THE POSITION OF THE CONSERVATIVE WORKERS' PARTY. 
The journalist and author John Gunther, in his very 
interesting book, Inside Africa, states that South Africa was 
the first country that he had encountered in Africa with a large 
poor white class. 69 Although the position of the working class 
whites in South Africa during the 1950s and early 1960s was far 
removed from their parlous situation in the late 1920s and 1930s, 
there were still whites who were impoverished and whose economic 
position would be severely jeopardised during any economic 
downturn. These people would have much to fear in the abolition of 
job reservation or any decision by the government to save money by 
retrenching staff in various government institutions. In 1961 the 
economy was experiencing a slight recession caused partially by 
the civil disorder in 1960 and the subsequent state of emergency. 
After the Sharpeville shootings there was a great loss of 
confidence on the part of foreign investors in South Africa. There 
was also a great outflow of capital from the country and the stock 
exchange slumped dramatically. 70 The recession naturally had an 
effect on the unemployment figures. 
The report of the Department of Labour for the year 
1961 shows that there was a monthly average of 30 392 unemployed 
whites, coloureds and Asiatics in South Africa. Of these, 15 875 
were whites. For the purposes of comparison, the monthly average 
of unemployed people during the previous year was 25 738. 71 
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Reference has already been made to a feeling of 
dissatisfaction among a significant number of working class whites 
in areas such as Germiston. An example is those working in the 
clothing industry, who had been adversely affected by the 
government's decision to encourage industrial development in the 
homelands. It is therefore not entirely surprising that a new 
party saw the light of day in September 1961 and that it was 
dedicated to supporting the white workers. Although this new 
party, the Conservative Workers' Party, was short-lived and 
did not come anywhere near winning the seats that it contested 
in 1961, its establishment did show that the government had lost 
some of its support among the white workers whom they had 
assiduously cultivated for many years and it did cause slight 
concern in some NP circles. 
Although the Conservative Workers' Party did not really 
pose any great threat to the Nationalists, Die Transvaler tried 
to soothe the fears of some workers that they were being neglected 
or forgotten. In an editorial entitled "Die werkers se vriend", 
the newspaper dismissed the new party as being of no consequence 
at all. In its view no party established so soon before a general 
election could have any chance of success. It pointed out that 
under the NP government the average annual salary of white workers 
in factories had risen from R 907 in 1948 to R 1 825 in 1960. The 
editorial did not however indicate whether these increases were 
above or below the general inflation rate. It also listed some 
of the improvements the NP government had introduced in the 
position of the workers ; improved conditions for apprentices, 
higher payments to the unemployed, the establishment of minimum 
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rates of payment in some industries, an increase in payment for 
overtime work, and greater opportunities for adults to be trained 
as artisans. 72 
On 22 September 1961 the NP took out a double-page 
advertisement in Die Transvaler describing what they had done 
for the workers. It was entitled, "Ons regering sorg vir die 
werkers". It pointed out inter alia that in its thirteen years 
in office more than 73 000 houses for whites had been built using 
state capital or with the help of the government. The 
advertisement also enumerated the additional benefits that the 
government had granted to its employees and to workers in general. 
Special mention was made of how the mineworkers, railwaymen, and 
members of the Police, Defence Force, and Prison Services had 
benefited under NP rule. 73 
The Conservative Workers' Party was formed and led 
primarily by leaders in various trade unions that had long been 
regarded as a source of support for the NP. When the party 
was established, the Sunday Times identified its leaders as 
J Kruger, the assistant chief secretary of the South African Iron 
and Steel Workers' Union, K du Preez, general secretary of the 
South African Engine Drivers' and Firemen's Association, R Nagel, 
the chief organiser of the Witwatersrand's Iron and Steel Workers, 
H Harvey, secretary of the Johannesburg Iron and Steel Workers' 
Union, and B Keeble, district secretary of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union. The report described the new party's main 
grievances as a perception that the "standards of industrial 
workers are being sacrificed on the altar of Bantustan apartheid", 
72 
73 
Die Transvaler, 9 September 1961. 
Die Transvaler, 22 September 1961. 
Page 189 
and that, "instead of checking unemployment, the Government is 
urging Afrikaner workers to pull their belts tighter". 74 
Nagel and Kruger were later dismissed from their 
positions in the South African Iron and Steel Workers' Union, 
when they refused to accede to the demand of the executive 
committee that they should stand down as candidates for the 
Conservative Workers' Party and withdraw from active politics. 75 
How significant, then, was the Conservative Workers' 
Party ? It would appear to be of very little moment in the South 
African political scene but was largely an indication that a 
number of working class Nationalists, particularly in certain 
urban areas, were discontented with their position. They felt that 
others in the NP were being favoured above them. The party's 
short life, its lack of success in the 1961 general election and 
the fact that it was rooted virtually entirely in the trade union 
movement meant that it would make very little impact on South 
African political history. 
THE ROLE PLAYED BY ORGANISATIONS REPRESENTING 
THE DISENFRANCHISED. 
At the time of the 1958 general election the ranks 
of the disenfranchised in South Africa included the Asiatics, 
the Africans (except for a small number in the Cape Province ), 
and nearly all the coloured people. During the 1959 parliamentary 
session Verwoerd managed to 
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representation of the Africans in the Cape, thus effectively 
disenfranchising all the Africans in South Africa. A small number 
of coloureds in the Cape were represented by four members of 
parliament. The Eleventh Delimitation Commission had the task of 
assigning these coloureds to four constituencies based on the 
voters' roll of 15 June 1957. These four constituencies, namely 
Boland, Karoo, Outeniqua and Peninsula had 8 221, 6 330, 6 330, 
and 8 393 voters respectively - 29 274 voters in all. There were 
doubtless some coloured people who were too apathetic or alienated 
to register. These figures are a very adequate indication of how 
limited and ineffective the coloured vote was during this 
period. 76 
The most influential black political organisation 
during this time was undoubtedly the ANC, led in 1958 by Chief 
Albert Lutuli. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a significant number 
of members of the ANC broke away from that organisation in 1959 
to form the PAC under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe. 77 The 
breakaway took place in circumstances of much bitterness. During 
the following year the rivalry between the organisations was an 
important factor in the events at Sharpeville and the subsequent 
unrest throughout the country. The extent of the animosity 
existing between these two organisations is evident in a statement 
released by a spokesman for the PAC, William Jolebe, after the 
bloodshed at Sharpeville : 78 
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The ANC is now trying to bask in the sunshine of 
the PAC's successes. Luthuli now has the courage 
which he has lacked for over twelve years to burn 
his reference book after passes had been suspended. 
Supported and boosted by the white Press, he has 
been making one foolish statement after the other, 
pretending he has a following in the country. 
Our advice and warning to the ANC and its liberal 
friends is : Hands off our campaign. We do not need 
your interference. Go on with your coffin-carrying 
and other childish pastimes but leave the African 
people to fight their struggle without you. Tell 
your bosses you cannot sell the African people 
because you do not control them. 
The animosity between the ANC and the PAC is also 
shown by a statement issued by Mandela in June 1961. It 
discussed the results of the stay-at-home which had been 
called for 29, 30 and 31 May 1961 and criticised the PAC for 
its lack of support. It accused the PAC of mean and cowardly 
behaviour in stabbing their kith and kin at a time when maximum 
unity had become a "matter of life and death to Africans." It 
mentioned supposed instances of collaboration between the PAC 
and the police and accused the PAC of "supporting a government 
that suppresses Africans". This was "treacherous and 
unforgivable". 79 
Tom Lodge identifies several key areas in which the 
ANC and the PAC differed. They differed in their attitudes 
towards white supporters with the PAC believing that whites had 
mainly sectional interests. These ideals had been reflected in 
the Freedom Charter in the form of various clauses that guaranteed 
the position and rights of various population groups. This had 
caused the dissolution of the "ethnically assertive nationalism" 
which the PAC believed should form the kernel of the black 
79 N Mandela, The struggle is my life ( London, 1990 ) , pp 112 - 113. 
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struggle. The ANC and the PAC also differed on the question of 
"spontaneity 11 • In Lodge's opinion the ANC regarded it as the duty 
of the leaders to give "proper direction" to the mass movements 
whereas the PAC thought that it merely had "to show the light and 
the masses will find the way." so 
Personality differences between the leaders of the ANC 
and the PAC were undoubtedly important in preventing the formation 
of a really effective and united front but these two parties 
also had considerable policy differences. They differed in their 
attitudes to the other population groups in South Africa. One 
writer, P van den Berghe, describes the PAC as being "militantly 
anti-Indian, anti-European and anti-Coloured, in spite of 
declarations to the contrary". 81 Van den Berghe also believes that 
there were certain other factors that hampered the various black 
political organisations in opposing the Verwoerd government. Some 
of these factors included the vigorous role played by the police 
in intimidating the leadership and the rank and file in these 
organisations. Many of these leaders were arrested and imprisoned 
while other leaders had to operate underground. These 
organisations often did not have the financial resources needed 
for sustained campaigns and the poverty of most black workers 
meant that most strikes would be doomed to failure. The 
traditional chiefs often viewed black political organisations with 
suspicion and there was sometimes a lack of contact between the 
leadership of these bodies and the rural masses. 82 
80 
81 
82 
T Lodge, Black politics in South Africa 
P van den Berghe, South Africa 
( Connecticut ) , pp 168 - 169. 
Ibid. 
since 1945, pp 83 - 84. 
a study in conflict 
Page 193 
Two important events had a great influence on the 
history of the black extra-parliamentary organisations between 
1958 and 1961. One was the banning of the ANC and the PAC in 1960. 
This has been discussed in Chapter 2 but it should be emphasised 
that this had the effect of driving most of the leadership into 
hiding or making them work underground. It also undoubtedly 
hardened the attitude of the ANC leadership and made them more 
willing to accept the idea of violence as a tactic. The other 
event was the drift from more peaceful methods of protest to 
more violent or forceful ones. For example, during the 1958 
general election, the ANC tried to call a general strike but this 
was a complete failure, partly because of the difficulties 
involved in organising such a strike and partly because of the 
firm measures adopted by the state. In London The Observer 
mentioned some of the strong tactics that the state might use to 
suppress such a strike. These included the use of convict labour 
in certain areas and the prohibition of gatherings of more than 
ten blacks in most cities. The fact that many companies had 
threatened to dismiss striking workers also militated against the 
possible success of strike action. Whatever the outcome, the ANC 
had been successful in its primary aim "to intervene 
impressively in the Union's all-white general election." 83 
Interestingly enough, Graaff also warned the blacks against taking 
part in these protests. At a meeting in Johannesburg he said 
83 
84 
The United 
action or 
political 
opportunity 
Party will not tolerate 
economic blackmail for 
grievances and I want 
of warning the Native 
The Observer, 13 April 1958. 
The Pretoria News, 25 March 1958. 
disorder, illegal 
the redress of 
to take this 
people of South 
84 
Page 194 
Africa not to be so foolish as to join the 
that is being organised by the Native 
conference and other bodies to make election 
week of national protest and demonstration in 
of what they call the people's demands. 
protest 
workers' 
week a 
support 
After the first day of the general strike the ANC 
decided to call it off as it promised, in Nelson Mandela's 
words, to be a "fiasco". In the discussions that took place 
within the ANC afterwards, a certain number of members argued 
that it would have been more successful had pickets and more 
coercive methods been employed. 85 This was possibly the most 
significant result of the strike - it showed the growth of a 
willingness to discard peaceful or persuasive methods of protest. 
In the three years that followed the 1958 general 
election, black politics in South Africa was dominated by various 
incidents of rebellion and violent protest. These included the 
disturbances in Pondoland, the riots at Cato Manor, the shootings 
at Sharpeville, the never to be forgotten march on Cape Town and 
the disturbances that occurred in much of South Africa in 1960. 
All of these have been discussed in Chapter Two. 86 The extent of the 
racial unrest had two main results - one was the hardening of 
racial attitudes among many whites. The other was the decision to 
declare a state of emergency and to ban both the ANC and the PAC. 
This, understandably, contributed greatly to the way that 
leadership of these parties disappeared underground. It also 
influenced their shift towards a policy of violence or "armed 
struggle". The ANC, thus, reached a significant point in its 
history at a meeting of the Working Committee in June 1961 when 
85 
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Mandela raised the question of an "armed struggle". Mandela 
commented that the state had given them no alternative but to use 
violent methods and that should the ANC not take the lead in 
employing violence it would soon "be latecomers and followers" to 
a movement over which they had no control." 87 According to Tom 
Lodge, the ANC National Executive decided that the Congress itself 
would not change its official policy of non-violence but "those 
of its members who involved themselves in the campaign should not 
be restrained". Lodge sees this as implying the need to establish 
a separate organisation - in this case Umkhonto we Sizwe. 88 
By the time of the 1961 election campaign many of the 
prominent leaders of the black "liberation organisations" had gone 
into exile or were in hiding. An example of this was Nelson 
Mandela who was on the run from the authorities after a warrant 
had been issued for his arrest. On 26 June 1961 he issued a press 
release which ran, "I will not leave South Africa, nor will I 
surrender. Only through hardship, sacrifice, and militant 
action can freedom be won. The struggle is my life. I will 
continue fighting for freedom until the end of my days." 89 
As will be seen in the chapter dealing with the themes 
of the 1961 general election campaign, the NP made an issue of 
the need to deal firmly with black unrest and with subversive 
black political organisations. The ANC and PAC were thus 
important in influencing white politics at this time. Black 
resistance politics during this period was characterised by a 
87 
88 
89 
N Mandela, A long walk to freedom, pp 320 - 323. 
T Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945, p 233. 
S Johns & R Hunt Davis ( eds. ) , Mandela, Tambo and the African 
National Congress (New York, 1991 ), p 90. 
Page 196 
move towards more confrontational and violent methods of trying 
to influence the government. The resources of the state and its 
security apparatus were brought into action to 
resistance. Also of crucial importance was the 
suppress black 
banning of the 
ANC and the PAC and their transformation into underground 
political movements. There were numerous factors that militated 
against these movements' chances of success. These included the 
strength and resolution of the state and the whites, the lack of 
unity among various black political groups, their inability to 
attract much support from foreign governments and furthermore 
the inability to launch a sustained and powerful campaign of 
resistance among a population group that was poverty-stricken 
and often fragmented. 
CHAPTER SIX. 
POLICIES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
PRIOR TO THE 1961 GENERAL ELECTION. 
This chapter will examine the policies of the various 
parties participating in the 1961 general election, followed 
by the decision to call an early election. 
The policies of the National Party. 
After the 1958 general election the government began 
paying considerable attention to the further implementation of 
the apartheid policy. In higher education, for example, the 
outcome was the Extension of University Education Act 
Act No. 45 of 1959 ), which provided for the establishment of 
university colleges for black students. In future these students 
would need the permission of the Minister of Education to attend 
a white university. This law was opposed by the UP, partly on the 
grounds that it was an attack on the autonomy of the existing 
universities and partly because the new black university colleges 
would not have the status of universities and would lack academic 
freedom. There were also objections that the Committee of 
University Principals had not been consulted on the new measure 
and that it would limit contact among the people who would in time 
become leaders of their own communities. It was furthermore quite 
impracticable for the new colleges to duplicate the courses that 
were already being followed by black students at their present 
racially-mixed universities. 1 
The Population Registration Act Act 30 of 1950 
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was fundamental to the policy of apartheid and there were regular 
examinations of doubtful racial classification. The Minister of 
the Interior announced in April 1961 that his department had thus 
far determined the race of 57 981 people on the white I coloured 
borderline and 70 605 people on the coloured I African borderline. 
He also claimed that the decisive test lay in the acceptance of a 
person by the community. For example, some Chinese had been 
accepted as individuals by the whites but this could not be said 
about the Chinese as a group, and thus this problem would have 
to receive attention. 2 
The Nationalist government was also determined to 
enforce the pass laws more stringently despite the difficulties 
involved in doing so. The pass system naturally involved a great 
deal of administration. The Minister of Bantu Administration 
mentioned in parliament in February 1961 that during the preceding 
twelve months 3976 black men and 991 women had been "endorsed out" 
of the municipal areas of Cape Town, Goodwood, Parow and 
Bellville. On 21 March 1961 the Minister of Justice said that 
during the last year for which statistics had been determined, 
"a daily average of 162 persons had been charged in Johannesburg 
for offences against laws and regulations dealing with 
measures generally known as the Pass laws." 3 
Although the policy of having separate schools on 
language grounds was a less prominent theme in the 1961 general 
election than it had been in 1958, it did occasionally feature 
in Verwoerd's correspondence. In a letter to a SJ Suchet of 
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Vereeniging, Verwoerd's private secretary pointed out that the 
Union government was not actually in control of the school system. 
The schools were in fact controlled by the provincial 
administrations. According to Verwoerd most rural schools in South 
Africa ( with the exception of those in Natal ) had been actually 
designated as parallel-medium but this was not always apparent 
as many English-speaking parents in the rural areas preferred 
to send their children to schools in the urban areas. It was 
therefore the English-speaking parents and not the government, 
who ensured that parallel-medium schools were not widely 
utilised. 4 
In May 1959 Verwoerd denied that the policy of 
independent black homelands meant that urbanised blacks would have 
to return to "purely rural reserves, as we knew them in the past", 
or that the tribal system "as it existed in primitive times" would 
be the "be-all and end-all of the Bantu governmental development 
visualized in this Bill". 5 No black who had acquired "either 
learning or knowledge or capital in the urban areas of South 
Africa" would be expected to return to any rural reserve "without 
any hope of advancement". Verwoerd claimed that since the adoption 
of the policy of separate development, "openings and 
opportunities" had been created on "an unprecedented scale for the 
Bantu, and particularly also for the more skilled or even the 
educated Native". Hundreds of young Africans had been given 
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responsible and important positions "in the service of their 
own nation''. 6 
KA Heard has identified some of the main objections 
to the NP's policies on the Bantustans and how these affected 
the 1961 election. For example, if these policies were to be 
comprehensively implemented there would still be six million 
blacks living in white areas by the end of the century. 
Furthermore, black urban dwellers ( even though they would have 
a limited form of self-government in the Bantustans would be 
unable to own their own land there. They would thus have rights 
that could 'hardly be regarded as substantial'. It was also clear 
that the economic development of the homelands would not be 
rapid or extensive enough to stop the large-scale migration of 
homeland blacks to the cities. 7 
Verwoerd's policies and visions relating to the black 
homelands were an easy target for the right-wing of the UP, which 
accused him of causing the break-up of large parts of South 
Africa. Typical of this is the oft-quoted speech by Vause Raw 8 
What mockery of the future of South Africa, 
put the White man in a minority of two to 
in a multi-racial state and at the same time 
build round him a horse-shoe, a Black noose 
states which inevitably must be alienated 
the White man in this country. 
to 
one 
to 
of 
from 
By the 1950s the NP had come to accept the Indians 
as part of the permanent population. There was no question, 
however, of their political or economic status being improved. 
The South African government had fallen foul of the UNO over the 
6 
7 
Debates of the House of Assembly, 20 May 1959, cols 6215, 6216, 
6217. 
K Heard, General elections in South Africa, p 122. 
Debates of the House of Assembly, 2 June 1959, cols 7180, 7181, 
7182. 
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Indian question but neither this nor the massive passive 
resistance campaign in the 1940s had produced any redress of 
the Indians' grievances by 1961. 
The policies of the United Party. 
The policies of the UP are described in an 
article written by Graaff in the journal Foreign Affairs 
in 1961. 9 In describing the "evolutionary progress of any 
racial group in Africa towards higher economic or political 
status," Graaff believed that, "the White man in South Africa 
has a duty as the bearer of the older and more established 
civilization to guide that evolutionary process, where it is 
within his power to do so." He felt that the Nationalist 
government was trying to seek a just solution to the country's 
race problems but that the difficulty with their proposals 
was that they had come two hundred years too late. Graaff 
regarded the government's aim of establishing segregation in 
the economic sphere as being unrealistic as it had "gone too 
far" and "the egg cannot be unscrambled". Furthermore, 
calculations had shown that the whites would compose a much 
smaller percentage of the country's work force by the year 2000 
and this meant that it would be impossible to maintain "parallel 
development and rigid separation for the races in those 
circumstances". 
The coloured people in South Africa had shown that 
they had accepted "Western standards" and were "civilized", and 
9 Sir de Villiers Graaff, "South African Prospect", Foreign 
Affairs, June 1961, vol 39, no 4, pp 670 - 682. 
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therefore "they should in every way be regarded as part of 
Western society in South Africa, enjoying the rights to which 
that status entitles them." They should be placed on a common 
voters roll and allowed to nominate and elect their own people 
to parliament. Furthermore, any measure "that may be necessary 
in the economic field to protect the higher standard of living 
of our civilized people should not apply to them". 
In discussing the blacks in South Africa, Graaff wrote, 
"When people are at varying stages of development one cannot be 
dogmatic about their position in society." As the whites feared 
being submerged 
regarded the 
important and 
"under a wave of primitive nationalism", 
strengthening of the white population 
would do so by increased immigration 
the UP 
as very 
and by 
"social planning to increase the birth rate". The UP hoped that 
with such a policy the white population would increase to at least 
fifteen million by the end of the century. This would mean a great 
change in the psychology of the white man as, "His influence will 
be supported by numbers, as democracy demands ; and his good 
intentions will then not be frustrated by the fear that justice 
done to the Native may mean his own cultural, economic and 
political annihilation." According to Graaff, the "responsible 
class of Natives qualifying for registration on their own voters 
roll" would be represented in parliament, and the blacks would 
also be represented in local government by "elective bodies 
not archaic tribal authorities" and in the administration of the 
reservations. The UP believed that as South Africa could not 
prosper if "dismembered", it could not support the Nationalist 
policy of partitioning South Africa. The UP intended to restore 
the representatives for the blacks to the central parliament. 
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Parliamentary representation for blacks, which had previously 
been limited to the Cape Province, would be extended to the rest 
of the country. These representatives would be whites "at least in 
the initial stages", and they would be chosen "by Natives 
registered on the grounds of character and responsible status 
on a separate voters roll". This would obviate the need to have 
"civilization tests", which were "at best arbitrary and 
unscientific". 
In the same article, turning to the position of urban 
blacks, Graaff identified three immediate and urgent tasks. These 
were namely to amend the laws which offended "against the dignity 
of our Native peoples as human beings"; to take steps which would 
bring real improvements in their standard of living and education 
and thirdly, to give the urban blacks a stake in the community by 
developing them into "a responsible, property-owning, middle class 
in contrast to the dangerous proletariat which they may well 
become as things are at present." In the economic sphere the UP 
intended to narrow the gap between the wages of the various racial 
groups, to boost productivity by improving the training given to 
blacks, to abolish job reservation, and to uphold the principle 
of paying "the rate for the job". 10 
In October 1960 when Graaff visited Britain and 
Canada in order to raise support for South Africa's membership of 
the commonwealth, he issued a statement outlining the UP's stance. 
According to him, those coloured people entitled to vote on a 
separate roll or a common roll should also have the right to 
stand for parliament. Artificial economic discrimination against 
10 Sir de Villiers Graaff, "South African Prospect", Foreign 
Affairs, July 1961, vol 39, no 4, pp 670 - 682. 
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coloured people, like job reservation, should disappear. Asians 
in South Africa should be accepted as a permanent 
population. Immediate attention should be given to 
part 
the 
of the 
effects 
of the application of the Group Areas Act ( Act No. 41 of 1950 
on the economic enterprises run by the Asians and negotiations 
should be opened to determine their future political status. 
Special emphasis should be placed "on the development of the 
African Reserves with White capital and White skill''. South Africa 
should "have the courage to accept a permanent detribalized 
African population as a fact" and this group should be given 
representation in parliament based primarily on a permanent urban 
middle class, whose emergence should be fostered. 11 
The policies outlined earlier emphasise the 
integrationist aspects of the UP's policies and do not stress 
those that were segregationist in character. The motion introduced 
by Marais Steyn in parliament in February 1960 showed a more 
right-wing bias, particularly the first section. This was probably 
intended more for the South African voter than for overseas 
opinion. He moved that the House should confirm the traditional 
and accepted South African policy of social and residential 
separation among the races and that it should condemn those NP 
policies which sought a solution of South Africa's race problems 
in unrealistic attempts to develop independent Native states. 
These were impracticable because they had no regard ' for the 
permanent presence of millions of blacks of the same ethnic groups 
outside those areas. He called upon the government to accept the 
11 A survey of race relations, 1959 - 1960, p 11. 
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permanent multi-racial character of South Africa and to formulate 
its policies accordingly. He also demanded that such reformed 
policies should "accept the restoration of the Cape Coloured 
people in the Cape Province and Natal on a common roll". They 
should "be based upon consultation with the Native peoples at all 
levels and their representation as a group in the Parliament of 
South Africa while ensuring the maintenance of those Western 
standards of which the European race group is by tradition and 
history the guardian." 12 
At the very significant Bloemfontein Congress of 
the UP in August 1959, 13 Graaff managed to have his ideas on racial 
issues adopted by the delegates, but only after what was described 
by the Cape Times as a "bitter row". The resolutions were that 
"African representation be restored to the Cape and extended to 
the Northern provinces ; that this representation be based on 
separate rolls that qualification for registration on separate 
rolls be based on responsibility ; that such representation be by 
Europeans and that the maximum number of representatives will be 
eight." 14 
The policies of the Progressive Party. 
After the first National Conference of the PP in 
Johannesburg in November 1959, the party formulated a statement 
of its main principles and policies. The first dedicated the 
party to "the maintenance and extension of the values of Western 
civilization, the protection of fundamental human rights and the 
12 
13 
14 
Debates of the House of Assembly, 15 February 1960, cols 1560, 
1561. 
See Chapter 4, pp 131 - 133. 
Cape Times, 13 August 1959. 
Page 206 
safeguarding of the dignity and worth of the human person, 
irrespective of race, colour or creed". No citizen of the Union 
of South Africa should be debarred on grounds of race, religion, 
language or sex, from making the contribution to their national 
life of which he or she might be capable. The Union of South 
Africa is one nation embracing various racial groups with 
different religions, languages and traditions. Each such group 
is entitled to the protection of its culture and its right to 
participation in the government of the nation. Furthermore, 
understanding, tolerance and goodwill between the different 
racial groups should be fostered. The Rule of Law should be 
maintained. The party pledged itself to the promotion of social 
progress and the improvement of living standards through the 
energetic development of a modern economy based on free 
enterprise, with the free utilisation of all national resources. 
It also encouraged the promotion of friendly relations with other 
nations, more particularly the members of the Commonwealth and 
those sharing the heritage of Western civilization with South 
Africa. ~ 
based 
In 1960 the PP adopted a franchise policy that was 
on the recommendations of the Molteno Commission. In 
February 1960, Steytler announced the names of the members of 
the commission, which was to be chaired by D Molteno, a former 
natives' representative in parliament. Its members included 
ex-Chief Justice Centlivres, Leslie Blackwell also a former 
judge and retired MP), Harry Oppenheimer, JG Strauss formerly 
leader of the UP ), Dr D van der Ross, and Zach de Beer. Two 
15 A survey of race relations, 1959 - 1960, p 12. 
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professors of history, LM Thompson and S Marais, were also members 
of the commission. In October 1960 its report was published. 16 
It proposed granting full voting rights on the ordinary voters' 
roll to all South Africans who had passed Standard Eight or its 
equivalent. Alternatively those who had reached Standard Six and 
had the attainments of a semi-skilled worker or who were literate 
and had the attainments of at least a skilled worker should be 
allowed to vote. Those who were literate and owned fixed property 
or who had been at any time a voter for the House of Assembly 
should also be enfranchised. There would be a special voters' roll 
for those who did not qualify to vote on the general voters' roll. 
The main requirement for admission to the special voters' roll was 
passing a literacy test. Voters on this roll would elect no more 
than ten percent of the members of the House of Assembly in 
specially delimited constituencies and at a separate election. 
There would be a rigid, entrenched constitution and a Bill of 
Rights to protect the rights of individuals and groups. The 
composition of the Senate would be changed and would exercise 
control over all non-financial legislation. A candidate could not 
be elected to the Senate unless he or she had obtained the support 
of a "meaningful percentage" of the members of each population 
group. The majority report of the Molteno Commission suggested 
that "a candidate at a Senate election who receives the largest 
number of votes shall be declared elected, provided that his 
votes include at least one-fifth of the total votes cast by 
members of each community." Otherwise the elected person would 
be the candidate who "had received the highest proportion of the 
16 J Strangwayes-Booth, A cricket in the thorn tree, pp 299 - 301. 
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votes of all the communities concerned i.e. the candidate whose 
ratio of votes of the community which favoured him proportionately 
least, is higher than any other candidates' ratio of the votes of 
the community that favoured him proportionately least." 
The above definition is somewhat obscure but the 
procedure is clarified by the report of the Molteno Commission 
which provided clear examples of how members of the Senate would 
be elected. 17 According to David Scher, there were two main schools 
of thought among the members of the Molteno Commission. The one 
held that there should be "a fairly high qualification for the 
full franchise" and that there should be special minority 
representation for all those who did not qualify. The other school 
believed that there was a general demand among the blacks for 
universal suffrage and that such aspirant voters would regard a 
high franchise qualification as merely "a device for the 
maintenance of white dominance". It should also be remembered that 
more than half of the members of the commission were not PP 
members. The commission rejected the idea of a "B" roll for 
those who did not qualify for the ordinary voters' roll. Harry 
Oppenheimer and Zach de Beer, however, submitted a minority report 
in favour of such a roll and this proposal was accepted by the 
18 PP congress. 
One of the members of the Molteno Commission, Richard 
van der Ross, also submitted a minority report and a letter to 
Molteno. The letter was subsequently printed as part of the report 
of the commission, and argued that the educational qualifications 
17 
18 
UNISA, Progressive Party Collection, File 12, Constitution 
and Franchise, Molteno Verslag, Deel 1, p 22, November 1960. 
D Scher, Dilitinzaba - He - who - removes mountains 
( Johannesburg, 1979 ), pp 83 & 85. 
Page 209 
for the franchise should be Standard Four. Van der Ross rejected 
the idea of a "B" roll but supported the idea of adult suffrage. 19 
Harry Oppenheimer also played a significant role in 
the formulation of policy. In a letter that he wrote to Harry 
Lawrence in November 1959, he pointed out that care would have to 
be taken not to give their opponents the opportunity to say 
that the Progressives were going to abolish the system of migrant 
labour. As far as the gold mining areas were concerned, ending the 
system of migrant labour would entail bringing another 2 000 000 
blacks to these areas "and this I should think would be impossible 
both economically and physically from the space point of view". 
Oppenheimer thought that the party should emphasise the need to 
create "proper conditions for a settled African population" and 
that they "could not express opposition to the migrant system 
as such". The Progressives' policy on labour should make it clear 
"that it is appreciated that the migrant system, especially in 
regard to the mining industry, cannot be abolished." Although 
Oppenheimer thought that the pass laws and the system of influx 
control should be abolished, he felt that experts should be 
consulted before taking any firm stand on the issues. 20 
The policies of the National Union Party. 
To a very large extent the policies of the newly 
established NUP were similar to those of the UP but there were 
some noteworthy differences and omissions. K Heard points out 
19 
20 
UNISA, Progressive Party Collection, File 12, Constitution and 
Franchise, Molteno Verslag, Deel 1, pp 47 - 48, November 1960. 
UCT, BC 640, Harry Lawrence Collection, Hl.36, Harry Oppenheimer 
- Harry Lawrence, 12 November 1959. 
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that the NUP favoured a republican form of government although 
with continued membership of the commonwealth. It omitted all 
references to the Asians, to the future political status of 
Africans and to the race federation idea expounded by the UP. 21 
Various PP supporters also sometimes tended to stress 
the fact that while the UP wished to return the coloureds to 
the common voters' roll with the whites, the NUP wanted them 
kept on a separate roll. The NUP also attempted to make political 
capital out of the need to improve relations between the two white 
language groups. 
Much of the intellectual basis for the policies of 
the NUP was provided by Henry Fagan's book, Our Responsibility, 
which was published in 1960. 22 Fagan provided statistics that showed 
that at the time of the 1951 census a mere 38,5 % of the black 
population lived in the "Bantu areas" and that the corresponding 
percentages for the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were 
21 and 3,5 % respectively. He cited the report of the Commission 
under his guidance that had been appointed by General Smuts in 
1946 to investigate the "Native problem" 
The Commission found it would be impossible to 
remove the Bantu from the European areas the 
Reserves could not carry them, and the industries 
which were established in the European areas, 
but which were now an indispensable source of 
income for all, White and non-White, could not 
do without them. 
Fagan defended the segregationist policies that were 
adopted by General Hertzog. He felt that the conduct of the 
21 
22 
K Heard, General elections in South Africa, p 126. 
HA Fagan, Our responsibility (Stellenbosch, 1960 ), pp 12 - 15, 
21, 44, 49, 54 - 55. 
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Hertzog Government was motivated solely by its general duty 
to preserve peace and order and to promote good living 
conditions." He condemned the "either-or" approach Of the 
government that recognised only extremes of policies and 
could not reach a compromise between such extremes. He also 
pointed out that apartheid did not direct economic laws but 
instead economic laws would dictate to apartheid what was 
feasible and what was not. In Fagan's view there was a natural 
between the races which did not require the segregation 
application 
legislation 
of Draconian legislation. He also believed that 
was not necessarily the remedy for everything. 
Generally his point was that there were certain forces at work 
that were irreversible apartheid, in his view, would be 
impracticable. 
An interesting aspect of Fagan's book is his idea 
that paying "the rate for the job" was not always feasible in 
South Africa. He referred to the building industry, maintaining 
that if blacks were trained to do skilled work in this industry 
it would be "unequal, and therefore unfair and harmful, 
competition" for them to compete with whites, coloureds and 
Asiatics. As Fagan expressed it, " ... people who have a high 
standard of life may require protection against others whose 
lower needs make the competition unequal and threaten to have a 
detrimental effect on the way of life of the best portion of the 
population." Nevertheless, he conceded that any job reservation 
should be applied "rarely and only with great caution''. 23 
23 HA Fagan, Our responsibility, pp 75 - 76. 
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The policies of the Conservative Workers' Party. 
There was very little publicity given to the 
short-lived Conservative Workers' Party but their policies 
were described in an article in the Rand Daily Mail of 
8 September 1961. The party stood for a system of comprehensive 
social security and welfare with free education, free hospital 
and medical services, a compulsory national pension scheme, and 
an enlarged scheme of national unemployment insurance. it also 
favoured family allowances, adequate housing for workers, 
minimum wage levels for all sections of the community and an 
immigration policy that took into account the needs of white 
workers without threatening the security of an employee's 
position. 24 
The policies of the Liberal Party. 
In 1960 the Liberal Party changed its policy on the 
franchise and decided that all adults in South Africa should 
be entitled to vote. It also believed that there should be a 
rigid constitution with a Bill of Rights based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. This would protect the rights of 
all South Africans and would be enforced by an independent 
judiciary. 25 
After its adoption of a policy of universal suffrage, 
the Liberal Party published a guide to its policies entitled 
''Non-Racial Democracy''. It detailed its two major objections to 
the prevailing system of government - the fact that political 
24 
25 
Rand Daily Mail, 8 September 1961. 
A survey of race relations, 1961, pp 11 & 12. 
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rights were restricted to whites and that there was no protection 
of "individual rights against arbitrary curtailment". The Liberal 
Party intended "to extend the right of franchise on the common 
roll to all adult persons". Because it recognised that universal 
franchise together with ''unlimited sovereignty of the central 
legislature" might lead to "tyranny by the majority'', it would 
seek to establish "a controlled constitution, in which a Bill of 
Rights will be entrenched". Major economic changes would also have 
to accompany these political changes. These would hopefully lead 
"to greater prosperity for the country as a whole, a more just 
distribution of income and equality of opportunity for all the 
people of South Africa". To implement this, the party would use 
four main methods : the abolition of the economic colour bar, the 
raising of wage levels, "the intensive expansion of industry by 
means of capital investment", and the "redistribution of land and 
progressive development of agriculture". The Wage Board would be 
responsible for raising the wages of poorer employees. The policy 
of redistribution of land would be facilitated by "means of 
taxation designed to discourage the concentration of large 
estates in a few hands and by enforcing the sale to the state of 
unused or under-developed land". 26 
A prominent Liberal, Ernest Wentzel, defended the 
party's adoption of a policy of universal franchise in a speech 
delivered in November 1960. In his view the Liberal Party could 
not deny the vote to blacks who through no fault of their own had 
not been particularly well educated but who had shown themselves 
26 UNISA, United Party Archives, Division of Information, File 92, 
Liberal Party of South Africa, Non-racial democracy ( no date ) , 
pp 3, 4 , 7 , 8 , 9, 21 , 
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to be men of "wisdom and integrity". It did not believe that 
education was the best test of a man's civilisation and asked why 
"illiterate India" had elected a responsible government while 
Germany "for all its learning" had fallen under the sway of 
Hitler. Under the PP's definition of a civilised man, "All the 
Nazis would easily qualify." Furthermore the Liberal Party 
believed that all men, whatever their education or financial 
worth, had certain needs and interests. Their needs would only be 
catered for if they had the vote and if some politician depended 
on them for support. Denying the franchise to blacks would merely 
cause them to adopt unconstitutional means to achieve their 
political aims. 27 
Rumours on the possibility of an early general election in 1961. 
When Verwoerd announced that a general election 
would be held on 18 October 1961, the news did not come as a great 
surprise. There had been considerable speculation in the press 
during the course of that year on the likelihood that the Prime 
Minister might call an early general election. As early as 
October 1960 The Natal Mercury speculated that Verwoerd's 
victory in the referendum would encourage him to call an early 
general election. With a skilful delimitation of seats, Verwoerd 
might well increase his parliamentary majority by eight or ten 
members. It would also be to his advantage, when attending the 
Commonwealth Conference to be able to claim that the majority of 
27 WCL, A1931, Liberal Party Collection, 061, Speech delivered 
by Ernest Wentzel at Kensington Hall, 29 November 1960. 
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the electorate had clearly supported his policies in a general 
election. 28 
In November 1960 Die Burger published a report 
expressing the opinion that rumours about the possibility of an 
early election were pure guesswork. It commented that the general 
election of 1958, the provincial elections of 1959 and the 
referendum of 1960 had placed an extreme burden on the civil 
service, the organisations of the various parties and on the 
public purse. An early election would also make it difficult 
to excite enthusiasm among the electorate. Die Burger felt that 
the UP would welcome an early election. It would have the 
opportunity to obliterate the Progressives in parliament, which 
would save the party much embarrassment. It would make the House 
of Assembly a more moderate body as none of the Progressive MPs 
there had been elected on a Progressive ticket. 29 
A report in the Cape Times on 9 February 1961 
mentioned that there was "a general feeling of preparedness for 
an election in Parliamentary circles" and that the opposition 
was making sure that it would not be taken "by surprise". The 
article referred to "persistent reports in the Nationalist 
newspapers" that the government might decide to call an early 
general election. It also commented on speculation in 
Die Burger that the early calling of the Nationalist Congresses 
might be an indication of an early general election. 30 
In June 1961 the Chief Whip of the UP, Jack Higgerty, 
asked the Prime Minister in parliament whether a general election 
28 
29 
30 
The Natal Mercury, 7 October 1960. 
Die Burger, 10 November 1960. 
Cape Times, 9 February 1961. 
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would be called prematurely but Verwoerd replied that press 
reports concerning such an early election were just "guesswork 
and shots in the dark". In a report on this reply the Cape Times 
mentioned that the UP was taking immediate steps to be ready for 
an early general election and commented on warnings that the Prime 
Minister might take the country to the polls early "before the 
deteriorating economic situation was felt by the country". Bill 
Horak, the General Secretary of the UP, said that such an early 
election would give the NP the chance to dispense with "certain 
lukewarm Verwoerd supporters". 31 Later that month, the Cape Times 
speculated that Verwoerd could not afford to wait till the expiry 
of the government's five-year term of office in April 1963. By 
then the situation in the country would have deteriorated 
significantly and the electorate would be experiencing "the full 
draught of the lack of overseas confidence in South Africa". The 
newspaper claimed that some Nationalist organisers were already 
preparing for such an election. 32 A report in the Sunday Express 
in June 1961 also speculated on an early NP call for a general 
election as it would allow them to capitalise on the emotional 
fervour generated by the establishment of the republic. 33 
It is also significant that the Information 
Committee of the NP was unaware of the date of the general 
election when it met on 19 June 1961 under the chairmanship 
of FC Erasmus. The chairman informed the committee that no 
decision had yet been reached on an early general election, but 
31 
32 
33 
Cape Times, 10 June 1961. 
Cape Times, 20 June 1961. See also Cape Times, 
Sunday Express, 4 June 1961. 
24 June 1961. 
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that it was desirable that the necessary preparations should be 
completed in case of this eventuality. 34 
In February 1961 the Chief Secretary of the NP in 
the Transvaal, Jack Steyl, wrote to Verwoerd about the need 
to have a new delimitation of constituencies during 1962. Steyl 
doubted whether the NP would gain much advantage from a new 
delimitation. He thought that they would win the constituencies 
of Boksburg and Pretoria Sunnyside even without a delimitation. 35 
Reasons for calling an early general election. 
On 1 August, Verwoerd announced that a general 
election would be held on 18 October 1961. The nomination day 
would be 15 September. According to Verwoerd, the decision to 
hold an early general election had been taken to provide the 
country with a "strong, stable" government to withstand any 
internal "organized onslaught on orderly administration" to 
counter "external pressure and attacks" and to "let the world 
know that a strong government would once again be in power for 
the next five years". As soon as the election was behind them 
the government could pay full attention to economic development. 
National unity could also be developed more successfully and 
progress made on racial issues. The prime minister expressed his 
34 
35 
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belief that a calmer political atmosphere was needed for economic 
progress. It was also desirable that "the whole population, White 
as well as non-White ... be protected by an election soon against 
efforts to disturb law and order". Those who had tried to incite 
internal disturbances had chosen 1963 for launching an active 
rebellion against the government and the state. An early election 
would allow the government to move ahead to address this problem 
without simultaneously having to fight a general election. 
Verwoerd was critical of the parliamentary opposition which had 
predicted an early general election with "such confidence". It 
would no doubt be "relieved at the fact that its dearest wish is 
to be fulfilled". In his view, they had in preceding months been 
keeping alive "unfounded rumours and even bitter feelings". What 
the opposition feared most was "prosperity in the Republic" 
under NP rule as this would "weaken its chances of attaining 
high office". 36 
Paul Sauer also advanced a symbolic reason for the 
holding of a premature election : the last general election had 
been in 1958 under the old monarchical constitution and as the 
country had since become a republic, it was apposite to elect a 
parliament based on the new republican constitution. 37 
Verwoerd's statements and his decision to hold an 
early general election were sharply criticised by both the 
opposition and their press. Marais Steyn, then the chairman 
of the UP's Witwatersrand General Council, described Verwoerd's 
statement as "couched in arrogant terms", and said that the 
Prime Minister had disguised the real reasons for calling an early 
36 
37 
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general election, namely a desire to conduct a purge within his 
own party and to avoid "having to face the people when the 
mounting difficulties his Government will have to face in the 
coming two or three years have become apparent to everyone". 
Dr Frans Cronje gave his view that the "scarcity of foreign 
investment" would make the budget of the following year a hard 
one. South Africa would soon be feeling the effects of being 
out of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, in 1962 the International 
Court would deliver its judgement concerning South West Africa. 
All these, in Cronje's opinion, were factors that had prompted 
Dr Verwoerd to call an early general election. 38 
At a meeting held in Milnerton in October 1961 
shortly before the electorate went to the polls, the Minister of 
Bantu Education and Indian Affairs, Willie Maree, asserted that 
a great deal of trouble and unrest could be expected in 1963, 
which he described as "the year set aside for the so-called 
liberation of the Bantu in South Africa." Maree accused the 
opposition of spreading "scare stories and rumours to harm 
the republic economically". According to him, the early general 
election had been called partly to put an end to such stories. 39 
The idea that South Africa could expect military 
aggression from other African states had also been expounded 
earlier by Jim Fouche, the Minister of Defence. At a meeting in 
Adelaide he told his audience that the government possessed 
"documentary evidence which had come from North African states, 
showing that certain of these states wished to make a final 
assault on South Africa in 1963". Fouche accused the Soviet 
38 
39 
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Union of wanting to use "those countries as starting points 
for the capture of Southern Africa for communism". 40 
At a meeting in Rustenburg, the Minister of Justice, 
BJ Vorster, advanced what was probably the major reason for 
calling an early general election. He told his audience that 
such an election would give the electorate the opportunity to 
get rid of the PP, which was "the most dangerous party in South 
Africa". He also mentioned that Verwoerd had promised before the 
referendum that South Africa would "under certain conditions" 
remain within the Commonwealth and that when he had withdrawn 
South Africa's application for membership, the NP was accused of 
having won the referendum on "false pretexts". An early general 
election would give the voters a chance to voice their opinions 
on this decision. The responsibility for leaving the commonwealth 
had to be shared by "every South African". 41 
Not all the PP sources concur that one of the major 
reasons for calling an early general election was the desire to 
eliminate the Progressives. Joanna Strangwayes-Booth writes that 
Verwoerd called an early election partly because he wanted to 
exploit the preoccupation of the voters with the recent events in 
the Congo and partly because he wanted to bring the waverers 
from the NP back into line. 42 
The views of various politicians are also worth 
examining. Brian Bamford, then a member of the National Union 
Party, ascribes Verwoerd's decision to an attempt to eliminate 
both the Progressives and the National Union party. He claims 
40 
41 
42 
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that Verwoerd was well aware of the advantages enjoyed by the 
Nationalists and was keen to make use of them. These included 
the fact that the country "was still in a republic euphoria". 
Graaf f regards Verwoerd's decision as politically "astute", 
wanting to capitalise on his victory in the referendum and to 
test his own popularity in his first election as premier. Jaap 
Marais remembers that certain influential members of the NP caucus 
felt that an early general election would enable the party to 
consolidate the support that it had received in the referendum. 
An early election would also allow the government to have a full 
uninterrupted five year period of office "to put the republic on 
course and, more importantly, to deal with the anticipated 
intensified international and internal onslaught on South 
Africa". 43 
Various PP MPs also see Verwoerd's decision to hold 
an early general election as being motivated by his desire to 
strengthen his personal position and his prime ministerial image. 
According to Colin Eglin, Verwoerd had not yet received a personal 
mandate from the electorate and he wanted a direct mandate to 
govern the country in terms of his racial policies. This view is 
supported by Zach de Beer, who also thinks that Verwoerd realised 
that he could exploit the differences and confusion prevailing in 
the ranks of the opposition. Ray Swart recalls that Verwoerd 
knew that the UP was in "disarray" and that the Progressives, whom 
he "loathed", needed time to build an effective organisation. 
Further support for the view that Verwoerd wanted to strengthen 
43 Brian Bamford - Author, Rondebosch, 23 January 1996 ; Sir de 
Villiers Graaff - Author, Cape Town, 19 December 1995 ; Jaap 
Marais - Author, Pretoria, 3 November 1995. 
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his position is provided by Helen Suzman. She thinks that Verwoerd 
wanted the electorate to endorse his decision to take South 
Africa out of the Commonwealth, especially as he realised that 
the republican referendum had given him a majority of 
approximately seventy thousand votes. " 
Following the events at Sharpeville in March 1960, 
the riots and the state of emergency thereafter, the South 
African economy had seen an increase in the rate of unemployment 
and also the reduction of wages in some areas of industry and 
commerce. Marais Steyn claimed that there were more white workers 
unemployed in South Africa in October 1961 than there had been 
at any stage since the Great Depression. Farmers were faced with 
the possibility of being unable to sell their surpluses and the 
economic situation showed signs of worsening. It therefore made 
sense for the prime minister to call an election in 1961 rather 
than in 1963 when the economy could be expected to have 
deteriorated even further. 45 
At the NP congress in Bloemfontein in September 1961, 
Verwoerd also referred to South Africa's financial difficulties. 
He told the delegates that these difficulties had also influenced 
the government in its decision to call an early general election. 
The government's opponents, he claimed, had deliberately caused 
unemployment and had encouraged the flight of capital to overseas 
countries all in order to hurt the NP government regardless of 
the harm caused to South Africa's people. 46 
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Later, during the election campaign, Blaar Coetzee 
claimed at a meeting in Virginia that the calling of an early 
general election had frustrated "a plot by Sir de Villiers 
Graaff's United Party and the English press to bring the 
Government to its knees with economic sabotage." Verwoerd's 
announcement of an early general election had caused money to flow 
back into South Africa. 47 
In Chapter Three some attention was paid to 
Verwoerd's problems with certain members of his caucus and 
cabinet. An early general election could afford Verwoerd the 
opportunity of disposing of cabinet members such as Paul Sauer 
and other Nationalist MPs such as Du Pisanie of Germiston. 
Naturally Verwoerd would not have admitted to these reasons for 
calling an early general election, but the thought of removing 
certain dissidents or members with lukewarm loyalties must have 
been very tempting. 
The political correspondent for the Sunday Times, 
Stanley Uys, ridiculed some of Verwoerd's reasons for calling 
an early election. In reply to Verwoerd's statement that the 
announcement of an early election would surprise nobody, Uys 
wrote that they were no longer surprised by the morality of a 
government that first waited for the voters' rolls to be closed 
before announcing an election. Uys also thought that the political 
atmosphere would be even stormier after 18 October and that this 
made a mockery of Verwoerd's claim that an early general election 
would produce "a calmer political atmosphere". 
47 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
THE 1961 GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN. 
According to Professor Willem Kleynhans neither the 
Nationalists nor the Progressives issued an official manifesto 
for the 1961 general election. The only manifesto was in the 
form of a signed agreement between the UP and the National Union, 
giving clarity on the policies of the NUP. This was signed on 
15 August 1961. 1 
Whereas in the 1958 general election there were 24 
seats that were uncontested, all of them UP seats, in the 1961 
general election there were no fewer than 67 such seats 
countrywide. The fact that 67 seats in a parliament of 150 seats 
nearly 45 % - were uncontested, was a striking phenomenon and 
one that was unique in South African politics until that time. 
It illustrates how static the white political system had become 
with so many seats either solidly UP or NP. Understandably the 
general election was regarded in some quarters as being 
predictable and "tame". One glaring point of interest was the 
degree of support for the PP. Would it be able to retain or even 
increase its parliamentary strength ? Another was whether the 
National Union Party would be able to draw enough support 
particularly from disillusioned Nationalists to establish 
itself as a durable and significant South African political party. 
Also of interest was the performance and strength of the 
Conservative Workers' Party which was showing signs of unsettling 
the Nationalist establishment in parts of the Transvaal. There 
were also a few marginal seats held by the UP such as Pretoria 
WA Kleynhans, South African general election manifestos 1910 -
1981 ( Pretoria, 1987 ) , p 401. 
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Sunnyside and Queenstown, which the NP focused upon. They became 
the scene of much political canvassing. The election campaign 
was also characterised by fierce- enmity between the PP and 
the UP. It also saw much bitterness between the NUP and the NP. 
As will be seen, another feature of the campaign was to be the 
large number of NUP meetings that were disrupted by Nationalist 
supporters. 
The election campaign conducted by the National Party. 
The themes of the Nationalist campaign in 1961 were 
not vastly different from those of earlier elections. The NP 
took care to project the party as the spiritual home of 
Afrikaans-speaking 
significantly more 
whites. Simultaneously 
support among the 
it tried to attract 
English-speakers. It 
portrayed itself as the only party that was capable of protecting 
the whites in South Africa. It made a special appeal to the white 
workers. The domestic disturbances of the previous year, the 
departure of South Africa from the commonwealth and the growing 
overseas spirit of hostility towards South Africa had made many 
voters nervous and apprehensive. The NP did its best to exploit 
the fears of these voters. Nor did it neglect to attack its 
traditional enemies such as the English-language press and South 
Africa's small liberal establishment. As was to be expected, it 
made great capital of the theme that the UP was weak, 
irresolute, and uninterested in the needs and aspirations of 
Afrikaans-speaking whites. The UP was accused of following 
policies that would lead to the extinction of the white man in 
South Africa. It should be remembered that the PP tried to avoid 
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contesting seats where they would have to fight both the UP and 
the NP. This meant that in most NP-contested seats the NP would 
be opposed chiefly by the UP and not by the Progressives. Although 
the NP did criticise the Progressives vehemently at times, it was 
doubtless aware that the UP was hoping to remove many of the 
Progressives from parliament. Thus, the NP could safely leave it 
to the UP to criticise and attack the Progressives. 
To strengthen the NP image, a leading MP, PW Botha, 
sent a pamphlet to his George constituents in which he listed 
four main principles according to which the government intended 
to run the country. The first was the creation of a process of 
development for both whites and blacks on the basis of good 
neighbourliness with clearly defined boundaries. To achieve this 
it would be necessary to ensure the safety of the white man in 
the country. The second principle was the bolstering of the 
country's economy while the third was that the government would 
strive to co-operate as fully as possible with friendly nations. 
The defences of the country would be strengthened in order to make 
the country a powerful force against communism. Fourthly, the 
government would continue to develop the spirit of unity and 
mutual respect among Afrikaans and English-speaking whites on the 
basis of one nation, one citizenship, one anthem and the principle 
of South Africa first. 2 
Nomination contests within the NP. 
The English-language press had predicted that 
Verwoerd would use the 1961 general election as an occasion 
2 Author's private collection, Pamphlet from PW Botha to the 
constituents of George, n.d. 
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to conduct a mini-purge in the NP caucus. Because of this, it took 
keen interest in some NP nomination contests. Two controversial 
MPs, Franz Mentz and L du Pisanie, announced that they were not 
going to stand for re-election. 3 The MP for Namaqualand, D Scholtz, 
who was also Deputy Chairman of Committees in parliament, was 
defeated in his nomination contest by G Maree. 
The protracted and acrimonious nomination contest in 
Pretoria District attracted much attention. Here, the sitting MP, 
Johannes Schoombee, was defeated by a minister of the Hervormde 
Kerk, AJ Peltzer, by 54 votes to 50. Schoombee, who was also 
Verwoerd's brother-in-law, claimed that his speech urging that 
members of races other than whites be given greater opportunities 
in the defence force and be allowed to receive "military rank of 
the highest order", had been used by his opponents to discredit 
him. 5 Schoombee appealed against the decision to unseat him and he 
was later reinstated as the party's candidate. Verwoerd opposed 
the idea that Senator de Klerk should be put forward as a 
compromise candidate. 6 According to the chairman Of the 
Sesmylspruit branch of the NP in Pretoria District, JS Kitshoff, 
Schoombee had caused a division in the constituency. The choice 
of Dominee Peltzer had thus been to reconcile the two opposing 
factions. 7 
Jaap Marais recalls that Schoombee had received the 
nomination in his constituency in the face of strong opposition 
3 
5 
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from former members of the Afrikaner Party. These men felt that 
one of their nominees should have been chosen as the seat had 
been allocated to the Afrikaner Party after its agreement with 
the NP in 1948. 8 
The political correspondent for the Sunday Express, 
"Tantalus", predicted that the NP establishment would replace 
the MP for Brakpan, Piet du Plessis, partly because he did not 
"blow his racial top as regularly as the higher authority would 
like." 9 In the nomination contest, Du Plessis was subsequently 
beaten by G Bezuidenhout, who had represented Nigel in the 
Transvaal Provincial Council. 10 
The NP tries to attract the votes of English-speakers. 
During the election campaign the NP made concerted 
attempts to attract the votes of English-speakers. One such 
example was covered by Die Transvaler in an article entitled 
"Engelssprekendes in honderde na N.P." It claimed that hundreds 
of English speakers had become new NP supporters. They were the 
forerunners of a stream of voters who had wrenched themselves free 
from years of political isolation. 11 
The Sunday Times took a much more sceptical view of 
the NP's attempts to attract English support. In one of its 
issues in September 1961 it published an article "Softly catchee 
Englishman", in which it depicted these attempts as insincere. It 
commented caustically : 12 
8 
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The Nationalist Party's candidates are tiptoeing 
around the country whispering to their mystified 
followers, 'Shhh, ans gaan die Engelse vang'. 
All this must be very confusing for some of 
the old timers, whose idea of catching an 
Englishman would be to take down the old Mauser 
and ride over the bult. 
In an earlier article appearing in the Daily Dispatch 
the day the election was announced, Donald Woods also 
ridiculed the Nationalist appeals for English support and its 
intention to appoint an English-speaking cabinet minister. He 
wrote sarcastically, "There is a job worth R 8 000 going for the 
asking. It is a job for one man who (a) is English-speaking 
(b) has an English name and (c) is prepared to submerge all his 
reason and conscience. The post is that of Cabinet Minister in 
the Nationalist Government." According to Woods, the lack of any 
English-speaking Nationalist MPs gave the lie to the Nationalists' 
claim that more and more English-speakers were joining the NP. 13 
There are several reasons for paying close attention 
to these newspaper extracts and for reproducing parts of them 
verbatim. One is that they show the dislike felt for the NP 
by many senior English journalists. As the English-language 
press had a wide readership, these journalists were able to 
exercise a significant influence on the NP's attempts to attract 
English support. We can hypothesise whether this was what the NP 
would have characterised as "boerehaat" - deliberately intended 
to perpetuate certain divisions within the white population and 
to bolster the UP. Whatever the motives of these journalists, it 
is clear that it was no easy task for the NP to garner English 
support. 
13 Daily Dispatch, 1 August 1961. 
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The NP criticises the English-language press in South Africa. 
As the NP had long harboured a fierce dislike of 
the English press, it was predictable that the question of press 
freedom and the role of the press should be mentioned during the 
campaign. At a meeting in Maitland, Frank Waring, standing as an 
independent under the auspices of the NP, criticised the 
English-language press most strongly, saying : "Freedom of the 
Press does not mean licence to commit some of the worst 
misrepresentations against this country that has been done over 
the years." Furthermore the press had failed to discipline itself 
and a council should be established to ensure that it "did not 
overstep the mark". In this respect, Waring was also supported 
by his father-in-law, Arthur Barlow, who delivered a speech 
at one of his meetings in which he 
and the English-language press. 14 
Speaking in Pretoria, Ben 
criticised both Britain 
Schoeman said that many 
thousands of English-speaking Whites would vote for the NP despite 
the campaign that had been waged against it by the English 
newspapers. He praised those English-speakers who would vote for 
the government, saying, "I have great admiration for those many 
English-speaking South Africans who today are prepared to throw in 
their lot with ours. Their decision is a difficult one." Schoeman 
criticised the English-language press harshly for supposedly 
encouraging English-speaking Whites to regard Afrikaners with 
distrust and suspicion. After describing the attitude of the 
"British Press" as "the South African tragedy" he explained 
14 Cape Times, 22 September 1961 & 7 October 1961. 
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why he had used the term, "British Press'', rather than 
"English-language Press". In his words, 15 
My reasons for saying that are quite simple. This 
Press is nothing more or less than the sounding 
board of Downing Street. They have never shown any 
South African patriotism. They have at all times 
gleefully vilified and slandered our own country. 
Their hate, their contempt is reserved 
exclusively for the South African Government. 
The National Party defends its racial policies. 
The events at the Commonwealth Conference in 1961 as 
well as the riots and racial disturbances of the previous year 
understandably focused a great deal of attention on South 
Africa's racial policies. Various NP parliamentarians emphasised 
their belief that the government's policies of separate 
development, an euphemism for apartheid ) , offered the only 
chance of peace in South Africa while benefiting all sections of 
the population. They made it clear that the reins of government 
would however remain in the hands of the whites. For example, 
Verwoerd defined his concept of "nationhood" at the Transvaal 
congress of the NP in August 1961 : 16 
Let me be very clear about this : when I talk of 
the nation of South Africa I talk of the White 
people of South Africa. I do not say that in 
disparagement of any other racial group of South 
Africa. I believe that they too have their 
nationalisms I do not see us all as one 
multi-racial state descending from various 
racial groups. 
Paul Sauer, seen by some as espousing the values of 
the more moderate Nationalists, also made it clear that the 
NP 
15 
16 
did not intend to make political concessions 
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"underdeveloped" black man. According to Sauer, the NP knew 
that "political rights could not be witheld from the Native people 
for all time", but the blacks had to be encouraged to develop 
separately in their own areas. Sauer believed that, "Any attempt 
at joint political rule would mean that finally the numerical 
majority, the Black man, would rule completely." 17 
BJ Vorster, the "corning-man" in the NP, expressed his 
racial beliefs very forthrightly in a speech at Brakpan, which 
attracted much attention, partly because his star was seen to be 
in the ascendant. In his speech he said to loud applause : "I do 
not want to belong to this nation of Blacks, Browns and whites 
I want to belong to a White nation." He condemned the view of 
the PP that educated Africans should be allowed political rights, 
saying, "If you let the vote get into the hands of non-Whites you 
cannot exist as a White nation. " 18 At an earlier meeting in Glencoe, 
both Vorster and Willie Maree were applauded enthusiastically by 
about 350 Nationalists when they appealed for South Africa to 
develop its military strength "to protect the White man 1 s 
heritage". In their opinion there was only one issue in the 
general election : "White leadership in South Africa". 19 The NP' s 
strong stand on racial issues would certainly have had some impact 
on all sections of the electorate. 
By the 1950s the NP had also come to accept the 
Indians as part of the permanent population. There was no 
question, however, of an improvement in their political or 
17 
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economic status. The South African government had fallen foul 
of the UNO over the Indian question but neither this nor a massive 
passive resistance campaign in the 1940s had produced any redress 
of the Indians' grievances by 1961. During the 1961 election 
campaign a statement was issued concerning the Indian population. 
The failure of the policy of voluntary repatriation was ascribed 
to the reluctance of a poverty-stricken Indian to accept its 
people back. The South African government would institute an 
Indian Council to act as an intermediary with the Indian people 
and provide certain social services. This was a natural 
development in the process of separate development on the same 
lines as followed for the coloureds. However, the Indians did not 
receive any parliamentary representation. There would be close 
contact between the Department of Indian Affairs and the 
Department of Community Development concerning the application of 
the Group Areas Act. 20 
The National Party and South Africa's international position. 
South Africa's position in the international 
community had deteriorated since the previous general election 
in 1958. South Africa had left the British Commonwealth mainly 
because of the opposition of the Afro-Asian bloc ; the government 
had been criticised by the UNO and was also facing the reality 
that many African states would soon be independent and would be 
adding their voices to the criticism of South Africa's racial 
policies. It was therefore not surprising that some Nationalist 
politicians adopted a belligerent tone during the campaign when 
20 INCH, PV 14, Marais Viljoen Collection, JM 45 I 2, Nasionale 
Party se Indierbeleid, 19 September 1961. 
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describing the need for white South Africans to stand together 
against "the total onslaught". It was predictable that 
these politicians would also mention certain issues on the Cold 
War. For example, PW Botha described the international situation 
as being ''in such an uncertain state of suspension'' that ''one 
false move could light the spark to set off a global explosion''. 21 
The Minister of Labour and the Interior, Jan de Klerk, told an 
audience in Pretoria that the world was "waiting for the answer" 
that the whites would give on 18 October and that "If there was 
the slightest sign of weakening by the Whites the enemies of 
South Africa would be strengthened and their attacks would become 
more violent." 22 The Minister of Defence, JJ Fouche, tried to 
reassure the electorate that South Africa's international position 
was not as serious as sometimes thought. South Africa would always 
be important to the West in any future war and the country had 
many friends "although perhaps not diplomatically". Britain knew 
that it could trust South Africa in the future just as it had done 
in the past. 23 The Nationalists did not give as much emphasis to the 
country's international difficulties as they did in later general 
elections but this was nevertheless an important theme in their 
campaign. The electorate would also have been susceptible to this 
kind of propaganda because many of them - particularly the English 
voters - would have been very distressed by the hostility directed 
at South Africa at the 1961 Commonwealth Conference. 
21 
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Nationalist campaigns in marginal constituencies. 
The Nationalist press took some interest in the few 
marginal constituencies being contested. These constituencies 
included Queenstown and Pretoria Sunnyside. Much of the 
campaigning there revolved around postal votes with the various 
parties sparing little effort to track down missing voters. The 
importance of postal voters is shown in an article in Die Burger 
which claimed that by 11 October 1961, 3 594 postal votes had been 
issued in Queenstown. 24 
The granting of the franchise to eighteen-year-olds had 
a great effect on the campaign in Pretoria Sunnyside, which 
the UP had won with a majority of 614 votes in 1958. According 
to Die Burger, this constituency had more than 15 000 voters 
but had only approximately 3 000 houses. The fact that many of the 
voters lived in flats, hotels or hostels meant that there was a 
very large floating vote. Figures supplied by the NP office showed 
that every five months between 4 000 and 5 000 voters changed 
their addresses. About one-seventh of the voters were students at 
the Teachers' Training College or at the University of Pretoria 
and these, according to Die Burger, were virtually entirely 
Nationalist. 25 
The NP also hoped to make inroads into the UP 
support in the Pretoria Rissik constituency which had returned 
a UP candidate with a majority of 2 756 votes in the 1958 general 
election. The NP was encouraged by the fact that in the referendum 
campaign of the previous year, the anti-Republican majority had 
24 
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only been 1 290. Approximately one-seventh of the voters in this 
constituency were students. The NP candidate, Sybrand van Niekerk, 
also claimed that he had impressive support from English-speakers 
and from Jews. 26 
The pro-Nationalist newspaper in the Eastern Cape, 
Die Oosterlig, counselled against NP over-optimism in Pretoria 
Rissik, saying that a victory there would be nothing short of a 
miracle. Nevertheless, the NP was confident of winning Pretoria 
Sunnyside and also had high hopes of taking Queenstown. It was 
also optimistic of increasing its majorities in Kimberley South, 
Aliwal and Port Elizabeth North. They were also encouraged by the 
way that many English-speakers in Natal had apparently begun to 
understand and value the government's racial policies. These 
voters realised that they were a very small minority surrounded 
by a large black population. 27 
The efficiency of the NP campaign organisation. 
The NP also benefited from a very capable campaign 
organisation which was very close to the voters which it hoped 
to attract. An example of this is to be found in the 
recollections of Brian Bamford of his campaign as the candidate 
for the National Union Party against PW Botha in the George 
constituency. He remembers that on election day, Botha took 
out a cigarette box and wrote on it what he thought the result 
would be. In the case of each of the three candidates, Botha 
proved to be correct "within a dozen or so votes". An interesting 
26 
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sidelight on the realities of electioneering in the future prime 
minister's constituency is also provided by Bamford. He writes, 28 
Election day was hell. Mr Botha and his workers 
committed all sorts of irregularities - they used 
electric megaphones, they lined the streets with 
schoolchildren in school uniforms, they led 
( Mr Heunis on a horse, Mr and Mrs Botha in a 
smart carriage ) a procession of voters from the 
State Saw Mills to the polling booths. Every time 
I objected ( mostly to Mr Heunis ) I was told that 
these were hallowed customs in the George 
constituency and if I were serious about my 
objections I was in danger of being lynched. 
The NP was also able to rely upon a very extensive 
organisation divided into a large number of branches throughout 
the country. This organisation had been systematically built over 
the years. An indication of the size and enthusiasm of the NP is 
provided by a cursory inspection of its membership figures. In 
1960, for example, in the Cape Province alone, the NP had no fewer 
than 140 450 members, divided into 892 branches. 29 This meant that 
during election time the NP was able to call upon a vast pool of 
talent, expertise and enthusiasm for its task of propagating its 
political message. 
During the 1961 election campaign the NP contested 
far fewer constituencies than in 1958 ; it was therefore able to 
bring all its resources to bear on the relatively small number of 
constituencies with NP candidates. It regarded the few marginal 
constituencies as being particularly important in this respect. 
The NP press frequently publicised examples of the zeal of various 
NP workers in these constituencies. For example, they described 
one worker in Queenstown who travelled more than two thousand 
miles in search of missing voters. 30 
28 
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A significant number of NP MPs were drawn from the 
ranks of former fulltime NP organisers. This meant that the 
NP was able to encourage its political organisers to new heights 
of endeavour by offering them the prospect of seats in the House 
of Assembly. With its dwindling number of seats in parliament, 
the UP did not have this advantage. The NP organisation was also 
imbued with a spirit of victory after its successful campaign in 
the referendum of the previous year ; this would also have 
encouraged them while on the campaign trail in 1961. The NP also 
had the encouragement of knowing that it was favoured by the 
delimitation of constituencies then in force and it was also 
helped by the enfranchisement of the eighteen-year-olds. 
The Nationalists defend their record during the Second World War. 
As the memories of the Second World War were still 
very fresh in the minds of many voters, it is not surprising 
that the UP sometimes tried to capitalise on the war records 
of prominent Nationalists. This was, however, only a minor issue. 
Eric Lauw, for example, adopted a "tu quoque" attitude when faced 
with such criticism. At a meeting in Brits, he claimed that the 
opposition press was trying to stir up hostility towards 
BJ Vorster on the grounds that he had been a general in the 
Ossewa Brandwag during the war. Lauw pointed out that one of 
the new much-publicised and applauded recruits for the UP, Jan 
Moolman, had also been a general in the Ossewa Brandwag. Was the 
opposition press going to publicise this fact ? 31 
31 INCH, PV4, Eric Lauw Versameling, 
Lauw se toespraak te Brits op 
File 56, Punte in Minister 
Saterdag 12 Augustus 1961. 
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The campaign waged by the United Party 
During 
challenges from 
the 1961 election campaign the 
both the left and the right 
UP 
and 
faced severe 
on occasion 
this forced the party into a difficult position. As in the 1958 
election campaign, the UP was often accused of trying to out-do 
the NP in appealing to the conservatism of the South African 
electorate. The UP also entered into a pact with the recently 
established NUP and this was seen by many observers as another 
indication of the UP's drift to the right. The UP also, 
predictably, made an issue of Verwoerd's racial and Bantustan 
policies. This, however, did not bring the UP the rewards that 
it sought. 
The pact between the United Party and the National Union Party 
On 15 August, shortly after Verwoerd's announcement of 
an early general election, the UP formed an election pact with 
the NUP. 
the right 
hoped that 
This party appeared to occupy a political position to 
of the UP but to the left of the Nationalists. It was 
the pact would compensate for any loss of support 
suffered by the UP on account of the Progressives. Furthermore 
the differences between the UP and the NUP were not nearly as 
pronounced as those between the UP and the Progressives. It was 
unlikely that the UP and the Progressives would form a pact. 
There was considerable disparity in their respective policies 
and the embarrassment caused to the UP in parliament by the 
PP was not easily forgiven. The Cape Times announced on 
16 August 1961 that the leaders of the NUP and the UP had signed 
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a nine point pact. It noted that "each party stood by its 
immediate policy on non-White parliamentary representation" but 
that they "both accepted the policies of race federation, 
consultation with non-Whites and the elimination from legislation 
of 'those things which offend against the dignity of the 
non-White'.'' 32 
It would appear that by entering this pact the UP took 
a pronounced step to the right in South African politics. The 
political commentator for the Sunday Times, Stanley Uys, saw the 
pact as the logical consequence of a strategy which the UP had 
been pursuing for many years. This strategy was based on the idea 
that the UP could be returned to power only with the support of 
disenchanted Nationalists. The UP was accordingly trying to make 
itself acceptable to those voters. 33 
During the talks that were held between the two parties 
to finalise the details of the pact, there appears to have 
been some antipathy in the UP towards members of the NUP. 34 
Die Transvaler attributed some of these initial difficulties 
to the absence of Marais Steyn, who was in hospital as the result 
of an accident. The newspaper regarded Steyn as the only person 
who could act effectively as a mediator between the two groups. 35 
In August Die Transvaler described the UP supporters 
as having misgivings about the two seats that their party had 
allocated to the NUP - one seat in the Senate and the other in 
the House of Assembly. It quoted Jack Basson, MP for Sea Point, 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Cape Times, 16 August 1961. 
Sunday Times, 20 August 1961. 
Sunday Times, 9 July 1961. 
Die Transvaler, 10 July 1961. 
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as stating bluntly that he did not think that the NUP enjoyed much 
support throughout the country. 36 
Brian Bamford, Chairman of the Cape Peninsula Council 
of the NUP, recalls "that there were several leading figures in 
the UP, including Mr Vause Raw, who were deeply suspicious of 
Mr Japie Basson, but who were, for temporary purposes, 
prepared to 'live' with the alliance." Bamford, however, saw the 
Cape Provincial Leader of the UP, Jack Connan, as being "clearly 
in favour of the alliance" and "doing his best to make it work". 37 
This pact undoubtedly saved Japie Basson's political 
career from a serious reverse if not complete extinction. Basson 
had very little chance of being re-elected by his constituents in 
the staunchly Nationalist seat of Namib. In the discussions on the 
prospective pact, the question of a safe seat for Basson was what 
the Sunday Times described as a "stumbling - block". It was 
eventually decided that Basson would stand in Bezuidenhout, a 
safe UP seat, and the member for Bezuidenhout, Hymie Miller, would 
oppose Helen Suzman in Houghton. 38 
The NUP was hardly in a position to make extravagant 
demands of the UP leadership. Their representation in parliament 
was limited to Basson. With the exception of Fagan they had few 
really prominent or charismatic members and their hopes were 
pinned on the idea that there was a large constituency of 
dissatisfied Nationalists who might be persuaded to change their 
allegiance. The UP leadership was probably "clutching at straws". 
36 
37 
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they had a great deal to offer the UP in this pact. One of 
Basson's lieutenants in Natal, JC Wilkinson of a very minor 
and little known political organisation known as the "Unification 
Movement", wrote a letter to Graaff in August 1961 complaining 
about the small number of seats allocated to the NUP. Wilkinson, 
who wanted nine candidates in the province, felt that the 
long-term solution to the country's political problems depended 
on the building up of "the strength of that one party which is 
most acceptable to the moderate members of the National Party 
at the expense of those parties which are completely unacceptable 
to them, i.e. the National Union at the expense of the United 
Party and the Progressive Party." In an earlier letter to Judge 
Fagan, Wilkinson also suggested that the only real solution to 
their problems lay in the "immediate fusion of the United Party 
and the National Union under a new name and your leadership". 39 
After the signing of the pact, the PP soon attacked 
the disparities in the policies of the NUP and the UP. Jacqueline 
Beck, who had once been an UP MPC, made a great play of this in a 
speech at a PP lunch-hour forum in Cape Town. She pointed out 
that Fagan had voted against South Africa's entry into the Second 
World War and had also voted with DF Malan in favour of concluding 
a separate peace while the UP was "engaged in an all-out effort 
to wage the war". She mentioned that Basson had been in favour of 
such apartheid legislation as the separate representation of 
voters, which had been opposed by the UP opposition. The NUP 
39 INCH, PV 58, Japie Basson Collection ; File 2/9/1/1/8, 
J Wilkinson - H Fagan, 20 July 1961 ; File 2/9/1/1/9, 
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favoured separate rolls for white and coloured voters while 
the UP intended to restore the coloured voters to the common roll. 
The UP, by undertaking to extend what was then referred to 
as Native representation to the northern provinces, went much 
further than the NUP. Basson's party intended only to return to 
the original system of "Native Representation" that had prevailed 
until its very recent abolition. In Beck's opinion, the election 
agreement would mean that the UP would move "nearer to the 
Nationalist Party than ever before". 40 
The role of Douglas Mitchell in the election campaign 
As Douglas Mitchell had long been an outspoken and 
prominent member of the UP hierarchy, it was not surprising that 
the press paid much attention to his speeches and meetings. 
During the campaign Mitchell was criticised for his comments 
in a speech at Umkomaas on the question of mixed bathing. Mitchell 
said that mixed bathing would cause the tourist trade to decline, 
property to deteriorate and would result in general stagnation. 
At one point he said, "Let the Progressives go and frolic in the 
surf with coolies and non-Europeans". Mitchell was heavily 
criticised in certain quarters for his use of the word "coolie". 41 
Subsequently Mitchell withdrew the remark unreservedly. 42 Mitchell 
also went on record at Doonside for criticising the PP for its 
franchise proposals. Could anybody be so naive, he asked, as to 
believe that a black minister of defence would defend South Africa 
against attacks from other black countries. 43 
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In his history of South Africa, Alex Hepple also quotes 
Mitchell as saying during the campaign "If you give the 
non-European a gun he will shoot five or six people but the 
Progressives propose to give the non-white a far more powerful 
weapon - the vote to kick the white man out of South Africa." 44 
The Sunday Express was very critical of Mitchell 
for his contentious statements. It commented that the UP was 
already handicapped by having to fight on two fronts and could 
do without "the further embarrassment - and racial nonsense - of 
people like Mr. Douglas Mitchell, its Natal leader, and some of 
its candidates who have raised the 'swart gevaar' bogy." 45 It is 
difficult to assess Mitchell's influence on the campaign. Few 
voters would have been lukewarm towards him they either 
supported him strongly or abhorred him completely. Some of his 
statements were undoubtedly a great boon to both the Progressives 
and the Nationalists. The Progressives could depict him and his 
supporters as being Nationalists under the skin while the NP could 
relish and capitalise on the embarrassment that he caused other 
members of the UP establishment. 
The United Party takes a conservative line on the issue of race. 
During the general election campaign various members 
of the UP made it very clear that their party stood for "White 
Leadership". Some members commented adversely on the alleged 
inability of the black people to govern themselves properly. 
44 
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One prominent UP member, Major Piet van der Byl, told a meeting 
at Bathurst that, "An African from the kraal - if he had the 
brain could become an Einstein ; but that won't necessarily 
mean he is civilised in the true sense of the word." He claimed 
that it took centuries to counteract "the turmoil and ferment 
of the barbaric aeons" that lay behind black culture. 46 
Van der Byl's sentiments were echoed by Graaff, who 
described the development of "non-Whites" on the road to democracy 
as being comparable to that of England during the reign of King 
Alfred. Graaff also argued that there were examples of other 
African states that had discarded democracy very soon after gaining 
independence. 47 
An examination of the manifestos of several UP candidates 
shows how strongly they emphasised the theme of white leadership. 
For example, in a letter to his constituents Douglas Mitchell 
expressed his pride in belonging to a party that stood for "The 
retention of white leadership in South Africa with every effort 
to strengthen the European group." 48 Similar sentiments were 
expressed by the UP candidate for Pretoria- Rissik, HC de Kock, 
in a circular to his constituents. De Kock described the main 
objective of the UP as "the preservation of our White western 
civilisation.'' According to him, "any reasonable approach to 
the colour question" would be based "in the first instance on 
continued white leadership". 49 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Eastern Province Herald, 4 October 1961. 
Eastern Province Herald, 13 October 1961. 
UNISA, United Party Archives Natal, Natal South Coast Division, 
File 51.2.1, Pamphlet entitled, The United Party policy to save 
South Africa", ( no date ) . 
UNISA, United Party Archives, Pretoria - Rissik Division, File 
90.2.1, Circular disseminated by H.C. de Kock, ( no date ) . 
Page 246 
The UP candidate for Constantia, Sydney Waterson, also 
stressed the supposed backwardness of the Africans, describing the 
great majority of them as being "still in a state of ignorance as 
far as modern civilisation is concerned." Any cession of political 
control to the Africans would be "an ignoble abdication on the 
part of the White man, of his responsibilities for maintaining the 
standards of western civilisation." As Waterson had identified 
himself with the Progressives in 1959, it is interesting how his 
views appear to have drifted much closer to those of the 
conservatives in the UP. 50 
There are several possible reasons why many of the UP 
candidates stressed their views on the racial issue so 
forthrightly. It should be remembered that they were fighting 
their campaign against both the NP and the Progressives 
simultaneously. Candidates might have felt that a conservative 
approach on the racial issue would reassure those UP supporters 
who might be tempted to vote for the Nationalists. Such an 
approach would also deter some traditional UP supporters from 
voting for the Progressives. In short, the UP would have felt that 
there were dividends to be earned in presenting the image of a 
conservatively-inclined party. Some UP candidates might also 
have felt inhibited in earlier years by the presence of the 
Progressives in their party but the departure of the latter 
in 1959 might have caused them to feel less constrained when it 
came to racial issues. 
50 UCT, BC 631, Sydney Waterson Collection, A6.38, Your United 
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The United Party tries to capitalise 
on the issue of the Bantustans. 
The UP was severely critical of Verwoerd's policies 
on the Bantustans and gave much prominence to the consequences 
of such policies. According to the UP, the policy would lead 
to the fragmentation of South Africa and the growth of a possible 
fifth column among the black people. It might even lead to the 
establishment of military bases by hostile countries on what was 
formerly 
to have 
South African territory and would cause many black people 
divided loyalties. It was also assailed as being 
completely impracticable as there were so many blacks who were 
effectively permanent residents in the urban areas. The UP also 
expressed concern at the financial implications of the Bantustan 
policy and were sometimes sceptical about the leadership ability 
of those the leaders who would administer the Bantustans. 
Two of Graaff's speeches indicate the emphasis placed 
on this issue. At a meeting in Wolmaransstad, he expressed the 
opinion that one of Verwoerd's reasons for calling an early 
general election was to obtain a mandate for his Bantustan policy. 
This would lead to the irrevocable situation that "every Native in 
the White areas of South Africa" would be regarded as "a foreigner 
or Uitlander" and would be expected to display patriotism towards 
a country other than South Africa. 51 
On a subsequent occasion, this time at a meeting in 
Port Elizabeth, Graaff warned that the Bantustan policy might 
encourage unrealistic ambitions among the black people by making 
51 Diamond Fields Advertiser, 22 September 1961. 
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promises that could not be fulfilled. The non-fulfilment or 
breaking of such promises might be seen as "a breach of faith" 
or "an act of treachery" that would have a very adverse effect 
on race relations. 52 
In East London which was particularly close to a 
possible Bantustan area, the policy featured prominently in 
the UP election campaign. Douglas Smit told his audience that the 
independent black states would become "hotbeds of Communist 
propaganda" and that the millions of "disgruntled Natives" 
remaining in the white areas would form an "immense fifth column". 
Smit regarded Verwoerd's scheme as "a fantastic piece of 
humbug". 53 
Although the issue of Bantustans was to be a major one in 
the UP's campaign, there were several reasons why it failed to 
bring the desired results. One reason was that in 1961 the 
implications of the Bantustan policy were too remote and nebulous 
for the average white voter. Many voters would have regarded 
the UP's predictions as excessively fanciful. They would not have 
been convinced by the suggestion that the NP government would 
allow hostile military bases to be established in the Bantustans. 
Furthermore, a large number of white voters lived in areas too far 
away from the borders of the potential Bantustans. 
The Daily Dispatch disapproved vehemently of some 
of Graaff's attempts to capitalise on the Bantustan issue. At one 
meeting in East London, Graaff asked his audience to imagine what 
their position would be next to the Transkei, which would be free 
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to become a Communist state should it so wish and to serve as a 
base for an army invading South Africa. According to Graaff, the 
Transkei could also wreak havoc with the economy in the Border 
region by erecting customs barriers or by turning local labour 
disputes into international issues. An editorial in the 
Daily Dispatch described Graaff's notions as being "utterly 
ridiculous and far-fetched" and an "astonishingly frank admission 
of United Party ineptitude and its inability to take a realistic 
view of the political situation in South Africa." 54 
The criticism of Graaff's actions and utterances by 
the Daily Dispatch was indicative of the feelings of much of 
the English-language press at the time. According to E Potter, 
the Daily Dispatch, the Evening Post in Port Elizabeth and 
The Natal Witness went along with the Rand Daily Mail in 
its support of the Progressives. The UP was supported by the 
English-language press "only because the Press saw no practical 
alternative and not because of any sincere belief in the party or 
its policies". Potter regards the Sunday Times as being 
virtually the only newspaper to give "uncritical support" to 
the UP during the election campaign. 55 There are several possible 
reasons why the English-language press became rather tepid in its 
support for the UP. On the one hand various editors probably 
feared that if they supported the Progressives very vigorously, 
they could split the opposition vote and thus keep the opposition 
weak and fragmented. This would be only to the advantage of the 
Nationalists. Some editors also realised that the Progressives 
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would be viewed by most of the electorate as being too far ahead 
of its time. It would also be very difficult for senior 
journalists 
to the UP. 
to discard their long-held and traditional loyalties 
On the other hand many opposition journalists might 
well have become disenchanted by what they saw as the autocratic 
and dictatorial attitudes of some of the UP leadership. They might 
well have resented the way that some senior members of the UP had 
come to regard the English-language press as a type of fiefdom 
which could be regularly abused but would always be expected to 
remain loyal. There would also be the feeling that too many 
senior UP parliamentarians merely tried to "out-do the 
Nationalists at their own game" and pandered too much to the 
prejudices of the voters. 
The UP makes an issue of the state of the economy. 
The temporary increase in the unemployment figures 
and the state of the economy were also themes that UP campaigners 
tried to use against the Nationalists. At a meeting in Welkom, 
Graaff dwelt for some time on the government's economic policies. 
The country needed a government which would "give priority to 
raising incomes and thus make the life of the agitator more 
difficult". Instead of being able to provide jobs for "a growing 
population", the government was unable to guarantee existing 
jobs. Significantly, Graaff stated that the UP recognised "the 
right of White workers to protection against unequal competition 
from lower-paid non-White labour". 56 
Later, at a somewhat rowdy meeting in Kimberley, Graaff 
56 Sunday Times, 24 September 1961. 
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paid attention to the supposed decline in real incomes and to 
the increase in the rate of unemployment. He claimed that the 
increase in real incomes in South Africa had been "among the 
lowest in the Western world", and that R 248 million worth of 
private capital had left the country in the previous eighteen 
months. He blamed the government for not heeding the advice given 
over the years by Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 57 
It should be remembered that the economic problems that 
had followed the state of emergency in 1960 were much less acute 
by the time of the election campaign than they had been the 
previous year. The level of white unemployment although higher 
than normal by post-Second World War standards - was still very 
far from being as serious as it had been during the 1920s or 
1930s. These factors would most probably have militated against 
the UP's chances of attracting NP voters on economic grounds. 
The vigorous UP attacks on the Progressives. 
During the 1961 general election the UP faced a severe 
threat from the PP. An election pamphlet circulated at the 
time by the UP entitled, "The Progressives and their policies 
are a danger to you and your country !"gave ten reasons why the 
"thinking voter" should reject the PP. Firstly, the UP was "the 
only alternative government", as it was the only party that was 
contesting enough seats "more than a hundred to get the 
Nationalists out." Secondly, the UP alleged that the Progressives 
were really helping Verwoerd "by fighting the United Party, 
splitting the vote, and tying up the U.P. organisation in safe 
57 Diamond Fields Advertiser, 5 October 1961. 
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seats." When examining this claim it should be remembered that 
the UP had refused to enter into an election pact with the 
Progressives. Furthermore, the Progressives tried to follow a 
policy of not contesting seats in which the Nationalists and 
the UP were also involved. The UP's third reason was that "the 
Progressives openly work for a multi-racial parliament with a 
Black majority," and their leader had actually stated that "he 
would work under a Black Prime Minister with such a Black 
majority". Fourthly the PP was wrong in its view that votes for 
all would solve "the Native problem". To the contrary, the UP 
believed that "What a backward people first of all needs is food, 
clothing, homes, health and education. Start with first things 
first." This was a contentious point because the Progressives 
claimed to stand for a qualified franchise and not a policy of 
votes for all. Fifthly, the UP pamphlet asserted that "the 
Progressives' own Report admits that their proposals are not 
acceptable now to either White or Non-White." As its sixth reason, 
the pamphlet discussed the differences of opinion among various 
Progressive thinkers. It claimed "The Progs. drift when it comes 
to direct matters like social and residential separation, Defence 
and Trade Unions." While one member said : "mixed schools and 
swimming baths for all I care", another said, "leave it to 
individual choice". The seventh reason advanced in the UP pamphlet 
was that it was Progressive policy to abolish the pass laws and 
influx control. This would surely "lead to thousands of unemployed 
Bantu, squalid squatter camps and crime". As its eighth reason for 
rejecting the Progressives the UP claimed that the Progressives' 
policy on immigration "on merit not colour" would mean "the 
door would be open to thousands of job seekers from India, 
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Pakistan, Malaya, Kenya, Congo and Japan. Is this fair when we 
have 15 million of our own non-Whites to look after ?" The ninth 
reason was that the Progressives had failed "to obtain any 
significant support from Non-Europeans", and that the "two 
hand-picked Non-Whites placed by them on their own Commission to 
work out their franchise, rejected its majority report where it 
conflicted with their own ideas on universal franchise." Lastly, 
the pamphlet criticised some of the Progressive candidates for 
failing to honour the pledge that they had signed - the "Borkum 
pledge" while still UP members of parliament, that they would 
resign their seats should they leave the UP. 58 
A recording of an address given by Graaff that was 
circulated by the UP elicited some criticism from the 
Progressives. In the speech Graaff accused the Progressives of 
"weakening the opposition against the Nationalists", and claimed 
that the Progressives' policies would promote communism and lead 
to a barbarous dictatorship. Graaff referred to incidents of 
torture and imprisonment without trial of various opposition 
figures in Ghana and Guinea and warned his listeners that under 
PP policy, "it not only can happen, but it will happen here and 
they know it". 59 
Steytler referred to this recording as evidence 
of "a degree of racial and colour prejudice that is disquieting 
indeed to anyone concerned about the future of race relations in 
South Africa." He criticised Graaff for singling out the 
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unsuccessful examples of independent African countries such as 
Ghana, the Congo, Guinea and Sudan while ignoring the seemingly 
more successful countries such as Nigeria and Tanganyika now 
Tanzania ) . The examples were clearly chosen as an attempt to 
suggest to voters that PP policies would lead to chaos, tyranny 
and dictatorship. In a statement intended to refute Graaff's 
claims, Steytler commented "It is significant, however, that 
the United Party case should in the opinion of its leader, be 
sufficiently weak on its merits to require bolstering by methods 
compared with which the worst examples of Nationalist swart gevaar 
propaganda pale into insignificance." 60 
In a message to the voters of Pinelands, Graaff 
criticised the Progressives for dividing the opposition and 
claimed that nothing could be more futile "than for minor 
opposition groups to play musical chairs against the United 
Party'' as the country needed a new government and not an 
opposition "that mills around in indecision". 61 
In order to neutralise the Progressive challenge, the 
UP issued a pamphlet for the guidance of their own candidates. 
This listed points that their candidates could raise in countering 
the Progressive challenge. It accused the Progressives of "tying 
up the U.P. organisation in safe seats" and asserted that third 
parties had no chance of succeeding in a two-party democracy. The 
policy of the Progressives would also lead to a black parliament 
and black rule all over South Africa as its franchise proposals 
were unrealistic and would not protect the whites. The literacy 
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test that the Progressives wanted to prescribe for candidates for 
the franchise was equivalent to that of a ten-year old white 
child. The Progressives were "starting at the wrong end" by 
wanting to give the blacks political rights instead of first 
looking at their social advancement. The Progressives' policy on 
social and residential separation was very contradictory and their 
policies on influx control and the pass laws would create 
overcrowding and poverty although experience had shown that influx 
control actually protected the blacks. Under Progressive rule 
there would be strikes and industrial unrest and black workers 
would be allowed "to paralyze our economy". Nor would the 
Progressives win the support of the blacks with their franchise 
proposals. The Progressives' policies would lead to "dishonest 
subterfuges such as special servitudes in title deeds". It also 
criticised the Progressive MPs for failing to resign their seats 
after leaving the UP in 1959 and claimed that it was the 
Progressives' fault that any plans to conclude an election 
agreement with the UP had floundered. "The Progressives, through 
their stubborn adherence to unacceptable and left-wing policies, 
excluded themselves from any agreement." The Progressives had 
also undermined the anti-republican campaign and had even 
produced a confidential circular which read, "We must not allow 
the whole effort to be consumed in merely the anti-republican 
campaign, but must at all times balance it out by putting 
Progressive Party policies before the public." 62 
The earlier refusal by the Progressive MPs to resign 
their seats in 1959 was a great cause of bitterness and resentment 
62 UNISA, Sir de Villiers Graaff Papers, File 99.1, Progressive 
Party, pamphlet circulated by the United Party, n.d. 
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in UP circles during the election campaign. Zach de Beer tried to 
counter these accusations of bad faith when he asked in an 
election pamphlet why the UP had formed a pact with Japie Basson 
although Basson had failed to resign his seat after leaving the NP 
two years earlier. 63 The attitude of Graaff over this particular 
issue is discussed by Professor Gideon Jacobs, a former MP for 
Hillbrow "To Div, whose word is his bond, failure to meet this 
solemn obligation was not only inexplicable, it was totally 
unforgivable.'' 64 
The attitudes of the UP towards the Progressives during 
the election campaign have been examined in some detail in this 
section. They show the extreme resentment felt towards the 
Progressives a resentment fuelled by the long-held belief that 
the progressive element had been responsible for the UP's reverses 
in earlier general elections. The impression sometimes created is 
that the UP saw the Progressives as being more of a danger 
than the Nationalists. The UP were resentful that the Progressives 
had alienated a large number of their traditional supporters. It 
is clear that the UP attacked the Progressives on a very wide 
range of issues from the question of character to allegations of 
disguising unpalatable aspects of their policy. The UP adopted the 
effective policy of depicting the Progressives as vague and 
unrealistic idealists whose policies would lead to a black 
take-over and dictatorship with resultant chaos. In this respect 
the predictions of some members of the UP were not dissimilar to 
those made by the Nationalists against the UP. 
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Minor dissent within the UP during the election campaign 
Shortly before polling day, a difference of opinion 
in the Natal branch of the UP caused the well-publicised 
resignation from the UP of AT Allison, who had been a MPC in 
Natal for 28 years. The Divisional Committee of the UP in 
Pietermaritzburg City had unanimously chosen Colonel OL Shearer 
as its candidate in the general election but this choice had 
been overruled by the party's hierarchy and Howard Odell was 
nominated instead. This caused a great deal of annoyance and 
led to Allison's resignation. Allison also announced that he would 
not be joining any other party but would be supporting the PP 
candidate for that seat, WG Mc Conkey. 65 
The Sunday Express expressed disapproval of what 
it saw as retrogressive trends within the UP. It condemned the 
replacement of the MP for Johannesburg North, Percy Plewman, 
a former Auditor-General, in a nomination contest. Plewman was 
seen as being the victim of the Mitchell group. Plewman had always 
been critical of the "bull-like methods of Mr. Mitchell and the 
more colour conscious manoeuvres in the United Party". 66 
Although it had been outspoken in its criticism of some 
of the actions of the leading members of the UP during the 
election campaign, the Sunday Express expressed muted support 
for the party before election day. It regarded the Progressives' 
attempts to "belittle or destroy" the UP as "utterly stupid" 
because the UP would remain the chief opposition to the 
Nationalists. The Progressives were "more a party of the future 
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than of the present" and they were "the conscience of thinking 
South Africans". The UP would come into its own should there be 
a "realignment of political forces". The newspaper's "main 
support" had to go to the UP-National Union alliance "in the 
belief that if it fails, the chance of eventually getting rid of 
the Nationalist Government will also be lost". Nevertheless, the 
editorial expressed the hope that the Progressives would do well 
as it would be a sad day should they be completely eliminated 
from parliament. 67 
In retrospect, Graaff thinks that the UP'S main 
advantage in the election campaign was that at the time of the 
referendum it had built up an organisation in every constituency 
which was working "quite smoothly". What counted most against 
it was that in many constituencies it had to fight on two fronts 
against both the Nationalists and the Progressives. 68 
A few days before the polling day the UP published a 
statement of its stance on some of the more controversial issues 
confronting the voters. It suggested several stages for "an 
ordered advance to a race federation". The first step to be taken 
was to "relieve racial tensions', and comprised the repeal or 
amendment of all laws "infringing the individual dignity of 
Non-Whites", as well as "a more humane administration of the pass 
laws and a drastic revision of the Group Areas Act". The second 
stage comprised ·"an ordered advance through constitutional and 
economic reform to meet the legitimate aspirations of the 
non-white races', and included measures already discussed such as 
the acceptance of the coloureds as part of the Western group and 
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their restoration to the common voters' roll ; the recognition 
of the Indians as a permanent part of the population and the 
amelioration of their lot under the Group areas Act the 
development of "a responsible and satisfied urban Native middle 
class as a bulwark against unrest and agitation ; the 
granting of opportunities for urban blacks to earn exemptions from 
the pass laws ; the upliftment of rural blacks from their lives of 
poverty the representation of blacks on a separate roll by 
members of parliament and senators ; and the abolition of job 
reservation and its replacement by the "rate for the job". The 
third stage was the ultimate goal of a race federation in which 
South Africa would be ruled by a "sovereign central parliament", 
in which "each racial group will have defined shares". The "basic 
rights of individuals, groups and areas will be entrenched 
constitutionally", and the federation would be "primarily one of 
races and not of territories but areas predominantly white or 
predominantly black e.g. the Transkei )". These would be 
"treated as political units for administrative purposes within the 
framework of the race federation". The UP plan rested upon "four 
fundamental principles", which were "a sincere willingness to 
share in practice the benefits of Western civilization with all 
non-Whites who are capable of accepting joint responsibility for 
the future well-being of the Republic" "the maintenance 
for the foreseeable future of White leadership and a firm refusal 
to permit political control to pass into the hands of an 
uneducated black proletariat" "effective inter-racial 
consultation at all levels of Government and administration", 
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and ... "the protection of the human dignity of every individual, 
irrespective of colour, race or creed. 11 69 
The campaign waged by the National Union Party. 
The campaign waged by the NUP was to a large extent 
dominated by the characters and electioneering of its two most 
influential members : Japie Basson and ex-Chief Justice HA Fagan. 
They concentrated their campaign on what they saw as the 
increasing authoritarianism of the government as well as the 
damage done by the government to relations between the English 
and Afrikaans speaking whites. The alienation of the coloureds 
was a less prominent theme in the NUP campaign. In a significant 
speech at Greytown, Fagan summed up the policies of his party. He 
called for less authoritarianism and claimed that South Africa 
was becoming a country where "more and more arbitrary rights" were 
being taken away. He criticised the NP for its supposed belief 
that English-speaking whites should join the NP to achieve good 
relations between the two white population groups. Whites in South 
Africa "would hold their own - if they recognized that Coloureds 
were part of Western Civilization." Fagan claimed that the 
government had refused to recognise that "there was a permanent 
urbanized African population", and that the policy regarding 
Bantus tans was a "policy of madness". The policy of the 
Nationalists seemed to be "Divided we stand". In his party's 
view South Africa had to work out the details of a scheme whereby 
all races could be represented in parliament - "but the rule of 
the White man should not be endangered." ' 0 
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The campaign strategy of the NUP was comprehensively 
discussed in a manifesto that was signed between that party and 
the UP on 15 August 1961. 71 The manifesto affirmed that it would 
ensure "the fullest co-operation, participation and 
co-responsibility of both Afrikaans and English-speaking people 
in the government of the country". Children from both language 
groups would go to school together. The policy on the coloureds 
would be to accept them as an inseparable part of the country's 
Western European population. The coloureds would be represented 
by their own leaders in bodies such as the Cape Provincial 
council. Those measures which were "disparaging to the non-White 
population groups" and which offended their human dignity should 
be removed from the statute book. The party would create 
"effective machinery ... for continued consultation between the 
different population groups". There should also be a "speedy and 
large-scale economic, social and constitutional development of the 
Bantu territories'' Such urbanized Bantu who have a sense of 
responsibility must be given a proper share in the management of 
the townships and enjoy the right of property ownership". Further, 
the Bantu should have an independent means of expressing his 
views, beliefs and grievances in Parliament". The party also 
recognised the Indians "as an established section of the 
population". It promised that any proposals for an extension of 
the political rights of the "non-Whites" other than those 
previously mentioned ) would be submitted to the electorate for 
approval in a referendum or election. The party believed in "the 
democratic way of life as the basis for civilized government" 
71 See WA Kleynhans, South African general election manifestos, 
p 404. 
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and would encourage "a speeding up of economic and industrial 
development" and the fullest opportunities of employment to all". 
It would also work towards the encouragement of friendly 
relations with other states in Africa and the creation of 
diplomatic and other contacts with them. 72 
Several of the points made by the NUP were somewhat 
vague. For example, the manifesto does not mention any of the 
laws that were "disparaging to the non-White population groups'. 
It does not elaborate on the "effective machinery" that should 
be created for "consultation between the different population 
groups", nor does it say how the "Bantu" were going to be given 
the opportunity of expressing their "views, beliefs and grievances 
in Parliament." 
Other campaign points made by Fagan were that the NUP 
believed that South Africa should remain under white control but 
that there should be a type of federation in which all the racial 
groups would be allowed responsibilities for the management of 
their own affairs - these responsibilities would be related to 
the abilities of the different groups. Fagan also accused the 
government of dragging "the name of the Afrikaner people through 
the world's mud". 73 
A remarkable feature of the NUP's campaign was the 
large number of its meetings that were disrupted by heckling 
and fighting. Japie Basson's meetings in Vereeniging and Pretoria, 
for example, were broken up prematurely. 74 
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The English-language press was very critical of the 
refusal of some audiences to give Japie Basson and Fagan a 
hearing. The behaviour of many students at these meetings came in 
for vehement criticism. In an editorial the Cape Times strongly 
condemned "shocking displays of bad manners and moronic jibing" 
from students at universities and teacher training colleges. The 
newspaper expressed its confidence that most Nationalists would 
deplore the way that these "strident youths" treated Fagan in an 
attempt "to maintain their ignorance intact". 75 
The fact that so many of the candidates for the NUP 
had been former members of the NP and were seen by many 
Nationalists as being defectors or deserters from the party might 
explain the particularly difficult reception that their speakers 
often received from Nationalist supporters. This tendency to 
rowdiness was not uncommon in South African politics and was to 
be repeated at meetings of the Herstigte Nasionale Party in the 
1970 general election. During the 1961 general election, however, 
it was infrequent at meetings of the UP. 
An examination of the background of many of the National 
Union candidates shows that many were former Nationalists. One of 
the most influential members of the NUP, the candidate for 
Boksburg, Jan "Rennie" Serfontein, was a former leader of the 
Jeugbond of the NP in Pretoria. He had resigned partly in 
indignation at the Senate Act and because he felt that he was 
not allowed "to criticise the party's leadership or methods, even 
within the party fold". At a meeting organised by Serfontein, "a 
group of hot-headed Nationalist extremists burst into the room and 
75 Cape Times, 25 September 1961. 
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assaulted Mr Luthuli, Mr Serfontein and many others". The leader 
of these "extremists" was later jailed for three months for 
assault. 76 
Besides Fagan and Basson, the NUP also had one former MP 
in its list of candidates. He was SJ Swanepoel, who had been 
the NP representative for the constituency of Gezina from 1943 
to 1948. He was described by the Cape Argus as a follower of 
General Hertzog. In the 1953 general election he stood for the 
UP in Koedoespoort and in 1961 he was the NUP candidate in 
Stellenbosch. 77 Other prominent ex-Nationalists who stood for 
the NUP in the 1961 election included Willie Beckman in Port 
Elizabeth North, RJ Verster in Newcastle, and Johannes Strydom 
in Vereeniging. All these men had occupied leadership roles in 
the NP at one time. 78 
The NUP candidates generally presented an image of youth 
but it was debatable whether this would appeal to the electorate. 
A special correspondent for The Times of London wrote in 
March 1960 of the Union parliament, "An appearance of age will 
strike anyone familiar with Westminster and it is confirmed by 
a vital statistic. Fourteen members in a house of 163 are in their 
seventies, more than 30 in their sixties, and some 50 in their 
fifties. Youth gets a poor show in contemporary South African 
politics ; rising parliamentary hopes of the 1920s are still to be 
found languishing, unfulfilled, on the back benches." 79 
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a theme of his election campaign in his future constituency 
of Bezuidenhout. He accused Verwoerd of showing open support for 
Hitler and Mussolini and described him as having a "fascination" 
for fascism and Nazism. Basson noted that Holland had been invaded 
by Hitler and labelled Verwoerd as the only statesman in the world 
to have chosen sides against both his fatherland and his 
motherland." 80 
The campaign conducted by the Progressive Party. 
In his memoirs, Ray Swart describes how the calling 
of an early election was detrimental to the Progressives' 
election campaign. In his words : 81 
The early election ... was most unwelcome from 
our point of view ; We had done well in setting 
up a basic party organisation in most parts of 
the country we had recruited members and 
established branches and we had thanks 
largely to the Molteno Commission - formulated 
much of our policy, but we needed much more time 
to get it across to the electorate. 
The PP candidates faced some formidable problems in 
their campaign. Helen Suzman recalls that the party had hoped to 
have three more years to formulate its policies and to present 
these to the electorate. In her opinion the calling of an early 
general election had dissipated any advantage gained from the 
party's recent performance in parliament. Zach de Beer thinks 
that the Progressives' main advantage was their "freshness" as 
many people had come to believe that the UP was "dull and 
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directionless" and these voters hoped that the Progressives 
would be a "more vigorous opposition" to the Nationalists. He 
considers that the "Don't split the vote" line of thought among 
many voters was the main problem confronting the Progressives. 
Colin Eglin agrees with Zach de Beer on the importance of this 
issue but regards the fact that the party was regarded as being 
"too far ahead of its time" as more important. Many voters were 
influenced by "the background of Uhuru elsewhere in Africa and 
conflict inside South Africa". 82 
At the outset of the election the PP decided that it 
would try to avoid contesting seats in which the NP would have a 
chance of winning should the vote be split. In the Zululand 
constituency, represented in parliament by Ray Swart, the PP 
decided not to contest the seat when the NP decided at the last 
moment to put up a candidate. As the PP's nomination had already 
been accepted, Swart appealed to the voters not to vote for him 
and ended up losing his deposit. 83 
Likewise, the decision of the UP to contest the 
Queenstown constituency against the Nationalists prompted Steytler 
to decide not to contest that seat for the PP. The Cape Times 
applauded this decision, saying that it could only congratulate 
him for his responsible withdrawal from the contest even though it 
must have been a great temptation for him to prove that there was 
solid support for the PP in the rural areas. 84 
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The Progressive Party attempts to defend its racial policies. 
Throughout its campaign the pp had to refute 
allegations that it stood for a policy of one man, one vote, and 
that its policies would lead to compulsory integration and the 
swamping of white areas and facilities by blacks. In a pamphlet 
circulated by Harry Lawrence in his constituency of Salt River, 
the party's position was uncompromisingly given • 65 
Any one who tells you that because Harry Lawrence 
is a Progressive he stands for "One Man, One Vote", 
IS TELLING A LIE ! Any one who tells you that 
because Harry Lawrence is a Progressive he will 
make you share Swimming Baths, Residential Areas, 
Playing Fields or other amenities with people of 
other races, IS TELLING A LIE. Any one who tells 
you that because Harry Lawrence is a Progressive 
he is helping the Communists, IS TELLING A LIE ! 
Colin Eglin, in contesting his constituency of Pine lands, 
reiterated the PP's position in the social field in a pamphlet 
distributed to his electorate. He described the PP as rejecting 
enforced social integration while at the same time believing that 
people should not be compelled to segregate against their will. 
The pp view was that experience had shown "that social 
relationships in our multi-racial country are best regulated by 
the conventions which exist." Should there be a demand from the 
inhabitants in any area to associate with or to reside among 
members of their own group, provision should be made for them 
to do so. 86 
Similar points were raised by Leo Boyd, who was 
standing for the Progressives against Douglas Mitchell in Natal 
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South Coast. Boyd circulated a pamphlet in which he tried to 
allay some of the misgivings felt by the constituents regarding 
social integration or segregation. One section of the circular 
was entitled, "Of course, there WILL be SEPARATE BATHING AREAS 
FOR WHITES when the Progressives are in power". He told the 
voters, "Under a Progressive Party government, separate beaches, 
swimming baths, residential areas, schools and other services and 
amenities will continue to be provided just as they are now. 
Nobody who does not want to mix with non-Whites will in any way 
be compelled to do so." 87 
Clive van Ryneveld, who was seeking re-election in 
East London North, also had to deal with similar allegations 
raised in a pamphlet that was circulated widely by the UP in his 
constituency. At a public meeting he added a few more points to 
those raised by Boyd. Van Ryneveld described the party as standing 
for a qualified franchise and not for "votes for all". In addition 
it was "completely untrue" that the Progressives would abolish the 
pass laws "overnight". The Progressives would also not allow the 
country to be swamped by job-seekers from "India, Pakistan, 
Malaya, Kenya, Congo and Japan". In answer to the allegation 
that the Progressives were helping Verwoerd by splitting the 
anti-Nationalist vote, van Ryneveld claimed that there was not a 
single three-cornered contest between Nationalist, Progressive 
and UP candidates. 88 
The Daily Dispatch commented scathingly on this UP 
pamphlet and also criticised aspects of the UP'S campaign against 
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the Progressives. It described the pamphlet as "an example of 
wilful distortion and deliberate misrepresentation of the truth 
that puts the party to shame." The newspaper also discussed some 
of the UP's various other methods of electioneering and criticised 
the recording of Graaff's speech attacking the Progressives. 89 
statements 
the policy 
the United 
These attempts to frighten by false 
about, and false inferences drawn from, 
of the Progressive Party clearly reveal 
Party as a carbon copy of Nationalist 
prejudices, using Nationalist methods. 
party deserving of support on Wednesday ? 
ideas 
Is such 
and 
a 
Die Transvaler also tried to compare the Progressives' 
policies on segregation with those about to be put into practice 
in Southern Rhodesia. The city council in Salisbury had recently 
decided to open the municipal swimming pools to all races and 
Die Transvaler attributed this move to the Rhodesians' recent 
decision to accept the idea of partnership. 90 
Professor PV Pistorius, an influential member of the PP 
in its early years, compiled a summary of the PP's principles 
and beliefs. This was published in the Eastern Province Herald. 
It stated in its preamble that the PP was convinced that any 
policy based on colour and race discrimination would destroy "not 
only the white man in South Africa but also the civilization 
brought by the White man to this country." It described the 
policies of the UP and the NP as being "identical in principle" 
and claimed that they differed only in the manner in which "race 
domination should be practised". They were based on "the false 
myth that even the most uneducated and irresponsible white man 
is superior to the most educated and responsible black individual 
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and that the one should be the leader and the other the one who 
has to obey". Pistorius described the PP policy as being one of 
"gradualism" and recognising that "very many non-whites are not 
yet capable of sharing political power with us'. Significantly, 
Pistorius wrote, "For that reason we utterly reject the princi?le 
of one man, one vote". The Progressives believed in a rigid 
constitution that would need the approval of all race groups 
before it could be changed so that it would be impossible for 
any one racial group to dominate another. Job reservation would 
be abolished as the Progressives believed that "it is morally 
right and economically sound that all men, whatever their colour, 
should be free to do whatever work their abilities allow them 
to do". Importantly, it also claimed: "We totally reject enforced 
social integration. Our written policy pledges our party to 
protect the rights of every individual to reside among his own 
kind and to share social amenities such as schools, swimming baths 
and sports fields with people of his own colour only. The Party 
will not stand in the way of people who may ask to establish 
integrated townships. It will not allow the racial character of 
existing townships to be changed without the consent of the 
inhabitants of these townships." Pistorius described South 
Africa's political choice as being between "temporary white 
domination followed by inevitable disaster or otherwise a gradual 
adaptation of the country to the change that can in any case not 
be avoided". 91 
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These individual statements made by various Progressive 
Party candidates show the enormity of the problem faced by the 
Progressives in trying to explain their policies to an electorate 
that was very largely convinced that these views would lead to a 
large-scale enfranchisement of vast numbers of blacks and the 
subsequent "swamping" of white residential areas and facilities. 
It is also an indication of the preoccupation of many voters with 
safeguarding white areas and privileges. It should also be 
remembered that all these appeals were directed primarily at 
voters in traditional UP seats and thus reflected the need to 
placate the fears of traditional UP supporters. It is clear that 
UP fears were similar to those felt by most NP voters. This is 
also a very revealing indication of how the UP was able to reap 
benefits from a more subtle form of the "swart gevaar" tactics 
that the NP had adopted for so long and so successfully. In 
addition it is interesting to notice how the NP was able to 
depict the UP as following policies that would lead to the 
subjugation of the white man while the UP in its turn made 
similar claims against the Progressives. A speech made by Colin 
Eglin at Landsdowne shows how the Progressives likened the UP 
tactics to those of the Nationalists. Eglin thought that Verwoerd 
would be delighted when he heard UP candidates telling urban 
audiences that "the Progressives were more dangerous to South 
Africa than the Nationalists". 92 
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against the Progressives by the Progressive candidates themselves. 
For example, Clive van Ryneveld asserted that approximately a 
hundred thousand "non-Whites" would receive the franchise under 
the PP's system. 93 This seemingly contradicted an earlier statement 
made by the PP's candidate for Maitland, Zach de Beer, who had 
told a meeting at Mowbray that it was possible that his party's 
position on the franchise would eventually lead to a black 
majority in parliament. He told his audience that to prevent a 
fear of oppression among minority groups the PP supported "a 
written constitution that would protect the rights of minorities". 94 
Zach de Beer's faith in the inviolability of an entrenched 
constitution is shown in a pamphlet distributed to the voters 
of Maitland. Here he claimed that such a constitution would make 
it impossible even for parliament to take rights away from any 
section of the population. According to De Beer, such a 
cons ti tu ti on was used in America and most Western countries. 95 The 
obvious rejoinder from UP supporters was that South Africa was 
very far from being a Westernised country with a Westernised 
population. Nor did it have a long tradition of democratic and 
stable government circumstances in South Africa were very 
different from those in America or Western Europe and furthermore, 
experience in other African countries was evidence of the short 
duration of democratic government on the principles of an 
entrenched constitution. 
The very frankness of some PP candidates was, in a way, 
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a hindrance to their chances of being successful in an election 
that was dominated by the racial issue. An example of this was 
provided by Zach de Beer who told a PP meeting in George that the 
Progressives would accept a black premier should he be elected in 
a democratic manner. In De Beer's opinion there was historical 
justification for the Progressives' desire for a qualified 
franchise as this had been practised "successfully in the Cape 
from 1854 to 1936 - a vote for any man, White, Brown or Black, 
who could prove he was civilized and responsible". 96 De Beer's 
statements were in accordance with the idea expressed by the 
leader of the PP, Jan Steytler, that although the rest of the 
world did not expect South Africa to adopt a policy of universal 
suffrage, it did expect South Africa to treat people 
"on merit". 97 
Newspaper headlines such as "We want lots of non-Whites 
to qualify for vote" would also have caused the Progressives 
some harm in certain quarters. Leo Boyd was addressing a meeting 
in Umkomaas when he announced that the Progressives had fixed 
lower qualifications for the franchise than was the case in the 
Rhodesian Federation to ensure that "many would qualify and to 
prove the party's sincerity". • 
A letter from the postal vote agent for the 
Progressives in Pinelands gives a valuable description of the 
animosity between the UP and the Progressives. The agent 
complained that one of the senior members of the UP, Lionel 
Murray, had taken advantage of his position as chairman of one 
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of the local old age homes. Murray had barred Colin Eglin from 
addressing the old people there although he simultaneously took 
the UP candidate, Ogilvie Newton Thompson, there to be introduced 
to the residents. 99 
The Progressive Party receives support from various newspapers. 
The PP was fortunate to gain the support of several 
influential English newspapers ( notably the Rand Daily Mail 
during the campaign. Joel Mervis describes how enthusiastically 
the then editor of the newspaper, Laurence Gandar, supported the 
Progressives' cause : ioo 
The paper, delighted at the chance of supporting 
a party after its own heart, treated the election 
as if it was itself a candidate. For weeks the 
Progressive Party was given plenty of space to 
express its views. On election day perhaps only 
the outbreak of war could have claimed bigger 
headlines, bolder paragraphs or a more impressive 
display than that given to the Progressive Party. 
Allister Sparks wrote a series of ''Election Spotlights" 
for the Rand Daily Mail, most of which concentrated on 
individual politicians. Many were particularly effusive in their 
praise of the PP candidates. For example, in describing Bernard 
Friedman, Sparks described the "striking" similarities between 
Friedman and Jan Hofmeyr, a previous MP for the constituency. 
Sparks described these two parliamentarians as arguably the 
greatest orators that the House of Assembly had ever seen. 101 
Sparks also praised the leader of the PP, Jan Steytler, 
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as a man "whose every word carries an aura of complete sincerity 
and honesty", and who possessed the "forthrightness, warmth and 
open-heartedness typical of Cape Afrikaners". 102 Helen Suzman was 
also given generous tributes in an article by Sparks : "Compassion 
lies behind lash of Helen Suzman's witty tongue". According to 
Sparks, the Progressives would ensure South Africa's return to 
the Commonwealth and they would prevent a black revolution from 
breaking out. The PP would also provide a home for moderate 
Nationalists who might eventually realise the futility of 
Nationalist doctrines. A PP victory would also give much 
encouragement to South Africa 1 s overseas friends. 103 
On polling day Gandar published a forceful editorial 
encouraging his readers to vote for the Progressives. He nailed 
his newspaper's sympathies firmly.to the mast. His editorial ended 
by saying that South Africa was faced with two alternatives. One 
was "political separation accompanied by immense economic 
sacrifices" the other was "economic integration accompanied 
by extensive political concessions". It was "hopelessly 
unrealistic'' and "downright dishonest and dangerous" to carry on 
with a policy of "enjoying the fruits of economic integration and 
ignoring its political obligations". He told his readers 
"And so vote Progressive if you have the opportunity ; if 
not, vote ~Pact I • n 104 
The Cape Times expressed less enthusiastic support 
for the Progressive Party. According to the editorial it would 
be a tragedy if the Progressives were to be removed from 
103 
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parliament particularly so in the case of Harry Lawrence. The 
Progressives presented the "thinking and ideas ... in the true 
European tradition". The Progressives would receive the support 
of those voters to whom modern Africa was "a moral and 
intellectual challenge". 105 
In Pietermaritzburg the PP also received warm support 
from The Natal Witness, which published an editorial on the 
day before the election, "Why We Support The Progressives". It 
was very critical of the UP in Natal : 106 
The praise that we have bestowed on the United 
Party in other provinces is not merited in Natal, 
where the Party's leadership and political tactics 
have fallen far below the level that we expect in 
those who aspire to represent the cause of freedom 
and decency in a house that will be dominated by 
Dr Verwoerd. 
The Progressives would never betray their principles, were 
not "docile", and would never run with the hare and hunt with 
the hounds. The UP, on the other hand, had made a pact with 
Japie Basson's party and had "exploited racial prejudice with such 
blatant irresponsibility." It is interesting to speculate to what 
extent the support from The Natal Witness contributed to the 
comparatively good showing of the pp candidates in 
Pietermaritzburg. 
In general we can observe how press support for the 
Progressives centred on three important issues. The first was 
the supposed more honest and less self-centred nature of the 
individual Progressive candidates. Another was their 
disenchantment with the UP and its alleged offensive and racially 
provocative style of electioneering. Thirdly, the press 
105 Cape Times, 17 October 1961. 
106 The Natal Witness, 17 October 1961. 
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emphasised the morality, honesty and altruism of PP doctrines. 
The Rand Daily Mail was by far the most enthusiastic and 
effusive supporter of the Progressives. 1 ~ 
The campaign waged by the Liberal Party. 
In the 1961 election the Liberal Party fielded only 
two candidates. They were its Randolph Vigne in Constantia, and 
Mary Walker in Hillbrow. Mary Walker was the sister of the 
historian Rayne Kruger. Both these candidates had an uphill 
struggle. Vigne complained that the PP had been distinctly 
uncooperative in providing voting details for his Constantia 
constituency. The newspapers, furthermore, did not want to publish 
anything sent to them by the Liberal Party. 108 Mary Walker also 
encountered difficulties in Hillbrow. She was unable to hire a 
hall for multiracial gatherings and most of her campaign meetings 
were held in the open air using a bullhorn and a penny-whistle 
band to attract listeners. 109 
The Liberal Party candidates tried to convince the 
electorate of the inevitability of black rule. Mary Walker's 
manifesto read 110 
Change is coming to South Africa .... In five 
brief years over 100 million non-whites have 
gained their independence in Africa. This tide 
is sweeping towards us - we cannot avoid it 
You, the voters of Hillbrow, could have reason 
to fear the change. 
107 J Mervis, The Fourth Estate, p 346. 
108 UCT, BC 587, Leo Marquard Collection, E 2.77, Randolph Vigne -
109 
Leo Marquard, 2 October 1961. 
D Irvine in J Butler, R Elphick and D Welsh 
Democratic liberalism in South Africa, p 123. 
eds. ) , 
110 Alan Paton Centre, Liberal Party Collection, PC 2/7/2/1, 
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Randolph Vigne's statement described the Liberal Party 
as "the true opposition to the Nationalists". It claimed that 
voting for the Liberal Party would be a rejection of "Verwoerd's 
and Graaff's claim that sharing of rights inevitably means 'black 
nationalism' and end of the whites", Those who believed this claim 
"should get out now : this is no country for them", 111 
According to Peter Brown, the Liberal Party also tried 
to enter into an agreement with the Progressives whereby the 
Liberal Party would contest Pietermaritzburg District, This had 
come to nothing but the Liberal Party members were told that they 
would be free to work for the Progressive candidate should they so 
wish, and some did indeed do so. 112 
In assessing the performance of the Liberal Party, 
Kenneth Heard is of the opinion that the Liberal Party waged its 
campaign not so much with the intention of winning votes but with 
the object of using the election to propagate its message from 
a public platform, According to Heard, the Liberal Party suffered 
from a lack of press support and its leaders lacked direct 
political experience. It did, however, have a "deep-seated 
conviction in the rightness of its cause, and the honesty and 
courage to express it". 113 
111 Alan Paton Centre, Liberal Party Collection, PC 2/7/2/1, 
South Africa is a wonderful country ruined by politics, 
112 UCT, BC 587, Leo Marquard Collection, E 2.76, Peter Brown 
- Leo Marquard, 12 September 1961. 
113 K Heard, General elections in South Africa, p 133. 
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The campaign waged by the Conservative Workers Party. 
Very few commentators regarded the election campaign 
of the Conservative Workers Party ( CWP as more than a minor 
side-show. The historian Leo Marquard, for example, wrote in his 
weekly column in The Baltimore Sun that this party would most 
probably do no more than reduce the NP majorities in the four 
seats that it was contesting. 114 Kenneth Heard also regards the CWP's 
campaign as being of secondary importance and thinks that its 
"only real contribution to the debate" was that it might have 
focused more attention on economic issues. 115 One noteworthy aspect 
of this campaign was the way the CWP tried to evoke memories of 
the harsh economic times of the 1920s and 1930s. This was a 
powerful emotional issue to many voters across the political 
divide - one of the many emotional issues of the campaign. 
The CWP's election campaign emphasised the fact that it 
represented the interests of the workers, who were ''the backbone 
of any country". It tried to exploit the fact that the NP was 
represented in parliament primarily by professional men, farmers 
and businessmen, with very little representation of the working 
class. A pamphlet circulated by the CWP made great play of the 
fact that the working classes were very poorly represented among 
the NP' s 102 members of parliament. 116 
The NP was depicted as being indifferent towards the 
workers. The pamphlet circulated by JA Kruger, for example, 
114 
115 
116 
The Baltimore Sun, 17 October 1961. 
K Heard, General elections in South Africa, p 134. 
UNISA, United Party Archives, Division of Information and 
Research, File 52, Conservative Workers' Party, Pamphlet 
entitled Our Party. 
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accused the government of neglecting the workers' economic 
problems so as to ''cadge for votes on ideological grounds". It 
claimed that nothing had been done to establish minimum wage 
standards for the workers or to obtain a measure of social 
security for them. The candidate for Germiston, KW du Preez, 
maintained that the CWP would concentrate "mainly on the economic 
problems of the workers, with a view to affording them a 
reasonable standard of living with adequate security against the 
problems and difficulties that come with unemployment, old age 
and infirmity". 117 
In an interview with Allister Sparks, KW du Preez 
linked the formation of his party to memories of the Great 
Depression. He told Sparks that his party had no quarrel with any 
party on ideological grounds but asked why it should be regarded 
as unrealistic to spend money on old age pensions and "a family's 
bread and butter" when "vast sums can be found to pour into 
ideological solutions". 118 
The press paid very little attention to the CWP. The 
party did, however, attract some attention at a public meeting 
held in Johannesburg to discuss the plight of the unemployed. 
The candidate for Mayfair, RJ Nagel, told the meeting, "All we 
get is promises. What do our wives and children eat while we 
wait another 15 weeks for the unemployment situation to resolve 
itself ?" This was in response to a statement that the Minister 
of Labour had told a delegation of unemployed workers that the 
117 UNISA, United Party Archives, Division of Information and 
Research, File 52, Pamphlets circulated by candidates of the 
Conservative Workers' Party. 
118 Rand Daily Mail, 22 September 1961. 
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situation would be resolved by the 
had been for many years a 
end of 
traditional 
disinclination among Nationalists to break ranks and to be seen 
as disloyal to the NP or to the "volk". This would be an important 
factor in limiting the CWP's chances of success. In addition, it 
lacked the funds and the opportunity to propagate its doctrines 
very effectively. It had little support from the press and its 
leaders had no great parliamentary or electoral experience. It 
also had the drawback of being a very newly-established party. 
With very few, if any, advantages and with the cards stacked 
against it, it is not surprising that the CWP made comparatively 
little impact in the 1961 election campaign. 
119 Rand Daily Mail, 14 October 1961. 
CHAPTER EIGHT. 
THE RESULTS OF THE 1961 GENERAL ELECTION. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The 
first section provides a general overview of the election results 
and the second takes a look at the election results from a 
statistical perspective. The second section also attempts to 
relate the 1961 general election results to trends that had become 
apparent since 1948. 
An overview of the results of the 1961 general election. 
The NP did not have over-ambitious aims for the 1961 
general election and did not expect a dramatic increase in its 
number of seats. It hoped merely to improve its majorities 
nationwide and to win a few seats which had become marginal as a 
result of the 1958 general election or gradual demographic 
changes. These changes included population shifts and an increase 
in the percentage of Afrikaans speaking voters. The constituency 
of Queenstown fell into the first category while Pretoria 
Sunnyside fell into the second. The UP won the constituency of 
Queenstown in 1958 by a majority of thirteen votes while in the 
referendum of 1960 it had obtained a majority against the 
republic of 121 votes. Following a concerted campaign the NP won 
this seat in 1961 by a fairly decisive majority of 369 votes. In 
the 1958 general election the UP had won Pretoria-Sunnyside by a 
majority of 614 votes but following the enfranchisement of 
eighteen-year-olds the composition of the constituency changed 
dramatically with large numbers of young Afrikaans speaking 
students living there. In the 1960 referendum there was a 
Page 283 
majority ( for the republic of 2 050 votes. By the 1961 general 
election the constituency had effectively become a safe seat 
for the Nationalists who won it with a majority of 2 727 votes. 
These two constituencies were the only new seats won in the 1961 
election by the NP. The party thus increased its representation 
in parliament from 103 members to 105 ( including the six members 
from South West Africa ) . As can be seen in Chapter Seven, most 
of the interest in this election was not on the contest between 
the NP and the UP but on that between the UP and the PP. 1 
One of the issues in the election was whether the 
National Union Party ( NUP ) would be able to draw an appreciable 
number of disenchanted Nationalists away from the NP. It failed 
lamentably in this respect. In straight contests between the 
NP and the NUP-UP alliance, the NP increased its majorities 
in every constituency except Humansdorp. In Humansdorp, Paul 
Sauer's constituency, the NP received 65,7 % of the votes cast in 
the 1958 general election. In the 1961 general election this 
dropped to 65,3 %. This small decrease was only significant in 
that it was the only constituency where the NP suffered any 
decrease at all. The NUP did nothing to check this tendency. The 
election effectively meant the end of the NUP and it is not 
surprising that it amalgamated with the UP soon afterwards. 2 We 
can speculate on whether this slight decrease indicated any 
disenchantment among some Nationalists in Humansdorp as a result 
of Sauer's well-known speech after Sharpeville in 1960. 3 
2 
3 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 359, 
378, 385, 400. 
Figures extracted from BM Schoeman, Parlernentere verkiesings 
in Suid-Afrika, pp 346 - 365, 388 - 405. 
See Chapter 3, pp 89 - 91. 
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Ben Schoeman, who was a long-serving member of the 
cabinet, summed up the position of the NUP very aptly when he 
wrote in his memoirs · 4 
Basson het Graaff met 'n slenter gevang. Die 
Nasionale Unie het hoegenaamd geen steun by die 
publiek gehad nie. Hoedat Graaff ooit kon gedink 
het dat Basson en sy Nasionale Unie vir die VP 
iets sou beteken, gaan my verstand te bowe. As 
Basson se kandidate op eie bene moes gestaan het, 
sender die hulp van die VP, sou almal, insluitend 
Basson self, hul deposito's verloor het. 
The NP was easily able to fend off the challenge 
from the Conservative Workers' Party ( CWP ) which also collapsed 
after the election. The NP won the constituencies of Germiston, 
Langlaagte, Mayfair and Westdene with majorities of 4 186, 3 566, 
3 392 and 4 030 votes respectively. Nevertheless the creditable 
performance of the CWP in polling 24,7 %, 28,1 %, 27,2 % and 
25,6 % of the votes cast in those constituencies did show that 
the NP did not have an overwhelming grip on the affections of the 
white working classes in some urban areas. 5 
The 1961 general election was also significant as it 
was most probably the first general election in which the NP 
could claim to have obtained the support of more than half the 
electorate. It will be remembered that the large number of 
uncontested seats in the 1958 general election made it difficult 
to determine exactly the level of support given to the NP. 6 This 
achievement was partly attributable to the good organisation of 
the NP, but it should be remembered that there were many factors 
that also worked to the advantage of the party. These factors 
5 
6 
Ben Schoeman, My lewe in die politiek, p 282. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 392, 
395, 396, 404. 
See Chapter 1, pp 5 - 8. 
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have been discussed elsewhere. 
Much of the real interest in this general election 
was to be concentrated on the contests between the PP and UP. 
Although the PP performed much better than in the 1966 general 
election, its supporters were very disappointed with its 
performance. It won only the constituency of Houghton with a 
majority of 564 votes. As the PP had polled 5 405 votes to 
the UP's 4 841 votes, this means that a comparatively small 
swing of 5,22 % away from the PP would have been sufficient for 
the UP to wrest this seat from the Progressives' grasp. 7 
The PP was unfortunate to lose Parktown by the narrow 
margin of 85 votes, polling 5 015 votes to the UP's 5 100. A 
swing away from the UP of 0,85 percent would have been enough 
for the Progressives to win this seat. 8 
Joanna Strangwayes-Booth attributed Jack Cope's defeat 
in Parktown partly to a "smear campaign by the United Party" 
that alleged that he had signed a petition against the 
construction of a synagogue in Greenside, part of his 
constituency. This supposedly cost him a portion of the Jewish 
vote in that area. 9 
Allister Sparks of the Rand Daily Mail commented that 
the UP had won in Parktown merely because it had a bigger party 
machine and was thus able to build up a lead of 117 votes while 
collecting postal votes. On election day the PP had received 
32 more votes than the UP. 10 
8 
9 
10 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, p 393. 
Ibid., p 398. 
J Strangwayes-Booth, A cricket in the thorn tree, p 198. 
Rand Daily Mail, 20 October 1961. 
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Helen Suzman regards her victory in Houghton as largely 
attributable to "the remarkable campaign organisation under the 
Campaign Manager, Max Borkum". She does not venture an opinion 
on why the Progressives lost Parktown. 11 
In the section of this chapter concerning the statistical 
analysis of the election results it is pointed out that in general 
the PP benefited in elections from a high turn-out of voters. 
Although the percentage turn-out of voters in the Parktown 
constituency was 81,7 %, we can speculate that a slightly higher 
turn-out might have been sufficient for a narrow Progressive 
victory. 
In Johannesburg North, Bernard Friedman of the pp 
polled 4 541 votes to the UP's 5 413, thus losing by 872 votes. 
In the constituency of Orange Grove Alfred Einstein of the PP 
polled 4 846 votes to the UP's 5 363, and thus lost by 517 votes. 
The percentage polls in these two constituencies were 75,7 % 
and 81,6 % respectively. 12 These results are further confirmation 
of how the Progressives fared comparatively well at the polls. 
The PP came comparatively close to winning the contest 
in Pietermaritzburg District where it obtained 3 839 votes to 
the UP's 4 014 - an effective majority of 175 votes. In this 
particular constituency the percentage poll was only 69,1 % and 
here again if there had been a higher turn-out the Progressives 
might have been able to capture the seat. In Pietermaritzburg 
City the PP polled 3 282 votes to the UP's 3 915, losing by 
only 633 votes. An interesting characteristic of this contest was 
11 
12 
Helen Suzman - Author, Johannesburg, 9 January 1996. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 394, 
398. 
Page 287 
that the percentage poll was only 53,8 %. It can be hypothesised 
that a large number of UP supporters or former supporters 
refrained from voting. 13 In Durban Berea, RR Butcher of the PP 
obtained 4 568 votes losing by 883 votes to the UP candidate. 
In Durban Musgrave, Durban North and Natal South Coast, the 
Progressive candidates obtained 44,7 38,9 % and 31,4 % 
respectively of all the votes cast. 14 In short, these results 
provide ample proof as to why SL Barnard describes the political 
strength of the Progressives in the 1961 g~neral election as 
lying in the areas of Johannesburg, Durban and Pietermaritzburg. 15 
It is interesting to speculate whether the PP's 
comparatively good performances in some of the Natal seats may 
have been influenced by the UP "back-lash" in some quarters which 
was aimed at the unpopularity of the provincial leader, Douglas 
Mitchell. Alternatively, many UP supporters may have decided not 
to vote as a sign of protest against the UP's supposed lack of 
direction and the way that it had seemingly forced the 
progressives out of the party in 1959. Some UP supporters may also 
have been disenchanted with the UP but were not yet prepared to 
make a total break with the UP and vote for the PP. The "apathy 
vote" may also have been an important factor. 
The UP's successful candidate for Pietermaritzburg 
City, H Odell, later claimed that both he and the UP candidate 
for Pietermaritzburg District had received help from the NP 
13 
14 
15 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, p 398. 
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during the 1961 general election and that the UP leadership had 
approved of this. B Hackland also claims that the UP benefited 
from "tactical voting by National Party supporters" although 
there was no apparent evidence of any formal agreements between 
the two parties. 16 
Some of the most disappointing PP performances were 
recorded in the Cape Province. In the Sea Point constituency 
Professor Fourie managed to obtain only 35,4 % of the votes cast, 
in the Simonstown constituency, Mrs Jacqueline Beck polled only 
20,4 % of the votes cast. In the constituencies of George, East 
London North and East London City, the Progressive candidates 
polled 5,3 %, 28,8 % and 17,3 % of the votes respectively while 
in the Albany constituency the Progressive candidate obtained 
only 16,1 % of the votes cast. Perhaps the saddest defeat suffered 
by the PP was in Salt River where the colourful veteran 
politician, Harry Lawrence, polled only 2 190 votes for the 
Progressives in comparison with the UP candidate's 4 670 votes. 17 
Zach de Beer recalls that the Progressives' hopes 
regarding Cape Town were not unduly optimistic. According to him, 
"Cape Town people do not make decisions or change attitudes as 
easily as some others." He also mentions that Cape Town was 
Graaff's home town and that he had always been very popular on a 
personal level there. According to Colin Eglin the Progressives' 
poor performance in Cape Town could be ascribed to the "background 
of Uhuru elsewhere in Africa and conflict inside South Africa". 
16 
17 
B Hackland, The Progressive Party of South Africa 1959 - 1981 : 
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Then too, the "English-speaking establishment remained loyal to 
Sir de Villiers Graaff and the United Party which was still seen 
by the middle and old age group as the Party of General Smuts". 
Graaff, however, regards the Progressives' poor showing as 
basically due to their lack of "grassroots support". As evidence 
he cites the fact that the PP was originally able to muster 
about eleven or twelve votes in the Cape Peninsula General 
Council, an organisation consisting of "between 130 and 140 
delegates", when it discussed the Progressives' actions at the 
fateful 1959 congress. Anthony Heard attributes the Progressives' 
poor performance to the fact that splinter parties "rarely made 
it" and the way that the UP relied on "strong wartime loyalties 
and camaraderie". In his opinion the incidents in the Congo had 
also frightened the whites in South Africa. Most of these 
recollections emphasise the conservatism of the Cape Town 
electorate and the strong personal loyalties commanded by 
the UP and Graaff. 18 
The opinions expressed above are supported by 
ER Mc Kenzie, who shows how the various disturbing events in 
Africa affected the Progressives' chances at the polls. In her 
words, "Lurid accounts of atrocities being committed in these 
former colonies and the seemingly sudden spate of black violence 
within South Africa served to entrench white prejudice and fears 
as well as the belief that blacks were unable to participate 
responsibly and peacefully in government. Within this unsettled 
18 Zach de Beer - Author, The Hague, 15 January 1996 ; Colin Eglin 
- Author, Cape Town, 8 November 1995 ; Sir de Villiers Graaff -
Author, Cape Town, 19 December 1995 ; Anthony Heard - Author, 
Cape Town, 15 January 1996. 
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climate the electorate was hardly likely to give enthusiastic 
support to a party whose ultimate goal was the inclusion of 
blacks in central government." 19 
It should be remembered that many of the Progressive 
candidates had represented their constituencies for some time 
and that they would probably have built up a personal following. 
Thus they would have obtained some votes from genuine Progressive 
supporters and because of personal loyalties and affections. 
What was ominous for the future of the PP was that new Progressive 
candidates would not have this advantage. It could also have been 
a factor in the poor performance of the PP in the 1966 general 
election. 
Post-election comments by prominent leaders. 
In his post-election address to the nation, Verwoerd 
expressed the opinion that the most significant lesson of the 
election was that "the tremendous stability of South African 
governments had been reaffirmed". He saw the increased majorities 
obtained by the Nationalist candidates as a sign of "a steadily 
broadening base of English and Afrikaans-speaking citizens" who 
had supported the government. He also declared that the nation had 
decided "that its very existence depends upon a policy, not of 
discrimination but of differentiation between racial groups in 
the population." Verwoerd said that the electorate had rejected 
"all forms of compromise", and described the NUP as being "the 
weakest straw of all". He described "a new star" that had arisen 
19 ER Mc Kenzie, "From obscurity to official opposition : The 
Progressive Federal Party, 1959 - 1977", in Historia, May 1984, 
vol 39, no 1, p 84. 
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in the form of the PP and asked whether it was "really a star, 
or meteor". In discussing the electoral fortunes of the 
Progressives, he said 
I do not wish to spoil the pleasure of its members 
in their minor successes, but to me the figures 
in which they exult tell the story of personal 
popularity of a lively group of middle-aged 
idealists and of another Natalian stand, this 
time to teach Mr Mitchell a lesson, rather than 
a strong conviction of the wisdom of 
equalitarianism for the solution of South Africa's 
colour and other problems. 
Verwoerd considered that the low percentage poll indicated 
that there were many voters who had rejected the UP but had not 
yet gone over to the NP fold. ' 0 
Verwoerd was criticised in some quarters for the 
exultant tone of his comments on the election results and for 
his remarks on some of the opposition members. In a letter to a 
couple in Pinelands, Verwoerd responded to criticism of his radio 
talk by saying that his "references to personalities were very 
slight". Despite the two-month campaign in the press claiming that 
the NUP had been draining away support from the NP. The NUP had 
failed to impress the voters. Graaff had been "rather caught 
out" in his pact with this party. Verwoerd added that during the 
campaign he had been repeatedly attacked "in person most violently 
and unfairly", but had not retaliated by discussing or criticising 
Graaff, Fagan, Japie Basson or Steytler. 21 
20 
21 
Dr Donges, the Cape leader of the NP, expressed the 
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opinion that the election was a "mandate to continue working for 
racial unity between the English and Afrikaans-speaking peoples." 22 
In similar vein at his meeting to celebrate his victory, PW Botha 
told the voters of George that the election results "threw a 
great responsibility on to the government to carry on with the 
principle of separate and parallel development and to make the 
most of the spirit of unity which was becoming more apparent." 
He also said that the hand of friendship was being extended 
to the English-speaking population and that the government 
"invited them to join in the forward march of South Africa." 23 
Sir de Villiers Graaff commented that the virtual 
extinction of the PP meant that the UP would be returning to 
parliament with a team of "capable young men" to replace the 
Progressives who had lost their seats. KA Heard describes Graaff's 
statement as "a most ungenerous comment on the older Harry 
Lawrence and Dr Steytler, and on the young Dr De Beer and 
R.A.F. Swart, apart from the other members." 24 
Graaff went on to say that he thought it very likely 
that the government would be forced to appeal to the voters again 
in another election before its five year period of office had 
expired in 1966, but he did not explain why he held this view. 
He decried the achievements of the Progressives saying that they 
had been backed by "disproportionate financial resources" and that 
a "section of the Press created an image in the public mind of an 
Opposition divided against itself and rendered helpless 
schism. n 25 
22 
23 
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After an opportunity to review the election results in 
greater detail, the UP expressed the view that the Progressives 
had been reduced to "a small artificial enclave" in the northern 
suburbs of Johannesburg. The election had been a time of 
"consolidation" for the UP. It had now emerged as a "purposeful 
unified body, no longer plagued by Left- and Right-wing 
dissentients". In the process it has shown a nett gain of eight 
seats the largest of any party in the election. Surprisingly, 
no attention was drawn to the fact that the 1961 general election 
had returned 49 UP candidates whereas the previous general 
election had seen the election of 53 candidates. The so-called 
UP gain was largely one of winning back the seats that the 
breakaway Progressives had won under the UP umbrella in 1958. 26 
Graaff later addressed a gathering of UP supporters in 
Johannesburg on the election results. He laid part of the blame 
for the UP's weaker performance at the door of the opposition 
press. He claimed it had split the English-speaking vote 
something which the NP had never managed to do. He commended some 
newspapers, particularly the Sunday Times, for supporting the 
UP and for propagating its plans for racial federation. He also 
criticised the state-controlled broadcasting services for 
favouring the NP in its presentation of the news. He regarded 
the radio as having become even more important than the Afrikaans 
press in spreading propaganda for the NP in the rural areas. 27 
The various PP spokesmen tried to be as optimistic as 
possible about their respective defeats. Jan Steytler said that 
26 
27 
Cape Times, 28 December 1961. 
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the results of the election showed that there was no place left in 
South African politics for centre parties. In his view "the future 
division in politics would be between the Nationalist Party and 
the Progressive party." Leo Boyd, the Natal leader of the 
Progressive Party, felt that it was a tremendous achievement for 
a party that was barely two years old to win the number of votes 
that the Progressives had obtained. 28 Altogether, the PP obtained 
68 045 votes - 19 886 in the Cape, 24 437 in Natal and 23 722 
in the Transvaal. 29 
According to Brian Bamford, the poor performance of the 
NUP can be attributed to several unpropitious factors. The party 
had only recently been formed and it had had very little time to 
organise itself or raise funds. The country was still in the grip 
of "Republic euphoria" and was not ready for the type of electoral 
reform advocated by the National Union. Isolation and boycotts had 
not yet begun to affect South Africa in any appreciable way and 
the government had "struck a gold reef in clamping down on 
Communism and civil lawlessness." 30 
The views of the press concerning the 
results of the general election. 
The various newspaper editorials had very divergent 
ideas concerning the results of the general election. 
reviewing the election the Cape Times commented on 
imbalances of an electoral system that allowed 
28 
29 
30 
Cape Argus, 20 October 1961. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, p 405. 
Brian Bamford - Author, Cape Town, 23 January 1996. 
In 
the 
the 
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Nationalists to rule the country with a large parliamentary 
majority while at the same time polling only about half the total 
votes cast. It wrote : 31 
The Nationalists' great strength in Parliament is a 
result of the eccentric delimitations in South Africa, 
which water down the votes of the central city areas 
( which have enabled the Progressive Party to make a 
real impact ) and over-value the votes of the 
platteland. The fact that this set of circumstances 
has resulted in an increase in Nationalist 
Parliamentary strength does not prove less than 
1 000 000 Nationalists right against the almost equal 
number of opposing White votes in South Africa, 
against the almost unanimous sentiments of the 
non-Whites in South Africa, and against the millions 
of politically conscious people outside, who have 
overwhelmingly renounced racial discrimination as a 
motive for political action. 
These claims are, of course, open to contention. 
The Cape Argus in its editorial took a more 
conservative line than did the Cape Times. It concentrated more 
on the reasons for the lack of success of the NUP and the PP. It 
hypothesised that the poor showing of the NUP was because the 
election had been called too early for the party. It had not had 
enough time to propagate its doctrines and "although many 
Nationalists sympathised with it, the time has not come for them 
to throw off their old allegiance and be accused of stabbing 
Afrikanerdom in the back." The Cape Argus gave several reasons 
for the poor PP results in the Cape. These included the way that 
the Progressives had broken away from the UP, "the 
conservativeness of the Cape and the fact that the Cape, erstwhile 
liberal leader of South Africa, is not prepared to go any way near 
as far left as the Progressive Party would go." It also speculated 
31 Cape Times, 20 October 1961. 
Page 296 
on whether the Progressives' comparatively better showing in Natal 
was due to antipathy towards Douglas Mitchell. 32 
The Daily Dispatch discussed the disappointing 
performance of the PP in the Cape "It is a remarkable reversal 
of political tradition in South Africa that the spirit of 
liberalism in race relationship is now much stronger in Natal and 
the Transvaal than in the Cape. Though beaten the Progressive 
Party can look forward to the future with confidence." 33 
Die Burger published a rather triumphant editorial in 
which it speculated on the future of the PP and the UP. It asked 
whether the Progressives, "a party which draws its greatest 
initial power from the flatland civilization of Johannesburg and 
the endemic separatism of Natal, can really develop into a first 
power on the national scene." It also pointed out that the 
comparatively satisfactory performances of the Progressives in 
some constituencies were facilitated by the complete absence of 
any Nationalist candidates. The editorial discussed the UP's 
"traditional dilemma" : being attacked from two sides. "This puts 
it under renewed pressure to swing more to the Left, while its 
experience on the second front again prescribes a clearer 
adaptation to the Right." The newspaper's reference to the 
"second front" presumably points to the challenge that the 
UP received from the NP. 34 
A triumphant note was also sounded by Die Transvaler, 
which ascribed the NP victory to a Higher Hand, which guided the 
destinies of nations. This newspaper also attributed the victory 
32 
33 
34 
Cape Argus, 19 October 1961. 
Daily Dispatch, 20 October 1961. 
Die Burger, 20 October 1961. 
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of the NP to the honesty with which it enunciated its principles 
and goals and waged its campaign. This was "the best weapon" 
that the NP had employed and it gave its supporters a spiritual 
power that had benefited them greatly during the election. The 
editorial also recorded its pleasure that the NP had won 
Queenstown a constituency that had been so strongly UP in 1948 
that the UP had been unopposed in it. However, the editorial 
omitted to mention that the delimitation after 1948 had much to 
do with the successes of the NP in that constituency. 35 
The Rand Daily Mail had been vociferous in its support 
for the Progressives during the campaign and its political comment 
after the election continued to reflect this attitude. In an 
editorial entitled "Has the U.P. got a future ?", it pointed out 
that in every election since 1948 the party had "lost ground". In 
the recent election "its attempts to use the National Union as a 
bridge by which dissatisfied Nationalists could cross to the 
Opposition failed completely." It accused the UP of being a pale 
reflection of the NP and being unable to offer any leadership to 
"the confused and frightened electorate". It stated bluntly that 
the "good elements" of the UP had been "increasingly obscured and 
vitiated by an overlay of compromise and expediency". This had 
caused the UP to become "a fortress of the status quo". 36 
Allister Sparks also praised the Progressives generously. 
He pointed out that although Smuts had won two-thirds of the seats 
in 1943, many had been won with narrow majorities. He drew an 
analogy between this and the way that the Progressives, although 
losing their "artificial strength" had increased their "real 
35 
36 
Die Transvaler, 20 October 1961. 
Rand Daily Mail, 20 October 1961. 
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strength by their gaining one seat and the knowledge that 
there are eight others which the inevitable further decline of 
the UP must place within their grasp very soon. .. He also expressed 
his opinion that the UP had taken "such a beating" from both the 
37 
NP and the pp that its whole future had to be in the balance. 37 
The following day Sparks wrote another article "Clear 
signs of strong post-election swing to the Progressives". He 
claimed that were there to be a new election immediately, the 
Progressives would win eight seats namely Houghton, Parktown, 
Pietermaritzburg District, Orange Grove, Johannesburg North, 
Pietermaritzburg City, Durban Berea and Durban Musgrave. 38 Sparks 
was probably guilty of wishful thinking but the Progressives 
might have been able to capture Parktown and possibly another 
marginal seat if they had been able to ensure a higher turn-out 
of voters. 
The Natal Witness also spoke deprecatingly of the UP, 
describing it as failing to understand the times in which it 
was living 
The great days of this party were in the war years 
and the epoch that preceded them before the 
racial question became the crucial factor in South 
African politics .... As things are it remains in 
the middle position exposed to attack on two sides, 
like the Liberal Party in Britain after the First 
World War. 
It also expressed some optimism on the future of the PP, 
describing it as "a new force in our political life" which had 
forced the UP to use "all its strength and cunning" in fighting 
off the Progressive challenge. 39 
37 
38 
39 
Rand Daily Mail, 20 October 1961. 
Rand Daily Mail, 21 October 1961. 
The Natal Witness, 20 October 1961. 
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The Star was critical of claims that the UP was facing 
eclipse or extinction, but it conceded that the party had lost 
votes to both the NP and the Progressives. The UP was still the 
official opposition "and, indeed, the only alternative government 
for the foreseeable future unless South Africa is involved in 
calamity." The UP also represented the opinions of a substantial 
number of voters. The newspaper also cautioned the UP against 
adopting policies that were reactionary or excessively cautious, 
saying, " the United Party must realise that its strength, 
and its real claim to be the official Opposition, lies in its 
differences from, not its similarities to, Afrikaner Nationalism. 
. . . It cannot meet reactionary trends with yet more reaction." ' 0 
In Durban The Natal Mercury wrote : "White nationalism 
had answered black nationalism. That is the only intelligent 
explanation for the blind, frightening and, let it be said, 
impressive loyalty of Afrikaners to the rigid leadership of the 
Nationalist Party." 41 
The Eastern Province Herald commented in its editorial 
that there must have been considerable apathy among sections of 
the opposition electorate for the NP to have increased its 
majorities so considerably in so many seats. It also discussed 
the dismal performance of the NUP and cited the case of Port 
Elizabeth North where the Nationalist candidate had more than 
doubled his previous majority despite the presence of much 
unemployment in that constituency. In explaining the NP success 
it wrote, " there can be no gainsaying the fact that the 
racialistic slogans of the Nationalist Party continue to exert 
40 
41 
The Star, 20 October 1961. 
The Natal Mercury, 20 October 1961. 
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a powerful appeal, and that race tolerance and the new concept of 
partnership based on merit have as yet made insufficient headway 
among the rank and file of voters." 42 
The Sunday Times took a more pro-United Party line 
and pointed out that although it had lost two seats to the 
Nationalists, the UP had nevertheless polled 302 000 votes 
compared to the 370 000 by the NP. It had also recaptured all but 
one of the seats held by the Progressives. While it was "sad" that 
the UP had not fared better, the reason for this was that South 
Africa was fundamentally a right-wing country and that since 1948 
there had been a "steady, constant move to the right." It also 
claimed that the Progressives' achievement was "remarkable, 
perhaps one may even say historic", and complimented the 
Progressives on the way they presented their policies with 
"frankness and candour". What the White electorate had been asked 
to vote for was "the abdication of their political power as a 
separate group ... and the fact that 69 000 White voters endorsed 
this policy is, in our view, one of the most remarkable political 
events of recent years. 11 43 The Sunday Times gives an incorrect 
total for the number of UP votes. According to BM Schoeman the UP 
polled 285 242 votes in the general election. 44 
The Times of London wrote that the "hesitant former 
Smuts party supporters" who had crossed over to vote yes in the 
referendum of 1960 had stayed in Verwoerd's camp. Most of 
Verwoerd's newest supporters were former right-wing supporters 
of the UP who had decided "at last to go the whole hog". It 
42 
43 
44 
Eastern Province Herald, 21 October 1961. 
Sunday Times, 22 October 1961. 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, p 405. 
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thought that Nationalist thinking was summed up well by the 
utterances by Daan de Wet Nel, the Minister of Bantu 
Administration, to an audience of young Nationalists in 
Pretoria "Every son and daughter of South Africa must regard 
the result of the election as a mobilization order for the 
struggle that lies ahead. We will die, each and every one of us, 
rather than give up our nationhood." 45 
Thus, in general, the PP was very favourably commended 
by many of the major English-language newspapers. It would appear 
that there was also a certain disenchantment with the rather poor 
showing of the UP. The UP increased its percentage of the vote in 
only two constituencies - that of Humansdorp where the percentage 
increase was only very small and in Benoni where there had been a 
three-cornered contest in the 1958 general election between 
Labour, the UP and the NP, and where in 1961 there was only a 
contest between the PP and the UP. 
The success of the NP in the 1961 general election 
can be attributed to several factors, one being that the NP waged 
an aggressive campaign on a few issues that had a strong emotional 
appeal to the electorate. The NP had a very strong belief in the 
virtues of its policies and this naturally transmitted itself to 
the voters. The NP was also well organised and had a large number 
of very keen and experienced campaigners, canvassers and 
organisers. It was further assisted by the fact that it had to 
campaign in a smaller number of constituencies than normal. It 
also benefited from the euphoria engendered among its supporters 
by the successful referendum campaign of the previous year. 
45 The Times, 20 October 1961. 
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Furthermore, events in South Africa and the rest of Africa had 
helped to convince many voters that their chances of security and 
prosperity depended on supporting the NP. Even if the NP had 
rested on its laurels it would still have done well as there were 
various other factors in its favour - the opposition was very 
disunited, the delimitation of constituencies was very favourable 
to the NP, and the proportion of Afrikaans-speaking voters had 
increased since 1958. The granting of the franchise to the 
18-year-olds also benefited the NP very significantly. In short, 
there were so many factors that favoured the NP, it could hardly 
have done anything else other than win a convincing victory in 
the 1961 general election. 
Statistical Analysis of the election results. 
The purpose of this section is to examine certain 
interesting statistical trends in the 1961 general election. It 
also attempts to relate these trends to those that were apparent 
in previous general elections and those which emerged in 
subsequent elections. The analysis focuses specifically on the 
150 seats reserved for white voters in the House of Assembly in 
the Cape, Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State. 
Influence of 'loading' and 'unloading' of constituencies. 
It is well known in South African politics that 
the delimitation process often allocates fewer voters to rural 
constituencies than to urban ones. According to Heard, the 
delimitation commissioners were allowed to increase or decrease 
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the number of voters in a constituency by a maximum of fifteen 
percent of the quota. The quota was established by dividing the 
number of eligible voters in the province by the number of 
constituencies allocated to the relevant province. 46 This system 
has been vigorously criticised by those opposed to the NP, and 
has often been seen as an important factor in NP victories. 
Likewise it has been used as an excuse for the decline in the 
parliamentary strength of the opposition after the 1948 general 
election. Helen Suzman has this to say about the causes of General 
Smuts's defeat in 1948 : 47 
What 
a most important factor contributing to his 
defeat [ was that ] Smuts stubbornly refused to 
amend the law that loaded the urban seats ( where 
the United Party had most support ) with 
disproportionally more voters than the rural seats. 
must be determined is whether the loading and 
unloading of seats was really as crucial as has been claimed. 
The Eleventh Delimitation Commission based its 
calculations on the population statistics of 15 June 1957. It 
had the task of assigning the 1 493 973 white voters to 150 
constituencies. Under a system of equal constituencies, there 
would have been approximately 9 960 voters in each constituency 
i.e. 1 493 973 I 150 ) . In the 1958 general election, based on 
the decisions of this commission, the NP won 97 seats, to which 
the commission had allocated 928 572 voters. The NP would thus 
have been entitled to approximately 93 seats 
( 928 572 I 9 960 ) . 48 
46 
47 
48 
KA Heard, General elections in South Africa, p 8. 
H Suzman, In no uncertain terms, p 16. 
Figures extracted from the report of the Eleventh Delimitation 
Commission as at 15 June 1957, Government Gazette Extraordinary, 
vol CXCI, no 6006, 7 February 1958, pp 1 - 123. 
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There was no new delimitation before the 1961 general 
election. Therefore, in both the 1958 and 1961 elections, the 
boundaries of the constituencies remained the same. In the 1961 
general election the NP won 99 seats in the Union while the UP 
won 49, and the NUP and the PP one each. The delimitation 
commission had assigned 948 754 votes to the 99 seats won by the 
Nationalists and 523 626 voters to the 49 seats won by the UP. 
Under a system of equal values, the NP could therefore expect 
to win approximately 95 seats i.e. 948 754 I 9 960 ) and the 
UP would have won approximately 53 seats i.e. 523 626 I 9 960 ) . 
The NP would have been entitled to four fewer seats than the 99 
seats that it actually won. The UP, which won 49 seats, would 
have been entitled to four more seats. 
We can thus conclude that the loading and unloading of 
constituencies was not nearly as important in causing the 
decline of the UP's parliamentary strength as has been claimed. 
Influence of the phenomenon of 'wasted votes'. 
Votes cast for a successful candidate are 'wasted' if 
they are not needed in order to win the seat i.e. the number of 
wasted votes for a successful party is one vote less than the 
majority. If a candidate is unsuccessful then all the votes cast 
for his party in that constituency are wasted. For many years 
there had been a very noticeable tendency for the UP to win many 
of its seats with very large majorities while the NP tended to win 
many of its seats by much smaller margins. This contributed to the 
phenomenon in 1948 whereby the NP received more seats in 
parliament than the UP although the UP had polled more votes in 
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the country as a whole. This phenomenon was not a temporary one. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in the 1958 general election the UP had 
nearly as many supporters in the Union as did the NP, yet the NP 
received many more seats in parliament. This tendency can best be 
described in tabular form 
*********************************************************** 
* * 
* Table 2 : A comparison of the number of "wasted * 
* votes" won by the respective parties * 
* in the general elections between 1948 * 
* and 1961 49 * 
* * 
* 1948 1953 1958 1961 * 
* * 
* No. of wasted * 
* votes won by : * 
* * 
* NP 191 823 289 560 325 776 191 210 * 
* AP 12 687 * 
* UP 384 242 461 944 422 201 198 149 * 
* Lab. 19 281 28 452 2 670 * 
* NUP 44 465 * 
* 
pp 64 201 * 
* * 
* No. of uncontested * 
* seats won by : * 
* * 
* NP 1 2 47 * 
* AP * 
* UP 11 18 24 20 * 
* Lab. * 
* NUP * 
* 
pp 
* 
* * 
*********************************************************** 
Thus, it can be easily observed how the phenomenon of 
"wastage of votes" operated to the detriment of the UP and to the 
advantage of the NP over the years between 1948 and 1961. These 
statistics provide an illustration of how the peculiarities of 
South African demographics favoured the NP in the 1961 general 
49 Figures extracted from BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings 
in Suid-Afrika, pp 282 - 300, 316 - 333, 346 - 364, 388 - 404. 
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election. The NP's followers were spread much more evenly over 
South Africa than those of the UP and had a much greater effect on 
South African politics than is often realised. This was probably 
far more significant in the success of the NP than the loading of 
constituencies an issue which has received substantially more 
attention over the years. 
Relationship between voter turn-out and support 
for the United and the Progressive Parties. 
It is interesting that certain parties are favoured 
by a high percentage turn-out at an election while others are 
correspondingly disadvantaged. The contests between the PP and 
the UP in the 1961 general election give a clear illustration 
of this phenomenon. Only constituencies involved in contests 
between the PP and the UP were included in determining a 
correlation between the percentage turn-out of voters and the 
percentage of votes won by each party. Eighteen constituencies 
were straight clashes between the UP and the Progressives. In 
the 1961 general election the correlation coefficient for the 
relationship between the percentage voter turn-out and the 
percentage support for the Progressives was r = 0,6385 and for 
the UP it was r = - 0,5989. 50 
For interest's sake and the purposes of determining 
whether this was the start of a trend or merely just a temporary 
phenomenon, similar calculations were performed for the general 
elections of 1966, 1970 and 1974. Some very interesting results 
50 Figures extracted from BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings 
in Suid-Afrika, pp 388 - 404, 417 - 438, 452 - 473, 490 - 509. 
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were obtained and these are presented in tabular form. 
********************************************************** 
* * 
* Table 3 : Correlation coefficients between voter * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Year 
1961 
1966 
1970 
1974 
turn-out and percentage support for the 
UP and the PP in the general elections 
between 1961 and 1974. 51 
Only "straight" contests between the 
UP and PP were examined. ) 
pp 
0,6385 
0,6707 
0,7197 
0,8837 
UP 
- 0,5989 
- 0,6717 
- 0,7175 
- 0,8758 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
********************************************************** 
It can be seen that in straight contests between the 
UP and the PP, a high percentage turn-out of voters favoured the 
latter and were to the disadvantage of the UP. 
These results can be viewed in several ways. One 
interpretation is that in each constituency there were a number of 
disaffected UP supporters who despite this were also hesitant to 
vote for the PP. Such voters would tend to abstain from voting in 
general elections. Thus, it would have been in the best interests 
of the PP to try to ensure the greatest possible turn-out of 
voters in its contests with the UP. Another interpretation is 
that there were significant numbers of aggrieved UP supporters in 
the various constituencies who stayed away from the polls as a 
sign of protest against their own party. 
51 Figures extracted from BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings 
in Suid-Afrika, pp 388 - 404, 417 - 438, 452 - 473, 490 - 509. 
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Comparison of the results of the 1958 and 1961 general elections. 
There was no delimitation of constituencies between 
the general elections in 1958 and 1961, so it is a useful exercise 
to compare the results obtained by the NP and the UP in terms of 
the percentages of votes cast for each party in various 
constituencies. Even a superficial examination of these statistics 
shows that in the space of three years the NP improved its 
position in all but one of the seats that it contested. Notable 
examples were False Bay, Stellenbosch, Bellville, Roodepoort, 
Alberton, Pretoria Rissik and Pretoria Sunnyside. These are 
presented in the form of a table : 
************************************************************ 
* * 
* Table 4 : A comparison of the percentage support * 
* * 
* given to the NP in various constituencies * 
* * 
* in the 1958 and 1961 general elections. 52 * 
* * 
* 1958 1961 * 
* * 
* False Bay 53,7 63,7 * 
* Stellenbosch 61,6 70,1 * 
* Bellville 57,8 67,0 * 
* Roodepoort 59,0 69,5 * 
* Alberton 63,2 77,0 * 
* Bloemfontein East 60,3 68,8 * 
* * 
************************************************************ 
The NP obtained some remarkable successes in the Orange Free 
State where only five seats were contested. In none of these 
seats did the NP obtain less than 67,7 % of the votes cast. 
In 
52 
the constituencies of Mayfair, Westdene, Germiston and 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 346 -
364, 388 - 404. 
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Langlaagte, all of which were contested by the UP in 1958 but 
not in 1961, and in which the NP in 1961 was opposed by the 
Conservative Workers' Party, there was a considerable increase 
in the percentages of votes cast for the NP, but naturally it 
is difficult to make comparisons in these constituencies. 53 
The only constituency which showed a slight drop in 
support for the NP was, as has been mentioned elsewhere, that of 
Humansdorp, which was represented by Paul Sauer. In this 
constituency Sauer polled 65,7 % of the popular vote in 1958 
and 65,3 % in 1961. 54 
The improvement in Nationalist fortunes in some 
constituencies could arguably been because of population shifts. 
A striking example of this was that of Pretoria Sunnyside where 
there were many students living in various hostels. 55 In his weekly 
column in the Cape Argus "Backbencher" claimed that 3 600 
students of the Pretoria Normal College and 6 000 students at the 
University of Pretoria would become voters in the Sunnyside and 
Rissik constituencies after the eighteen-year olds had been 
enfranchised. In his opinion, this would greatly affect the 
position of the UP in Pretoria, where in the general election of 
April 1958, the NP had polled 57 529 votes and had won eight 
seats, while the UP had polled 36 480 votes but had won only 
two 
53 
54 
55 
56 
seats. 56 
BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 346 -
364, 388 - 404. 
Ibid., pp 352, 394. 
See Chapter 7, p 235. 
Cape Argus, 7 June 1958. 
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The growing impregnability of the National Party. 
The Nationalist Party Afrikaner Party alliance had 
won the 1948 general election very narrowly and its grip on power 
at that time depended largely on the political swings in a number 
of very marginal constituencies. This situation was, however, to 
change in the NP's favour. This situation is depicted very 
accurately in the following table : 
******************************************************** 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Table 5 : Distribution of the sizes of the 
majorities won by the National Party 
* in the various constituencies during 
* 
* various general elections between 
* 
* 1948 and 1961. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
( The figures for 1948 include those 
seats won by the Afrikaner Party. ) 57 
* 
* 
* 
* 40,0 - 44,9 % 
* 45,0 - 49,9 % 
* 50,0 - 54,9 % 
* 55,0 - 59,9 % 
* 60,0 - 64,9 % 
* 65,0 - 69,9 % 
* 70,0 - 74,9 % 
* 75,0 - 79,9 % 
* 80,0 - 84,9 % 
* 85,0 - 89,9 % 
* 90,0 - 94,9 % 
* 95,0 - 100,0 % 
* Uncontested 
* 
* Total 
* 
1948 
2 
21 
18 
17 
9 
11 
1 
79 
Number of Seats. 
1953 
1 
18 
25 
14 
17 
4 
6 
1 
2 
88 
1958 
7 
18 
27 
19 
14 
7 
5 
97 
1961 
1 
8 
13 
15 
8 
7 
47 
99 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
***********************************·********************* 
57 Figures extracted from BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings 
in Suid-Afrika, pp 282 - 300, 316 - 333, 346 - 364, 388 - 404. 
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It is interesting that the NP appeared to be somewhat 
vulnerable until the 1958 general election, after which its 
position seemed virtually impregnable. It grew from strength to 
strength in subsequent years and in the 1961 general election it 
polled more than seventy percent of the votes cast in fifteen 
constituencies and won 47 other constituencies in uncontested 
elections a total of 62 constituencies, 26 more than 
in 1958. 
Further evidence of the growing impregnability of the 
NP between 1948 and 1961 is provided by an examination of the 
percentage swings of support away from the NP that would have 
been necessary to unseat the NP after every general election. 
This is also best provided in the form of a table : 
********************************************************* 
* * 
* Table 6 : Percentage swings away from the NP * 
* * 
* that would have been required to unseat * 
* * 
* the party after every general election * 
* * 
* between 1948 and 1961. 58 * 
* * 
* * 
* 1948 1953 1958 1961 * 
* * 
* % swing 1,687 8,727 16,134 24,479 * 
* * 
********************************************************* 
Until the 1958 general election there was still a 
possibility that the NP could be unseated under certain 
circumstances. In circumstances such as a severe economic 
depression, a reinvigoration of the UP or a rupture in the ranks 
58 Figures extracted from BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings 
in Suid-Afrika, pp 282 - 300, 316 - 333, 346 - 364, 388 - 404. 
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of the ruling party, the NP might have lost a general election. 
After the 1958 general election, however, a very substantial swing 
of 16,134 % would have been necessary and after the 1961 general 
election the swing would have had to be 24,479 % i.e. nearly a 
quarter of the NP voters would have had to change their political 
allegiance. 
Political researchers Stultz and Butler use a very 
ingenious formula based on the results of the 1960 referendum, 
to calculate the percentage support enjoyed by the NP by 1961. 
They concluded that approximately 53,5 % of the white electorate 
would give its support to the NP in the 1961 general election. 59 
There seems to be no reason why the same formula 
should not be used to calculate the percentage support enjoyed by 
the NP in the 1958 general election. Using the formula, it can be 
calculated that approximately 49,084 % of the white voters would 
have supported the NP in 1958. Thus, the 1961 general election 
was a break-through for the NP : it was the first general election 
in which the party was supported by more than half the white 
electorate. 
59 KA Heard, General elections in South Africa 1943 - 1970, p 145. 
CHAPTER NINE. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1961 GENERAL ELECTION. 
In many respects the 1958 general election was much 
more significant for the NP than was the 1961 election. The reason 
for this assertion is that the 1958 general election had, 
as previously discussed, put the NP in an impregnable position, 
something that the two previous general elections had been unable to do. 
In the 1961 general election the NP did not make much 
in increasing its number of seats. It only regained Japie 
progress 
Basson's 
seat in South West Africa and won two additional seats from the 
UP but it did consolidate its position by improving its majorities in 
nearly all the seats that it contested. 
To the Nationalists it appeared 
vindicated 
Bantustans, 
the 
and 
government's policies on 
the decision to have 
that the electorate had 
racial segregation, 
a republic outside 
the 
the 
British Commonwealth. The results of the general election were 
also to be another point in the NP's upward curve on the graph of 
election successes since 1948 a curve that was only to show a 
temporary decline in the bitterly contested 1970 general election. 
This decline was partly the result of the acrimony and 
recriminations generated after the secession of Dr Albert Hertzog, 
Jaap Marais and their supporters in order to form the Herstigte 
Nasionale Party. What must also have been another cause of satisfaction 
for Verwoerd was that the election marked another personal triumph for 
him, and one that would improve his popularity and standing both in the 
NP and among Afrikanerdom as a whole. 
two general elections 
This was to be the first of the 
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in which he led the NP to the polls. As Henry Kenney has pointed out 
in his biography of Verwoerd, up to the time of the 
assassination attempt at the Rand Show in 1960 Verwoerd had 
not been particularly popular in his own party and there were many 
Nationalists who were suspicious or wary of him. Events such as 
the assassination attempt and Verwoerd's leadership of the country 
to a republic did much to improve his stature and in the same way 
the NP's triumph at the polls in October 1961 was also to improve his 
popularity and his position and to assuage the doubts which many 
Nationalists had about his leadership abilities. 1 
For the UP the 1961 general election was merely to be another of 
the many disappointments that had plagued the party since May 1948. 
Granted, it had regained all but one of the seats that it had lost after 
the defection of the Progressives in 1959 and furthermore it had lost 
only two seats to the Nationalists, but more importantly its support had 
decreased considerably in nearly all the constituencies that it had 
contested. It is clear that the NP was making steady inroads into the 
UP' s electoral base and the NP' s electoral pool was increasing 
dramatically as a result of the disparity in the birth-rates of the two 
white language groups and the fact that the NP had the advantage of 
thirteen years in power to propagate its policies. This was to be a 
portent for the 1966 general election in which the NP scored sweeping 
successes at the expense of the UP and even extended its influence into 
the heartland of Natal, which had so emphatically rejected the NP in 
many previous elections. 
The 1961 general election was also significant in 
1 H Kenney, Architect of apartheid, p 194. 
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that it dispelled the claims that the NP harboured many dissidents 
and disillusioned supporters who were on the verge of leaving the 
party. Such hopes as were held by the opposition parties were soon 
dashed. The poor performance of the National Union Party showed 
that although there may have been disenchanted sections here and 
there in the NP, they were not significant enough to influence 
South African politics in any meaningful way. It was another 
illustration of the deep party loyalty of the NP's supporters despite the 
misgivings that some of them might have had. 
For the Progressives, the 1961 general election was 
highly significant. It marked the beginning of a decline in their 
fortunes which continued until the early 1970s when their 
position began to improve to the point that they were able to win 
seven seats in the 1974 general election. Although the 
Progressives gave the appearance of being elated by their 
comparatively good showing in some constituencies, the reality was 
that only one of their candidates had been returned to parliament. 
Furthermore this was after the Progressives had had a full two years in 
which to propagate their views to the electorate. From now on their 
opportunities would be limited. Their influence, numerical strength and 
speaking time in parliament would be far less. In addition some of their 
most capable parliamentarians such as John Cope and Harry Lawrence would 
soon fade from active politics. The decade that followed the 1961 
general election was not at all propitious for the Progressives. Events 
such as the disturbances in many African countries, the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia, the disturbances in the various 
Portuguese colonies, the emergence of political terrorism and sabotage in 
South Africa, the growing isolation of South Africa 
Page 316 
in world affairs, and various other factors all contributed 
towards a beleaguered mentality that precluded all support for 
political parties that appeared even remotely liberal. It is 
therefore not surprising that the Progressives fared so badly in 
the 1966 general election when Helen Suzman became the only 
Progressive candidate returned to parliament. 
Although it should be remembered that a delimitiation 
of constituencies had taken place before the 1966 general election, 
we can observe the extent of the Progressive decline by examining certain 
constituencies. Whereas in Parktown, for example, the 
Progressives had lost by only 85 votes in 1961, in the 1966 
general election they lost by 2 949 votes. In the Houghton 
constituency Helen Suzman increased her share of the votes only 
marginally from 52,4 to 52,9 %. The extent of the electoral disaster for 
the Progressives can be gauged by the fact that in the 1966 election it 
would have lost its deposit by virtue of polling less than one-fifth of 
the votes of the winning party in the constituencies of Bezuidenhout, 
Brentwood, Durban North, Durban Central, East London North, 
Rosettenville, Stellenbosch, Virginia, Walmer, Waterkloof, Welkom, and 
Zululand. It was only in the constituencies of Hillbrow, Houghton, Sea 
Point, Parktown, and Johannesburg North that the Progressives gained more 
than 25 % of the votes cast. In only Houghton and Parktown did 
the PP obtain more than thirty percent of the votes. 2 
In short it can be claimed with some justification that the 1961 
general election was significant. It extinguished 
2 BM Schoeman, Parlementere verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, pp 417 - 438. 
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much of any tendency to liberalism and re-established the UP as 
the influential opposition party. It most probably quelled any 
moves towards a more liberal spirit in both the NP and the UP and 
underlines the strength of the NP's grassroots support. It 
confirmed again that the road to electoral success for the NP 
lay in catering for the rising tide of conservatism among the white South 
African electorate. It provided a shattering blow to the Progressive 
Party from which it took years to recover. It also effectively ended the 
careers of some distinguished parliamentarians such as Harry Lawrence, 
and last but not least, it enhanced the prestige of Verwoerd both in his 
private capacity and in his capacity as leader of the NP. It was for 
Verwoerd one of the milestones - albeit not one of the major milestones -
on his path towards achieving great popularity among his supporters. 
Furthermore the result of the election was evidently an endorsement by 
the electorate of Verwoerd' s decision to make South Africa a republic 
outside the British Commonwealth. 
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